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Preface
Being a Ph.D. student has had a profound impact on my life, an impact that
can hardly be overstated. It allowed me to learn more about economics, public
finance, policy making, and political philosophy than I did in the preceding twenty
three years combined. It provided me with a framework to analyze issues of an
economic or moral nature, enabling me to think and form judgments critically and
independently. In short, it allowed me to grow up intellectually. I am fully aware
of how privileged I am for having been granted such opportunity, and am grateful
beyond words to those who enabled it.
First and foremost, I owe a large debt of gratitude to Bas Jacobs, my supervisor.
The way in which he welcomed me as part of his intellectual family has truly been
heartwarming. Indeed, the term ‘family’ is hardly an exaggeration. His devotion
to my academic development has been of an intensity and a selflessness commonly
only observed among families. He invested his time and effort not just in improving
my thesis, but in fostering a personal relationship that made collaboration with
him a real pleasure. He had faith in me during times in which I had very little left
of it myself, and whenever I was convinced a ceiling had been reached, he always
managed to stimulate me to carry my work to a higher level. I could not have
wished for a better or more involved supervisor.
I am happy to have had Ruud de Mooij as a second supervisor during the first
year of my Ph.D., before he left for the IMF. I look back with fond memories to
many coffees, lunches, and dinners I shared with him and Bas, and it is always a
great pleasure to see Ruud at any of the international conferences or in Washington,
D.C.
Ever since my first international conference, the 2010 meeting of the Canadian
Public Economics Group in Quebec City, Robin Boadway has been, for me, the
personification of the international community of public economists that greatly
enhanced my experience as a Ph.D. student. I am therefore very excited and
thankful that he agreed to be a member of my doctoral committee. I also very
much appreciate the fact that Robert Dur, Rick van der Ploeg, Otto Swank, and
Coen Teulings are willing to invest their scarce time in reading my dissertation
and being members of my committee.
Four years would have been a long time to survive without income. I therefore
thank The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, which provided the
financial support for my Ph.D. project under NWO Vidi Grant 452-07-013. I’m
grateful to the support staffs of the Tinbergen Institute and the Economics depart-
ment at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, that made sure my Ph.D. project ran
smoothly despite my own disorganized mind. Without diminishing the gratitude I
owe to the rest, I especially want to mention Carolien Stolting (TI) and Milky Vi-
ola Gonzalez (EUR) for their help with getting my thesis published and defended,
and Judith van Kronenberg (TI), whose unfailing cheerfulness is instrumental in
making the Tinbergen Institute such a great place to work.
I consider myself extremely lucky for having had Floris Zoutman and Hendrik
Vrijburg around me at the Erasmus University. While I knew Floris from my
time as a Master student in Groningen, we had not been in touch for a year until
happy coincidence brought us back together as office mates. It was thrilling to
see how little effect time had had on the fervor, the excitement, the depth of our
discussions. Floris is also the direct cause of my biggest disappointment during my
period as a Ph.D. student: I vowed to use our four years as office mates to teach
him an appreciation of Bob Dylan, at which I miserably failed. Neither did we
succeed in building that fort of empty coffee boxes, despite a no less than heroic
attempt. On the upside, together we did manage to solve any problem we set our
mind to, as long as there was a white board around.
Being two years ahead, Hendrik has always been an important example to me. I
greatly admire how he manages to soberly maintain his extraordinary involvement
in everything he does, whether it concerns his research or teaching, his family
including two young sons, or our common quest of discovering the most shady bar
around any of the conference venues we visit. I have grown especially attached
to our many coffees and lunches together, which never fail to provide either new
insights or higher-order confusion regarding whatever topic that happens to be
on the table. If the position of benevolent dictator ever becomes vacant, I would
happily recommend both Floris and Hendrik.
During the final months of my Ph.D., Uwe Thuemmel and Alexandra Rusu
joined the Erasmus University as the latest scions of tree Jacobs. I would like to
wish them both all the best in their academic career. I am looking forward to
seeing them more often in the years to come.
I am grateful to Jacques Siegers, of whom I was a research assistant during my
time as a Bachelor student in Utrecht. I still fret at the idea of what I would have
done without his encouragement when I faced a temporary spell of severe disil-
lusionment with economics. Jacques frequently mentioned that the chief purpose
of granting me a research assistantship was to stimulate my interest in economics
and academic scholarship. I hope he agrees that this purpose has been served well.
My dissertation is dedicated to my parents who, from my earliest memories on,
have stimulated my pursuit of knowledge. It was they, who taught me to read and
write long before school would. It was they, who tirelessly tutored me whenever I
had difficulties with a subject at school. It was they, who stimulated me to read,
and read, and read. And, most importantly, it was they, who instilled in me an
appreciation and respect for knowledge, the good, and the beautiful. I am also
thankful to my brothers, Willem, Dirk and Tom, who helped me drown any of the
superfluous brain cells that my parents provided me with.
My dear Bahar. More than anyone else, you know the highs and the lows I
experienced for my Ph.D. What is more, you were always there to sit them through
with me. When things went well, you shared in my excitement. When I felt dis-
couraged, you would lift my spirits. I hope you know how grateful I am for your
support – it is essential to everything I do.
Aart Gerritsen
Mu¨nchen, Winter 2013/2014

‘It came into him life; it went out from him truth. It came to him short-lived
actions; it went out from him immortal thoughts. It came to him business; it went
from him poetry. It was dead fact; now, it is quick thought. It can stand, and
it can go. It now endures, it now flies, it now inspires. Precisely in proportion
to the depth of mind from which it issued, so high does it soar, so long does it sing.’
Ralph Waldo Emerson
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Chapter 1
Introduction and summary
One might wonder why anyone is interested in what government ought to do, when
‘is’ is often so obviously far removed from ‘ought.’ In fact, I have been pondering
that question myself throughout the course of the past four years. While this
is not the place for a fully developed discussion of the matter, I believe John
Maynard Keynes provided the key to an answer when closing The General Theory
Of Employment, Interest, And Money with the words: ‘soon or late, it is ideas,
not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.’ Ideas are a necessary
input to the legislation of government policy, and the public economist is primarily
responsible for the supply and quality of these ideas. In this spirit, my Dissertation
can be seen as a collection of ideas on optimal government policy, which I hope
will, soon or late, find their way to policy circles and be dangerous for good. In
this opening chapter, I aim to introduce these ideas to the reader in two separate
parts. In the first part, I describe how my Dissertation fits within the body of
ideas that makes up the orthodoxy of public economics. I do this by introducing
a number of key concepts of public economics, paying special attention to how my
Dissertation agrees with, or departs from, the orthodoxy. The second part of this
introduction is devoted to a chapter-by-chapter summary of the most important
ideas generated in my Dissertation.
Relation to the orthodoxy of public economics
Public economics
As its title suggests, my Dissertation is meant to contribute to the discussion of
what government policy ought to be. This discussion is a central issue within the
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academic discipline of public economics. Public economics is generally considered
to be a subdiscipline of economics, and is taught as such at universities. The central
questions underpinning public economics, however, are radically different from the
central question of economics. Whereas economics tries to explain human behavior,
public economics is concerned with the determination of what government should
do. The enormous ambition of this goal is apparent from its multidisciplinary
nature. In order to establish what optimal government policy is, one first needs, as
a bare minimum, determine what goals a government ought to strive for, what the
behavioral responses to government policies are, and how these policies and their
behavioral responses affect individuals’ well-being. In other words, in determining
optimal government policy, the public economist is inescapably conditioned by
insights from political philosophy, economics, and the psychology of well-being.
Below I briefly sketch which of these insights make up the orthodoxy of public
economics, and how my Dissertation relates to them.
Political philosophy or what government ought to strive for
To determine what constitutes optimal government policy, it is necessary to know
what government ought to strive for. This question plays a prominent role within
political philosophy, and numerous theories have been offered to answer it. There
are theories that argue government policy ought to be focused on so-called ‘pri-
mary goods’ (cf. Rawls, 1971), ‘capabilities’ (cf. Sen, 1992), minimal intervention
(cf. Nozick, 1974), or on minimizing inequalities that originate from a limited num-
ber of factors for which individuals cannot be held responsible (Dworkin, 2000). By
far the most influential theory, at least within public economics, is known as ‘wel-
farism’ (cf. Kaplow and Shavell, 2002). Welfarism argues that the ultimate goal
of government policy ought to be the maximization of some sum of individuals’
well-being.1
While welfarism is not wholly uncontroversial, as evident from the large num-
ber of competing theories of the ‘right’ goal of government policy, a number of
important arguments are made in its favor. It could be argued that welfarism
describes the goal for government policy that would be chosen by someone be-
hind the so-called ‘veil of ignorance’ – a hypothetical prenatal state in which he
is wholly ignorant about the particular life he would lead. Contrary to the other
1Welfarism does not necessarily imply that the goal of government should be an unweighted
sum of individuals’ well-being. Instead, it allows for worse-off individuals to have a larger weight
than others and is therefore slightly more general than classical utilitarianism (Bentham, 1907;
Mill, 1863; Sidgwick, 1874).
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theories I mentioned, it can also be shown never to lead to a form of rule fetishism
by favoring a state of the world in which every person is worse off just because it
complies with the theory’s prescribed goal. For these and other reasons I adopt
welfarism as a normative guide to government policy in my Dissertation: I assume
that optimal government policy maximizes a sum of individual well-being.2
Economics or the behavioral effects of government policy
An answer to the question what government ought to strive for is still far removed
from an answer to the question what optimal government policy is. We first
need to understand how government policy instruments can contribute to the
goal of higher individual well-being. The behavioral effects of government policy
are of crucial importance to this understanding. Suppose redistribution from the
employed to the unemployed could be considered as raising aggregate well-being.
In itself this does not imply anything for the desirability of higher unemployment
benefits. While on the one hand such benefits would enhance aggregate well-
being due to the redistribution, on the other hand it distorts the incentives of
the unemployed to search for a new job. Such distortion leads to lower labor
supply and hence lower tax revenue. Because of such behavioral effect, for every
euro a government taxes away from the employed it can redistribute less than a
euro towards the unemployed. Such a trade-off characterizes virtually every policy
instrument. A minimum wage, for example, redistributes income from firms to
employees. Although in itself this might be considered as improving aggregate
well-being, it also leads to a behavioral response of firms, which will decide to hire
less low-skilled labor in order to maintain profit margins.
Economics is particularly well suited to identify and quantify these trade-offs.
After all, economics is concerned with the explanation and prediction of human
behavior. Economists make extensive use of models for the identification of poli-
cies’ behavioral consequences. Such models are highly stylized representations of
reality, stripped of any non-essential elements. This approach is often criticized
by non-economists, for both good and bad reasons. On the one hand, a high level
of abstraction is essential to be able to say anything sensible about an extremely
2This is not to say that there are no problematic issues with welfarism. One of the most
important concerns about welfarism is that it could be used as a justification of phenomena like
racism as long as enough people derive well-being from it. This is not an issue in my Dissertation,
as I assume that an individual’s well-being is independent from other people. Indeed, I believe
government policy ought to be concerned with so-called ‘laundered’ well-being – that part of an
individual’s well-being that is independent from others (cf. Harsanyi, 1982).
3
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complex reality. On the other hand, an economist should always be able to defend
his decisions to abstract from specific aspects of reality. One important abstrac-
tion, which is not always easy to defend but is nevertheless part of the orthodoxy of
public economics, is the assumption that prices and wages are fully flexible. Under
this assumption, prices and wages always adjust to equalize demand and supply
– implying that involuntary unemployment cannot exist. In much of my Disser-
tation, I take issue with this assumption and determine how optimal government
policy is affected by rejecting the notion of flexible wages.
Psychology of well-being
Finally, even when we accept welfarism and when economic science perfectly in-
forms us about the exact behavioral effects of government policy, we still do not
know what optimal government policy is. This requires insight into how policy,
and its behavioral consequences, affect the well-being of people. The explanation
of mental processes, such as well-being, is part of the academic discipline of psy-
chology. The consistent application of welfarism thus demands solid knowledge of
the psychology of well-being. An elegant trick to escape this responsibility, a trick
that is routinely performed by the orthodoxy of public economics, is to assume
that people always act to maximize their own well-being. Under this assumption
no person ever behaves against his own interest, such that there is no need for gov-
ernment policy to ‘correct’ individual behavior. Moreover, this assumption allows
economists to identify the well-being effects of government policy on the basis of
observed behavior alone, without a need for any knowledge of mental processes.
The Dissertation
In my Dissertation, I explicitly challenge a number of assumptions that are deeply
rooted in the orthodoxy of public economics. First of all, I reject the notion that
human behavior is always and everywhere a matter of well-being maximization.
This rejection is based on insights from psychology, behavioral economics, and
neuroscience. Apart from these insights, introspection reveals that much of human
behavior is motivated by factors that have little to do with the maximization of
well-being. When behavior is not necessarily based on well-being maximization, it
is possible that an individual is outside his well-being optimum. This creates a new
role for government policy, namely to ‘correct’ individual behavior. In Chapter 2
of the Dissertation, I derive the consequences for optimal income taxation.
4
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the minimum wage as a policy instrument. An im-
portant difference with earlier literature is that I explicitly model the educational
decisions of individuals, a decision from which most other studies abstract. The
effect of a minimum wage on this decision is ambiguous: a higher wage rate for
low-skilled workers creates incentives to invest less in education, but higher un-
employment among the low-skilled creates incentives to invest more in education.
In Chapter 3, I analyze how the effect of a minimum wage on educational choice
affects the desirability of a minimum wage, relative to income taxation.
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on minimum wages by rejecting an-
other often-made assumption. This assumption concerns the distribution among
low-skilled workers of the involuntary unemployment caused by a minimum wage.
Earlier literature commonly assumes that laid-off workers are the ones that derive
least well-being from their job (so-called ‘efficient rationing’), or, as in Chapter 3,
that every low-skilled worker has an equal chance of becoming involuntarily un-
employed (so-called ‘uniform rationing’). However, there is hardly any theoretical
or empirical justification for any of such assumptions. In Chapter 4, I do not im-
pose any assumption on the distribution of unemployment, but analyze how the
desirability of a minimum wage depends on this distribution. Moreover, I show
how this desirability can be empirically tested without making assumptions on the
distribution of unemployment.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I analyze the consequences of inflexible wages for opti-
mal income taxation and labor-participation policies. Just as in the previous two
chapters, I deviate from the orthodox assumption that wages perfectly adjust to
equate demand and supply. The analysis of this chapter is particularly relevant,
for example, for labor markets that are dominated by labor unions, whose wage
demands are not aimed at equating demand and supply. Another situation in
which the results of this chapter carries special relevance, is during times of eco-
nomic recession. It is abundantly clear that involuntary unemployment tends to
be extraordinarily high during recessions, which implies that during such times the
typical assumption of flexible wages potentially disqualifies much of the insights
generated by the orthodoxy of public economics.
5
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Findings on optimal government policy
Optimal taxation and well-being (Chapter 2)
In Chapter 2 of my Dissertation I reject the commonly made assumption that indi-
viduals, when making decisions, always maximize their well-being. As is common
in most of the economic literature, I do assume that individual behavior can be
described as a maximization of utility. However, I reject the notion that utility is
identical to well-being – that which ultimately makes life valuable. This implies
that individuals can make ‘mistakes’ in their own behavior by acting against their
own interest.
I subsequently determine how this affects the structure of optimal income tax-
ation. Taxes can only be optimal if the net social gains of a small increase in
the tax rate are nil. After all, if the net social gains would be strictly positive
(negative), it would be socially beneficial to raise (lower) the tax rate. The social
gains of taxation consist of what the revenues are used for: investments in public
goods, for example, or redistribution towards low-income workers. The social costs
consist of a lower income of the taxpayer, and a distortion of individual behavior.
This distortion of individual behavior is crucial for my research. A small in-
crease of the income tax rate causes workers to work less. This reduction in labor
supply leads to lower tax revenues, which constitutes a social cost. When individ-
uals maximize their well-being, such a reduction of labor supply does not lead to
changes in individual well-being. The reason for this is that individual well-being
maximization implies that a small change in behavior does not affect well-being.
This changes when I reject the assumption of individual well-being maximization.
In that case, a reduction of labor supply also has a direct effect on the well-being
of the individual. It leads to higher well-being if workers originally worked harder
than good for them; it leads to lower well-being if workers were originally working
less than good for them.
This creates an additional motive for the use of distortionary taxation. The
income of workers that work ‘too much’ should be subject to a higher marginal
tax rate to incentivize them to work less. Similarly, the income of workers that
work ‘too little’ should be subject to a lower marginal tax rate to incentivize
them to work harder. The same logic applies to taxes and subsidies on education
or specific consumption goods. When people generally decide to invest less in
education than what well-being maximization would prescribe, education subsidies
should be higher compared to the benchmark case in which individuals maximize
6
well-being.
Whether people indeed work ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ is an empirical matter.
So in order to provide an answer to this question I require a measure of well-being.
In my research I use the answer, on a scale from 1 to 7, to the question: “How
dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?”. Thanks to the British
Household Panel Survey, I know the answer to this question for about 28,000
British individuals, followed over 12 years. On top of that, I know a great many
other details of these individuals, including net income and the usual number of
weekly working hours. On the basis of these data I determine how well-being
depends on both net income and working hours, which allows me to determine the
optimal number of working hours for every individual. Comparing this optimal
number of hours to the actually worked hours, I conclude whether an individual
works too much or too little.
The results of this empirical exercise lead me to the conclusion that British
workers with a relatively low income work, on average, too little. They could en-
hance their own well-being by making more working hours each week. For workers
with a relatively high income the opposite holds: they make too many hours each
week, harming their own well-being. The policy implication of these results is
that the British government should implement a lower marginal income tax for
low-income workers, and a higher marginal income tax for high-income workers.
Such a reform provides incentives to workers with a low income to make more
hours, and to workers with a high income to make less hours, thereby correcting
the well-being-suboptimal behavior of British workers.
Optimal minimum wages and education (Chapter 3)
Chapter 3 deals with the welfare effects of minimum-wage legislation. It deviates
from most of the literature on minimum wages by explicitly modeling individuals’
educational decisions. This innovation is motivated by the fact that the effect of a
minimum wage on schooling is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, a minimum
wage raises the wages of low-skilled workers, thereby providing an incentive to
invest less in education. On the other hand, a minimum wage leads to higher
unemployment among the low-skilled as they becomes more expensive to hire.
Such higher unemployment provides an incentive to invest more in education.
We3 first show that the net effect of a minimum wage on education depends
crucially on the ease with which firms can substitute high-skilled for low-skilled
3This chapter is joint work with Bas Jacobs.
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labor. The easier this is, the more a firm will substitute high-skilled for low-skilled
workers when the latter become more costly due to a minimum wage. The elasticity
of substitution between high- and low-skilled workers – the percentage change in
the number of high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers, as a response
to a one-percent change in the high-skilled wage rate relative to the low-skilled
wage rate – appears to be of crucial importance. If this elasticity is smaller than
1, a minimum wage leads to relatively little unemployment and therefore to less
schooling. If this elasticity is larger than 1, a minimum wage leads to so much
unemployment among the low-skilled that more people decide to become high-
skilled worker, despite the increase in low-skilled wages. Since empirical estimates
of this elasticity are generally larger than 1, my model indicates it is plausible that
a minimum wage increase leads to more education.
Subsequently, we determine how the schooling decision affects the desirabil-
ity of a minimum wage. We concentrate on the case of perfect competition on
the labor market. Earlier studies showed that a minimum wage might improve
economic efficiency in a labor market that is characterized by monopsony power.
Our findings are conditional on the assumption that there is no monopsony power.
In other words, we focus on the possible redistributive role of a minimum wage,
rather than its role of correcting imperfect competition.
Abstracting from taxation, a binding minimum wage has two separate effects
on social welfare. On the one hand it leads to higher wages for low-skilled workers,
which firms pay for by offering lower wages to the high-skilled. This constitutes a
positive welfare effect under the plausible assumption that an increase in low-skilled
income is valued more dan a similar increase in high-skilled income. On the other
hand, firms will be less inclined to hire low-skilled workers because of the higher
wage costs. This leads to increased unemployment, which constitutes a negative
effect on social welfare as the involuntary unemployed would rather have a job.
The desirability of a minimum wage is therefore ambiguous and depends on the net
welfare effect of increased redistribution and higher involuntary unemployment.
The social costs of a minimum wage increase once we introduce income taxa-
tion. While the social benefits still consist of the same redistributive gain, the costs
of unemployment increase as higher unemployment now also leads to a loss of tax
revenue. However, a minimum wage can still complement redistribution through
income taxation as long as taxes cannot be perfectly conditioned on the wage rate
or skill level. The reason for this is that a minimum wage directly increases the
net wage of low-skilled workers and decrease the net wage of high-skilled workers.
8
Only if government is able to do condition taxes on skill level, it can mimic the
redistributive gains of a minimum wage by lowering the tax rate for low-skilled
workers, and raising the tax rate for high-skilled workers. In comparison to such
a tax reform, a minimum wage still leads to increased low-skilled labor costs and
thereby to higher unemployment, while this unemployment leads to higher ed-
ucation. The role of the minimum wage, in such case, does not consist of the
redistribution of income, but of counteracting distortions on education, caused by
a progressive tax structure. A minimum wage is then desirable if the social benefits
of higher eduction are larger than the social costs of higher unemployment.
Optimal minimum wages and the distribution of unemployment (Chap-
ter 4)
Chapter 4 builds on the results of the previous chapter, in which we concluded
that a binding minimum wage is desirable if the social benefits of additional school-
ing outweigh the social costs of higher unemployment. In Chapter 4, we4 show
that this conclusion is generally valid under very weak assumptions. For example,
we assume very general utility functions and allow individuals to decide not only
on their working hours and educational decisions, but also on whether they are
labor-market participants or voluntarily unemployed. Most importantly we relax
assumption concerning the so-called rationing schedule. This schedule is a theoret-
ical concept which describes how involuntary unemployment is distributed among
the low-skilled. Earlier literature often assumes that rationing is efficient, in the
sense that unemployment only affects those workers who derive least well-being
from working as a low-skilled worker. Chapter 3, on the other hand, assumes that
every low-skilled person faces the same probability of becoming unemployed. In
Chapter 4, we abstain from such specific assumptions, and determine the desir-
ability of a minimum wage under a general rationing schedule. In our view, this is
an important step because there is hardly any theoretical or empirical foundation
for any one specific schedule, while this rationing schedule does appear to be a
crucial factor underlying the welfare effects of a minimum wage.
To determine whether a minimum wage is desirable in such a setup, we de-
termine the consequences of a so-called net-income-neutral (NIN) minimum-wage
increase. As part of this reform, government raises the minimum wage, while ad-
justing income tax rates such as to leave the net income of workers constant. The
welfare consequences of such a NIN minimum-wage increase give a clear picture of
4This chapter is also joint work with Bas Jacobs.
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the difference between redistribution through a minimum wage and redistribution
through income taxation. As the net wages of workers remain constant, the NIN
reform does not affect people’s incentives to provide labor effort. Furthermore, as
the rewards from working remains constant, the reform does not affect the labor-
participation decision. It does, however, raise the costs for firms to hire low-skilled
employees, thereby leading to lower demand for low-skilled labor. As low-skilled
labor supply remains constant, while demand drops, involuntary unemployment
rises. Higher unemployment, however, implies a lower expected gain from low-
skilled work, providing incentives to invest more in education. The reform thus
leads to both more involuntary unemployment and more high-skilled workers.
The reason why the rationing schedule is so crucial for the welfare effects of
a minimum wage is now easy to understand. On the one hand, if much of the
unemployment is concentrated among the low-skilled who are rather unemployed
than high-skilled, a minimum wage mainly results in higher unemployment with-
out affecting education. However, if unemployment is mainly concentrated among
the low-skilled who are relatively indifferent between high- and low-skilled work, a
minimum wage has a large positive impact on education. In the chapter we prove
that a minimum wage can always be ‘made’ optimal by adopting the appropriate
rationing schedule. In the same vein, a minimum wage can always be made unde-
sirable. For this reason, the desirability of a minimum wage is, from a theoretical
point of view, fundamentally ambiguous.
In order to escape this fundamental ambiguity, we rewrite the desirability con-
dition of a minimum wage in terms of so-called sufficient statistics. These are
statistics which are measurable empirically and allow us to forego the empirical
identification of deeper model parameters such as the rationing schedule. We show
that the desirability condition can be expressed in three sufficient statistics: the
tax revenue associated with an additional high-skilled worker, the tax revenue
losses associated with an additional unemployed person, and an elasticity which
indicates how the number of high-skilled workers responds to an increase in unem-
ployment.5 We obtain data on the tax revenue gains and losses from schooling and
unemployment from publications by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) for a large number of OECD countries. On the basis
of these numbers we conclude that, for all OECD countries under consideration
except the United States, a NIN increase in the minimum wage is only desirable
5Notice that we implicitly assume that direct utility losses from unemployment are negligible.
Hereby we write the desirability condition in a way that is highly favorable for a minimum wage.
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if a percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a higher school
enrollment rate of at least 0.6 percentage point. For the United States, enrollment
rates should increase by at least 0.4 percentage point.6
Turning to the empirical literature on the effect of unemployment on school
enrollment rates, we find that a percentage point increase of the unemployment
rate is typically associated with an increase of enrollment rates of between 0.1
and 0.6 percentage points. Thus, from these findings we can conclude that a
NIN minimum wage decrease is desirable for all countries under consideration –
except possibly the United States. Such a reform leads to both more tax revenue
and utility gains of individuals who manage to obtain a job due to the lower
wage costs. A reduction of the minimum wage is thus part of a so-called Pareto-
improving policy reform, leading some individuals to be better off and no one to
be worse off. For countries who do not have a legally binding minimum wage –
such as Germany, Austria, Italy, or the Nordic countries – implementing one is not
desirable.
Optimal taxation and unemployment (Chapter 5)
In the last chapter of my Dissertation I consider the consequences of involuntary
unemployment for optimal taxation. As in the previous chapter, I assume that it is
a priori unknown how unemployment is distributed among the labor force. I show
that the presence of involuntary unemployment leads to conclusions on taxation
that are diametrically opposed to conventional wisdoms from public economics,
in which unemployment is often assumed away. One of those wisdoms holds that
increased taxation on the one hand enables a higher degree of redistribution, but
on the other hand distorts labor supply. After all, higher taxation leads to lower
net wages and thus a reduced incentive to work. Lower labor supply causes tax
revenue to decline, which constitutes the welfare loss associated with the distortion.
Optimal taxation therefore needs to balance this trade-off: the redistributive value
of increased tax revenues versus the efficiency costs of lower labor supply.
Involuntary unemployment, however, implies that the supply of labor exceeds
the demand for labor. If, on top of that, there is inefficient rationing, then some of
the unemployed would derive more well-being from a job than some of the workers
who managed to obtain a job. In that case, higher tax rates still lead to reduced
incentives to supply work, causing some workers to work less or not at all. But
6See column 5 in Table 1 of Chapter 4 for specific values for all OECD countries for which
enough data was available.
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since the supply of labor already exceeded the demand of labor, this does not
affect aggregate employment. A reduction in the labor supply of some workers
leads to employment opportunities for those who were initially unemployed. Since
aggregate employment is unaffected, there is no efficiency loss from a decline in
tax revenue. On the contrary: efficiency improves as people who derive relatively
little well-being from their job decide to work less, thereby creating employment for
the unemployed that derive more well-being from working. Similar results apply
to unemployment benefits. In the absence of involuntary unemployment, higher
benefits lead to less labor supply and thereby to an efficiency loss. However, in
the presence of involuntary unemployment, higher benefits lead workers to create
jobs for the unemployed who derive more well-being from it. In other words,
by raising taxes and benefits government substitutes voluntary unemployment for
involuntary unemployment, generating an efficiency gain.
Contrary to the conventional equity-efficiency trade-off, taxes and benefits thus
lead to both improved equity and improved efficiency. The policy implications are
straightforward: raise income taxes for labor-market segments that are character-
ized by high involuntary unemployment, and use the additional revenue to increase
unemployment benefits. From a dynamic perspective, government should raise in-
come taxes and unemployment benefits in times of high-unemployment recessions,
and lower them in more prosperous economic times. These conclusions also bear
implications for government policy that is aimed at increasing labor-market par-
ticipation. If the labor market is characterized by involuntary unemployment, it
does not make sense to increase participation. Such policy would only lead people
who are just as well off sitting at home, to enter the labor market and compete
for jobs with people who do really want a job.
Furthermore, I show to what extent these policy implications are robust to
allowing for endogenous educational decisions. The results are comparable to the
previous chapter: if unemployment is concentrated among low-skilled workers who
are indifferent between being low- or high-skilled, it could in principle be socially
beneficial by promoting education. In that case, government might not want to
entirely substitute voluntary for involuntary unemployment. I also show that the
same policy implications obtain when the low-skilled wage rate is endogenously
set by labor unions. If government commits to raising taxes when unemployment
rises, labor unions will moderate their wage claims as they anticipate higher taxes
in response to higher wages. As a consequence, such a commitment will lead to
lower involuntary unemployment. Finally, I show that conventional wisdom on
12
the incidence of taxation no longer holds in the presence of involuntary unem-
ployment. According to this wisdom it is economically irrelevant whether labor
income taxation is collected from employees or employers. In both cases the tax
would lead to the same decrease in workers’ net wages and increase in firms’ labor
costs. I show that this conventional wisdom is based on the assumption of flexible
wages, an assumption that can hardly account for involuntary unemployment. In
the presence of involuntary unemployment, higher employee taxes lead to both
equity and efficiency gains (as described above), but higher employer taxes lead to
even less labor demand and higher unemployment, and therefore to an efficiency
loss.
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Chapter 2
Optimal taxation when people do
not maximize well-being
‘Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every
writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of util-
ity, meant by it ... pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain.’
John Stuart Mill in Mill (1863, p.8)
‘The discrediting of utility as a psychological concept robbed it of its
only possible virtue as an explanation of human behaviour in other
than a circular sense, revealing its emptiness as even a construction.’
Paul A. Samuelson in Samuelson (1938, p.61)
‘In the standard approach, the terms “utility maximization” and “choice”
are synonymous. A utility function is always an ordinal index that de-
scribes how the individual ranks various outcomes and how he behaves
(chooses) given his constraints (available options).’
Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer in Gul and Pesendorfer (2008,
p.7)
2.1 Introduction
Historically, the concept of ‘utility’ has been defined in at least two different ways.1
The classical definition, implicit in the first quotation by John Stuart Mill, is inti-
mately related to the well-being of its subject: utility is seen as the ultimate ‘good’
1This chapter is based on Gerritsen (2013b).
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and, therefore, the natural aim of consequentialist public policy. The second def-
inition, which is dominant in the field of economics since at least the seminal
contribution on revealed preference theory by Paul A. Samuelson, and implicit
in the second and third quotations, is directly related to individual behavior.2
In economics, utility is simply defined as that of which the maximization leads
to behavior, i.e., it is a rationalization of behavior. Normative economics and,
more specifically, public economics and the literature on optimal taxation usually
implicitly insist that the two definitions perfectly overlap. That is, individual be-
havior follows from utility maximization, and this same measure of utility is taken
to be the ultimate ‘good,’ the aim of optimal policy. The implicit assumptions
are generally (1) that individuals behave in a way that is consistent with their
own well-being, and (2) that individuals’ well-being ought to be the goal of public
policy.
These assumptions are by no means uncontroversial, but criticism of either
of the two assumptions follow from very different lines of reasoning. The latter
assumption is a judgment based purely on moral and political philosophy, and is
therefore a metaphysical judgment which I do not concern myself with in my Dis-
sertation.3 The former assumption, that behavior is consistent with maximizing
well-being, is a judgment which can, in principle, be assessed empirically. Indeed,
increasingly many studies reject the claim that voluntary choice is always and ev-
erywhere conducive to well-being. This rejection is based on a variety of insights
from the fruitful interactions between economics and neuroscience (e.g., Camerer,
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005), psychology (e.g., Rabin, 1998), and happiness re-
search (e.g., Clark, Frijters and Shields, 2008), as well as on straightforward intro-
spection. Moreover, the divergence between utility and well-being is increasingly
stressed by scholars of economic methodology (e.g., Hausman, 2011).
Notice that such rejection in no way invalidates positive economic analysis,
which seeks to describe and predict individuals’ economic behavior. It is true
that, in much of the economic literature, individuals are represented as if they
consciously maximize a certain utility function when making decisions. However,
2Later in life, especially since the publication of his Foundations of Economic Analysis in
which he introduces the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function (Samuelson, 1947), Samuelson
came to view utility as more than the empty construct he alludes to in this quotation. For a
historical account of his ideas on the Bergson-Samuelson function, see Backhouse (2013).
3Like most public economists, I am, however, convinced by and committed to a consequential-
ist moral philosophy that takes individuals’ well-being as its ultimate end – see Chapter 1 of this
Dissertation. Nevertheless, most of the theoretical results in this chapter could be reinterpreted
in terms of a government that is motivated by other concerns than its subjects’ well-being.
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nothing in the positive economic analysis of behavior presupposes anything about
the cognitive processes that underlie decision making. Economic analysis only
presupposes that behavior could be captured in terms of maximizing a utility
function – and sometimes not even that. In reality, this could come about because
individuals consciously maximize their well-being, because they are genetically
wired to behave in such a way, or because they are led to their decisions by
their social environment. The nature of the cognitive processes underlying human
behavior are irrelevant for its economic analysis. This makes the transition from
utility as a positive concept to utility as a normative concept, to put it lightly,
non-trivial. If individuals are genetically wired to behave as they do, there is little
reason to equate utility with ‘well-being’ or, indeed, with ‘the good.’ Thus, even
if individuals’ decisions can be shown to be compatible with maximizing some
function, it does not follow that this function carries the moral import that public
economics tends to ascribe to it.4
The aim of this chapter is to reassess some standard results of optimal taxation
by dropping the assumption that individuals necessarily maximize their own well-
being. To avoid confusion, I use the concept of utility as defined in mainstream
economics and refer to the aim of consequentialist government policy as well-
being. Hence, individuals maximize utility, but not necessarily well-being. As a
result, individuals tend to be away from their well-being-maximizing bliss point.
Once I relax the assumption of well-being-maximizing agents, utility can no longer
function as a moral guide and ordinary optimal tax calculations are flawed. Social
welfare is no longer given by a sum of utility, but by a sum of well-being which,
like utility, is assumed to depend on the individual’s allocation of scarce goods.
The first contribution of this chapter is to derive optimal tax rates – direct and
indirect, linear and nonlinear, on the intensive or extensive behavioral margin –
and compare them with the standard case in which government maximizes utility.
This yields optimal tax formulae that allow for straightforward interpretation.
Taxes are set to equate marginal social costs and benefits, which are given by
three separate terms: by (i) the social costs of an eroding tax base, (ii) the social
benefits of increased redistribution, and (iii) the social costs or benefits of drawing
people farther from or closer to their bliss point. The first term is identical to the
distortive costs in the standard optimal tax formula. The second term is similar
to the redistributional benefits in the standard formula, except that the benefits of
4For a further discussion on the irrelevance of cognitive processes for positive economic anal-
ysis, see Gul and Pesendorfer (2008).
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redistribution are measured in terms of marginal well-being, rather than marginal
utility. The third term is absent in the standard case when individuals are always
on their bliss point. If, from a well-being perspective, individuals work too much
(or consume too much of a certain good), this increases the marginal benefits of
taxation as higher marginal tax rates will draw people closer to their bliss point.
On the other hand, if individuals work too little (consume too little of a good), the
marginal benefits of taxation are lower since higher marginal tax rates exacerbate
the preexisting ‘mistake’ in individual behavior.
The main insight generated by the optimal tax formulae is thus that tax rates
should be adjusted to correct for suboptimal individual behavior. The extent of
the necessary correction can be expressed in terms of the difference between a
utility-based marginal rate of substitution and a well-being-based marginal rate of
substitution (MRS). If utility coincides with well-being, the utility-based MRS of,
say, leisure for consumption, naturally equals the well-being-based MRS. However,
if the well-being-based MRS exceeds the utility-based MRS, substituting leisure
for consumption improves well-being even though, by the individual’s first-order
conditions, such substitution does not affect utility. Thus, a positive (negative)
difference between the well-being based MRS and the utility based MRS of good
A for good B provides a motive for positive (negative) marginal tax rates on good
A.
The second contribution of this chapter is to determine empirically how impor-
tant the corrective motive for income taxation is. For this, I first determine both
the utility-based MRS and the well-being based MRS of leisure for consumption.
It is relatively straightforward to measure people’s utility-based MRS as it, by
definition, equals observed net marginal wages. To measure the well-being based
MRS, however, a direct measurement of well-being is necessary. For this, I use
questionnaire data on subjective life satisfaction. Specifically, I use a panel dataset
of British households to directly estimate well-being as a function of net income,
proxying for consumption, and hours worked, among standard control variables
and time- and person-fixed effects. Based on parametric and nonparametric es-
timation techniques I find that well-being is highly concave in consumption and
single-peaked in working hours. On the basis of these estimations I construct a
measure of the well-being based MRS of leisure for consumption. Comparison with
the utility-based MRS indicates that low-income workers tend to work too little
from a well-being perspective, whereas higher-income workers tend to work too
much. Because well-being is highly concave in income, the implications for the
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optimal income tax schedule are especially pronounced for low-income workers.
Compared to standard optimal tax simulations, and provided that workers are
not demand-constrained – in which case lower marginal taxes would not help in
raising their labor hours – my analysis endorses much lower marginal tax rates at
the bottom of the income distribution.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to calibrate optimal
tax formulae using data on life satisfaction. There is a number of studies that
determine optimal taxes when individuals’ and government’s preferences differ,
but they stop short of empirically determining this difference. Similarly, there is
a large number of studies on the determinants of well-being, but none of them
integrate their findings into a proper public-finance setting. My contribution to
the literature on optimal tax theory is closely related to the contributions by Kan-
bur, Pirttila¨ and Tuomala (2006) and Blomquist and Micheletto (2006), which
both build on seminal work by Seade (1980). Kanbur, Pirttila¨, and Tuomala, like
Seade, derive the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule in a Mirrlees (1971) set-
ting in which government maximizes something else than utility. Blomquist and
Micheletto do the same in the setting of Stiglitz (1982). The conclusions from
these studies are directly in line with mine, namely that the standard optimal tax
schedule is supplemented with an additional term which depends on the difference
between the individual’s and government’s MRS. I derive the same conclusion
for a wider range of settings, including indirect taxation and taxation of discrete
labor-supply decisions. In a broader context this study is related to the litera-
ture on optimal taxation in the presence of external effects, e.g., (e.g., Sandmo,
1975; Jacobs and De Mooij, 2011). Instead of an externality, individual behavior
exhibits an internality, i.e., individuals do not take full account of their decisions’
consequences for their own well-being. The optimal tax treatment of internalities,
however, is very much comparable to optimal corrective taxation in the presence
of externalities.
Since I attempt to merge optimal tax theory with the empirical study of life
satisfaction, this chapter is also related to the empirical literature on the deter-
minants of life satisfaction. This literature, by now too vast to comprehensively
discuss here, has recently been reviewed by Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008). The
study by Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2008) is of special interest as they attempt
to measure individuals’ marginal well-being of income, which is a crucial ingredi-
ent of optimal tax formulae. However, to determine the nature of the trade-off
between consumption and leisure – a crucial ingredient of any exercise in optimal
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taxation – one also needs to determine the marginal well-being of leisure. To my
knowledge only few studies include work effort or hours in their analysis of the
determinants of life satisfaction, and with mixed results. For example, Pouwels,
Siegers and Vlasblom (2008) conclude that hours worked negatively affects life
satisfaction but estimate an equation in which hours worked enter logarithmically,
thereby imposing a diminishing marginal well-being of working hours. Knabe and
Ra¨tzel (2010) argue that such functional form is counterintuitive but fail to discern
an effect of working hours when estimating an equation in which working hours
enter quadratically. Booth and Van Ours (2008), using the same data as I, fail to
find any relationship between hours worked and life satisfaction. I conjecture that
this might be caused by not controlling for job changes and promotions. Indeed,
if a promotion improves well-being and is generally followed by longer working
days, as one would expect, the regression coefficient on hours worked might cap-
ture both a positive promotion effect and a negative hours effect. Controlling for
this I indeed find a robust single-peaked relationship between life satisfaction and
working hours.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The first three sec-
tions discuss optimal tax formulae when utility differs from well-being. The first
section discusses linear income taxation, the second section nonlinear direct and
indirect taxation, and the third section taxation of labor-market participation and
education. The fourth section determines empirically the difference between the
utility-based MRS and the well-being-based MRS and derives the implications for
optimal nonlinear income taxation. The fifth section discusses the robustness of
these results and the sixth and final section concludes.
2.2 Optimal linear income taxation
2.2.1 Individual utility maximization
To illustrate the basic intuition behind the optimal tax results, I first discuss
optimal linear income taxation when government maximizes a sum of well-being.
Optimal nonlinear taxation – which yields results very similar to the case of linear
taxation – is left for the next section. Assume a mass-one population of individuals.
Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to, and denoted by, their ability n ∈
N = [n, n]; they are distributed over N according to cumulative distribution
function Fn ≡ F (n), with density fn ≡ F ′ (n). Utility of an individual n is
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denoted as un, which might be different from his well-being, denoted as gn. Utility
is assumed to be identical across individuals, and defined over consumption cn and
labor effort ln:
(2.1) un ≡ u (cn, ln) , uc,−ul > 0, ucc ≤ 0, ull < 0.
I assume that utility is increasing and concave in consumption, and decreasing and
convex in labor effort. Subscripts n indicate that, in equilibrium, consumption and
labor effort, and thus utility, can be written as functions of ability n. Individuals
are constrained in their behavior by a budget constraint which stipulates that
consumption should equal net income. I assume that ability corresponds to the
gross wage rate per effective unit of labor, such that the budget constraint is given
by:
(2.2) cn = (1− t)nln + T.
Here, t is the income tax rate and T is a non-individualized lump-sum transfer from
government. Standard utility maximization implies that the individual’s marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) of leisure for consumption equals the net wage rate:
(2.3)
−ul,n
uc,n
≡ −ul (cn, ln)
uc (cn, ln)
= (1− t)n.
Together with the budget constraint, this condition determines equilibrium values
of consumption and labor effort for every individual n ∈ N as functions of the tax
instruments. Denoting equilibrium labor effort as ln = ln (t, T ), I can define the
Hicksian (compensated) labor supply elasticity as:
(2.4) εcn ≡
(
∂ln
∂t
+ nln
∂ln
∂T
)
1− t
ln
< 0.
Note that the elasticity εcn is a compensated one in the sense that utility, not
well-being, is assumed constant.
2.2.2 Social welfare maximization
I assume that individual well-being is, like utility, a function of consumption and
labor effort and identical across individuals, such that it is given by:
(2.5) gn ≡ g (cn, ln) .
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I assume that social welfare, W , is given by the integral, over all individuals, of
well-being:
(2.6) W ≡
∫
N
g (cn, ln) dFn.
The function g could be, but is not necessarily, equal to a concave function of
utility. If it is, such that I can write g (cn, ln) = gˆ (u (cn, ln)), the model collapses
to the standard exercise of optimal income taxation. Government income should
equal expenditures and its budget constraint can thus be represented as:
(2.7) B ≡
∫
N
(tnln − T ) dFn = 0.
Government can set the income tax rate t and the lump-sum transfer T . Optimal
policy follows from maximizing social welfare, (2.6), subject to budget constraint
(2.7). Denoting the shadow price of the budget constraint by λ, I can thus write
for the optimum:
(2.8)
dW/λ
dx
+
dB
dx
= 0, x ∈ {τ, T} .
I follow Diamond (1975) by defining αn as the monetarized social marginal
well-being of income,5 i.e., the social gains associated with individual n receiving
one unit of additional income:
(2.9) αn ≡ gc,n
λ
+ tn
∂ln
∂T
− gc,n
λ
(−gl,n/gc,n
−ul,n/uc,n − 1
)
(1− t)n∂ln
∂T
.
The social marginal well-being of income consists of three elements. First, higher
income leads to a direct welfare gain from higher consumption, gc,n/λ. Second, for a
positive tax rate, t > 0, and negative income effects on labor supply, ∂ln/∂T < 0,
higher income leads to a smaller tax base and thus a loss in tax revenue given
by tn (∂ln/∂T ). Third, if the well-being-based MRS of leisure for consumption,
−gl,n/gc,n, exceeds the utility-based MRS, −ul,n/uc,n, individual n supplies too
much labor. In that case, the negative income effect on labor supply leads to
an increase in well-being and thus to an increase in social welfare. Conversely
if −gl,n/gc,n < −ul,nuc,n, individual n supplies too little labor and the negative
income effect on labor supply leads to lower social welfare.
5Where Diamond refers to social marginal utility of income, I refer to social marginal well-
being of income to stress the fact that social welfare is defined over well-being, not utility.
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Substituting the derivatives of the welfare function and government’s budget
constraint into equation (2.8), and substituting for αn, yields the following opti-
mality condition for the lump-sum transfer:
(2.10) α ≡
∫
N
αndFn = 1.
Thus, the average social marginal well-being of income, α, should equal 1, which is
the public resources required to marginally increase the lump-sum transfer. This
result only differs from the standard result for the optimal lump-sum transfer in
that the social marginal well-being of income includes an additional term associ-
ated with suboptimal individual behavior.
The optimality condition for the income tax rate t can be written as:
(2.11)
∫
N
nln
(
1− αn + t
1− tε
c
n −
gc,n
λ
(−gl,n/gc,n
−ul,n/uc,n − 1
)
εcn
)
dFn = 0.
The equation is entirely standard, except for the last term within brackets. This
term gives the direct welfare gains of lower labor effort, resulting from a marginal
increase of the tax rate. Naturally, if the welfare function is only a function of the
utility function, then −gl,n/gc,n = −ul,n/uc,n, and the final term disappears.
2.2.3 Interpretation of the optimal income tax rate
I can now identify three sources of social costs and benefits from above optimality
condition: a mechanical effect, a behavioral effect on the tax base, and a behavioral
effect which corrects or worsens a possibly suboptimal labor supply decision by
individuals. The first two effects are standard, the last one originates from the
assumption that individuals do not maximize well-being.
Mechanical effect – The first mechanical effect of a marginal increase in the labor
income tax consists of the revenue gain and is given by nln, which is the
first term within brackets in equation (2.11). The second mechanical effect
constitutes the direct welfare loss associated with the drop in individuals’
net income due to a higher income tax. This effect is given by the second
term in brackets, −nlnαn.6 The overall mechanical effect of a higher tax rate
is thus given by nln (1− αn).
6Here I somewhat stretch the meaning of ‘mechanical’ to include all effects that are not due
to substitution effects. Naturally, αn represents in part the welfare consequences of any income
effects of a tax change.
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Behavioral effect on the tax base – An increase in the income tax rate leads
individuals to substitute leisure for consumption, eroding the tax base. This
represents a welfare loss as long as the income tax rate is positive, t > 0. A
one percentage-point increase in the tax rate leads to a compensated change
in labor supply of εcn/ (1− t) percent; a one percent decrease in labor supply
leads to a tax revenue loss equal to tnln. Thus, the welfare effect associated
with the behavioral effect on the tax base is measured by the product of the
two, nln
t
1−tε
c
n, which, in equation (2.11), is the third term within brackets.
Behavioral effect on individuals’ suboptimal labor supply – The substitution of
leisure for consumption leads to an additional welfare gain (loss) by drawing
individuals closer to (farther from) their well-being optimal labor supply.
Again, a one percentage point increase in the tax rate leads to a decrease
in labor supply of εcn/ (1− t) < 0 percent; a one percent decrease in labor
supply leads to a (monetized) welfare loss due to lower consumption equal of
(1− t)nlngc,n/λ, and a (monetized) welfare gain of lower labor supply equal
to lngl,n/λ. Thus, the welfare effect associated with the behavioral effect
on individuals’ suboptimal labor supply is measured by the product of the
behavioral effect and the net welfare gain. Some straightforward rearranging
yields the final term in equation (2.11). This welfare effect of a higher tax rate
is positive if the individual supplies too much labor, such that −gl,n/gc,n >
−ul,n/uc,n. In that case a higher tax rate corrects the suboptimal behavior as
it leads him to work less. The opposite holds if workers supply too little labor,
such that −gl,n/gc,n < −ul,n/uc,n. In that case, higher taxation exacerbates
individuals’ suboptimal behavior as it incentivizes people to work even less.
Naturally, this welfare effect disappears if well-being and utility coincide,
such that the well-being based MRS equals the utility-based MRS.
In the tax optimum, these three effects, summed over the entire population
N , should equal zero such that no further increase or decrease in the income tax
rate could lead to an increase in social welfare. This is exactly what is stated by
condition (2.11). To rewrite the optimality condition in a more familiar form, I
define the wedge on the labor supply of individual n as follows:
(2.12) ωn ≡ t
1− t −
gc,n
λ
(−gl,n/gc,n
−ul,n/uc,n − 1
)
.
The wedge equals the difference between the monetized social welfare gains and
private utility gains of one additional hour of labor, as a proportion of the net wage.
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It consists of two terms. The first is standard and represents the tax revenue of
an additional labor hour. The second term represents the move towards, or away
from, the individual’s bliss point. I define the income-weighted average of the labor
wedge as:
(2.13) ω¯ ≡
∫
N nlnωndFn∫
N nlndFn
.
Following Feldstein (1972), I define the distributional characteristic of the income
tax base as the negative of the normalized covariance between labor income nln
and the social marginal well-being of income:
(2.14) ξ ≡ − cov [nln, αn]∫
N nlndFn
∫
N αndFn
= 1−
∫
N nlnαndFn∫
N nlndFn
∈ [0, 1] ,
where I made use of the first-order condition of the transfer to substitute for∫
N αndFn = 1. Since the distributional characteristic is a normalized covariance, it
is necessarily the case that −1 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. However, as the social marginal well-being
of income, αn, is likely to be decreasing with income, nln, one could expect ξ to be
positive. The larger the distributional characteristic of labor income, and hence
the stronger the covariance between αn and nln, the larger the redistributional
gains from taxing labor income.
Substituting for ωn and ξ into (2.11) and rearranging yields:
(2.15) −
∫
N nlnωnεlt,ndFn∫
N nlndFn
= ξ.
Furthermore, assuming that the Hicksian labor supply elasticity is equal for all
individuals, such that εcn = ε
c, I can write:
(2.16) ω¯ =
ξ
−εc .
The formula for the optimal wedge on labor income is virtually identical to the
standard formula for the optimal linear income tax derived under the assumption
of well-being-maximizing individuals. The optimal labor wedge is determined by
the redistributional gains of higher taxation, given by ξ, divided by the magnitude
of the substitution effect, given by −εc. The only difference is that the wedge
now includes a term that indicates the average difference between individuals’
actual and well-being-maximizing labor supply. For a given optimal labor wedge,
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if individuals provide too much labor, taxes should be higher; if individuals provide
too little labor, taxes should be lower.
Above derivation suggests a broader implication, which is confirmed in further
analysis below. The standard calculation of optimal wedges largely carries over
to the case in which well-being does not correspond to utility. However, the total
wedge consists of the degree of suboptimal behavior, as well as the tax wedge.
2.3 Optimal non-linear taxation
2.3.1 Direct taxation – single good
In this section I derive optimal non-linear tax formulae in the case that utility
does not necessarily correspond to well-being. Utility is still the same function
of consumption and labor effort, given by equation (2.1). I assume taxes are
conditioned on labor income nln, such that the taxes that an individual n pays are
given by T (nln). His budget constraint is therefore given by:
(2.17) cn = nln − T (nln) .
Utility maximization implies that the individual’s utility-based marginal rate of
substitution of leisure for consumption equals the marginal net wage rate:
(2.18)
−ul (cn, ln)
uc (cn, ln)
= (1− T ′ (nln))n,
where T ′(·) denotes the marginal tax rate. Together with the budget constraint,
and for a given tax schedule T (·), this equation gives consumption and labor
supply as a function of ability n.
The social welfare function is still given by equation (2.6). Government maxi-
mizes social welfare subject to a budget constraint and an incentive compatibility
constraint. The budget constraint can be written as:
(2.19) B ≡
∫
N
T (nln) dFn =
∫
N
(nln − cn) dFn = 0,
where the second equation follows from substituting the individual’s budget con-
straint. I solve for the government’s maximization problem by deriving the optimal
second-best allocation, which is decentralized by means of the optimal non-linear
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income tax schedule.7 Incentive compatibility follows from the individual’s first-
order condition (2.18). Eliminating the marginal tax schedule from this condition
by substituting in the derivatives of the budget constraint and the utility function,
I can rewrite the incentive compatibility constraint as:8
(2.20)
dun
dn
=
−ul (cn, ln) ln
n
.
The optimal allocation is obtained by maximizing social welfare, (2.6), with
respect to cn and ln, subject to the budget constraint, (2.19), and the incentive
compatibility constraint, (2.20). This can be seen as a problem of optimal control
with control variables cn and ln, and state variable un. The Hamiltonian associated
with this maximization problem is given by:
(2.21) H = (g (cn, ln) + λ (nln − cn)) fn−θn−ul,n (cn, ln) ln
n
+µn (un − u (cn, ln)) .
Here, λ, θn, and µn, are the shadow prices that belong to the resource constraint,
the incentive compatibility constraint, and the constraint on utility. The first-
order conditions are obtained by taking derivatives of the Hamiltonian. Together
7As proved by Mirrlees (1976), feasibility of the implementation requires the adoption of
additional assumptions on the allocation and the utility function. Denoting gross labor earnings
as zn ≡ nln, and the marginal rate of substitution of gross labor earnings for consumption
as s(cn, zn, n) ≡ −ul(cn, zn/n)/nuc(cn, zn/n), I assume that the following necessary conditions
hold:
∂s(cn, zn, n)
∂n
< 0;
dzn
dn
> 0.
The first condition is the single-crossing condition which ensures that the marginal rate of substi-
tution of gross income for consumption, evaluated at a fixed bundle of income and consumption,
is decreasing in ability. The second, monotonicity, condition requires that, at the optimal allo-
cation, gross income is monotonically increasing with ability.
8That is, total differentiating the utility function yields dun = uc (cn, ln) dcn + ul (cn, ln) dln.
Total differentiating the budget constraint yields dcn = (1− T ′ (nln)) (ndln + lndn). Using this
to substitute for dcn in the derivative of the utility function, and substituting for (1− T ′ (nln))n
from the first order condition yields the incentive compatibility constraint.
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with the boundary conditions on θn, and after rearranging, they are given by:
∂H
∂cn
= 0 :
(
gc,n − λ
uc,n
)
fn − θn
n
−ucl,nln
uc,n
= µn,(2.22)
∂H
∂ln
= 0 :
(
gl,n + λn
ul,n
)
fn +
θn
n
(
1 +
ull,nln
ul,n
)
= µn,(2.23)
∂H
∂un
=
dθn
dn
:
dθn
dn
= µn,(2.24)
lim
n→n
θn = lim
n→n
θn = 0.(2.25)
Combining equations (2.22) and (2.23), and substituting in the individual first-
order condition, (2.18), yields, after some rearranging, an expression for the opti-
mal marginal income tax schedule:
(2.26)
T ′ (nln)
1− T ′ (nln) =
uc,nθn/λ
nfn
(
1 +
d ln (ul,n/uc,n)
d ln ln
)
+
gc,n
λ
(−gl,n/gc,n
−ul,n/uc,n − 1
)
.
Hence, the optimal tax schedule is additive in two terms. The first term is identical
to the optimal tax schedule in the case that individuals maximize well-being, and
represents both the behavioral responses of higher taxation, and the redistribu-
tional gains. For a detailed interpretation of this first term, see Mirrlees (1971),
Tuomala (1990), or Saez (2001), among others. The second term, which vanishes in
the standard optimal tax exercise, is the term of interest for this chapter. This term
is familiar from the case of linear taxation (e.g., from equation (2.12)), and indi-
cates whether from a well-being perspective individual n works too much or too lit-
tle. If −gl,n/gc,n > −ul,n/uc,n, an individual works too much, and the second term
in equation (2.26) is positive, providing a motive for higher marginal income taxes
to ‘correct’ individual behavior. On the other hand, if −gl,n/gc,n < −ul,n/uc,n,
workers work too little, providing a motive for lower marginal tax rates.
Analogous to equation (2.12) for linear taxation, I can write the wedge on labor
as:
(2.27) ωn ≡ T
′ (nln)
1− T ′ (nln) −
gc,n
λ
(−gl,n/gc,n
−ul,n/uc,n − 1
)
,
such that I can write for the optimal wedge on labor:
(2.28) ωn =
uc,nθn/λ
nfn
(
1 +
d ln (ul,n/uc,n)
d ln ln
)
.
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Hence, the optimal labor wedge is virtually identical to the optimal marginal tax
schedule derived in, e.g., Mirrlees (1971). The difference, if individuals do not
maximize well-being, is that the wedge on labor includes both a tax wedge and a
wedge due to suboptimal labor supply decisions.
An additional implication of condition (2.28) is that nonzero marginal income
tax rates are optimal even in a first-best world in which government has full in-
formation on individuals’ ability and markets are complete. If government can
observe individuals’ ability the incentive compatibility constraint is slack such
that θn = 0. Hence, by equation (2.28), optimal wedges in the first best equal
zero. This implies that marginal taxes are set to perfectly correct individuals’
suboptimal behavior. Thus, even if the second fundamental theorem of welfare
economics holds, such that any feasible Pareto-efficient allocation can be imple-
mented by means of individualized lump-sum taxes and transfers only, nonzero
income-dependent taxation might still be optimal. After all, if individuals make
decisions that do not correspond with their own well-being, Pareto efficiency ceases
to be a compelling normative requirement.9
2.3.2 Indirect taxation – multiple goods
It is relatively straightforward to extend the model to include multiple taxable
goods, yielding results which are similar in spirit to the ones derived under direct
linear and non-linear taxation. For simplicity, I consider an additional good, xn,
upon which a commodity tax tx = tx (x) can be conditioned. Utility is now given
by:
(2.29) un ≡ u (cn, xn, ln) .
The budget constraint takes account of the additional good purchases and taxation:
(2.30) cn + xn + tx (xn) = nln − T (nln) ,
9Here I implicitly defined a Pareto-efficient allocation as one in which no person’s utility can
be increased without decreasing anyone else’s utility. Naturally, one can alternatively define
a Pareto-efficient allocation as one in which no person’s well-being can be increased without
decreasing anyone else’s well-being. In that case, Pareto efficiency would still be a compelling
normative requirement. However, that would imply a refutation of the fundamental theorems
of welfare economics as complete markets, perfect competition, and local nonsatiation of prefer-
ences, in the absence of taxation, would no longer lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation.
29
Chapter 2. Optimal taxation and well-being
which, together with the following two first-order conditions, describes equilibrium
values for cn, xn, and ln:
−ul (cn, xn, ln)
uc (cn, xn, ln)
= (1− T ′ (nln))n,(2.31)
ux (cn, xn, ln)
uc (cn, xn, ln)
= 1 + t′x (xn) .(2.32)
Individuals’ well-being is described by g (cn, xn, ln), such that welfare is given
by:
(2.33) W =
∫
N
g (cn, xn, ln) dFn,
which, to obtain optimal tax formulae, is maximized subject to a budget constraint
and an incentive compatibility constraint:
B ≡
∫
N
(T (nln) + tx (xn)) dFn =
∫
N
(nln − cn − xn) dFn = 0,(2.34)
dun
dn
=
−ul (cn, xn, ln) ln
n
.(2.35)
Denote the wedge on consumption of good xn as follows:
(2.36) ωxn ≡
t′ (xn)
1 + t′ (xn)
+
gc,n
λ
(
gx,n/gc.n
ux,n/uc,n
− 1
)
.
Notice that, if gx,n/gc.n > ux,n/uc,n, individual n consumes too little of good xn.
Marginally substituting consumption of xn for cn leaves utility unchanged while
improving well-being. Thus, even in the absence of indirect taxation, the wedge
on xn is positive if the individual consumes too little of the good, and negative if
he consumes too much. Solving the maximization problem in the usual way yields
the following expressions for the optimal wedges:
ωn =
ucθn/λ
nfn
(
1 +
d log (ul,n/uc,n)
d log ln
)
,(2.37)
ωxn =
ucθn/λ
nfn
(−d log (ux,n/uc,n)
d log ln
)
.(2.38)
The optimal wedge on labor is given by the first equation and simply corresponds
to equation (2.28). The optimal wedge on consumption of good xn is given by
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the second equation. The right-hand side is the standard result for the optimal
marginal tax schedule (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976). It indicates that the
wedge on good xn is proportional to the degree in which the marginal rate of
substitution of xn for cn changes with labor effort – that is, to the relative com-
plementarity of good xn with labor. However, even though this is the case for the
optimal wedge, the optimal tax schedule depends on whether individuals consume
too much or too little of good xn. If individuals consume too much, the optimal
marginal tax schedule t′x (xn) / (1− t′x (xn)) exceeds the optimal wedge on xn; if
individuals consume too little, the optimal marginal tax schedule is smaller than
the optimal wedge.
2.4 The tax treatment of discrete decisions
So far, I only considered labor supply decisions on the intensive margin. The
idea that well-being diverges from utility, and thus that individuals make well-
being suboptimal decisions, might very well apply to discrete decisions as well.
Especially decisions that are difficult to reverse and of a once-and-for-all nature –
to follow higher education, to participate in the labor market – might not be made
while taking all well-being consequences into account. Adolescents’ decisions on
higher education – on both participation in and type of higher education – is an
obvious example. Both utility and well-being functions are likely to be affected
by the decision, as well as an individual’s intertemporal budget constraint. Such
effects of education are difficult, if not impossible, to comprehend and it is therefore
highly plausible that revealed preferences for higher education bear little relation
to well-being.
The implications for optimal tax policy are, given the analyses in the previ-
ous two sections, theoretically straightforward. Imagine individuals neglect, on a
net basis, the well-being benefits of participation in the labor market or of higher
education. This provides a motive to stimulate these descrete decisions by lower
participation taxes and higher education subsidies. These motives are seperate
from and in addition to the standard motives for participation taxes and edu-
cation subsidies. In this section I illustrate these points by developing a simple
model that encompasses participation and schooling decisions. See Gerritsen and
Jacobs (2013a, Chapter 4 of this Dissertation) for a more extensive model that
also incorporates intensive labor supply decisions and involuntary unemployment
but in which well-being and utility are assumed to be identical.
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2.4.1 Individual utility maximization
Assume individuals can decide between three alternatives: (i) to be voluntarily
unemployed and earn unemployment benefits b, (ii) to be a low-skilled worker,
earn income wL, pay taxes tL, and incur disutility of participation qL(n), or (iii)
to be a high-skilled worker, earn income wH , pay taxes tH , and incur disutility of
schooling qH(n). Thus, disutility of labor is a function of individuals’ ability.
10 I
assume q′H(n) < q
′
L(n) < 0. Thus, disutility is decreasing in ability, and at a faster
rate for high-skilled workers than for low-skilled workers, which is sufficient for
participation and education decisions to be well-behaved. Utility for each seperate
decision is given by:
uU ≡ u (b) ,(2.39)
uL ≡ u (wL − tL)− qL (n) ,(2.40)
uH ≡ u (wH − tH)− qH (n) .(2.41)
There are two critical ability levels. An individual with ability level nL is indifferent
between being non-participant or low-skilled; an individual with ability level nH
is indifferent between being low-skilled or high-skilled. Hence, these critical levels
are determined by the following two conditions:
nL : qL (nL) = u (wL − tL)− u (b) ,(2.42)
nH : qH (nH)− qL (nH) = u (wH − tH)− u (wL − tL) .(2.43)
In equilibrium, individuals n ∈ [n, nL) are unemployed, individuals n ∈ [nL, nH)
are low-skilled, and individuals with n ∈ [nH , n] are high-skilled. Thus, the number
of unemployed, low-skilled, and high-skilled are given by FnL , FnH − FnL , and
1− FnH . I furthermore define the following semi-elasticities:
(2.44) ηLi ≡ dFnL/FnL
di
, ηHi ≡ −dFnH/ (1− FnH )
di
, i ∈ {b, tL, tH} .
Thus, ηLi gives the relative change in the number of unemployed due to a marginal
change in tax instrument i, and ηHi gives the relative change in the number of
high-skilled workers.
10It is convenient to model disutility of work, rather than labor earnings, as a function of
ability. This way, all individuals of the same labor type earn the same income and I can ignore
within-group income redistribution.
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2.4.2 Social welfare maximization
For simplicity I assume that the utility of consumption u(·) corresponds to well-
being. However, the disutility of participation qL(·) and of education qH(·) might
not correspond to well-being. The well-being losses of participation and education
are denoted hL(·) and hH(·). I denote the difference between utility and well-being
losses as:
(2.45) ∆i (n) ≡ qi (n)− hi (n) , i ∈ {L,H} .
If this difference is positive, individuals behave as if the well-being costs of partici-
pation (or education) are larger than they actually are. The social welfare function
is thus given by:
(2.46)
W =
∫ nL
n
u (b) dFn+
∫ nH
nL
(u (wL − tL)− hL (n)) dFn+
∫ n
nH
u (wH − tH)−hH (n) dFn.
Government’s budget constraint is given by:
(2.47) B = −
∫ nL
n
bdFn +
∫ nH
nL
tLdFn +
∫ n
nH
tHdFn = 0.
I denote the shadow-price of the budget constraint – the marginal social value of
government resources – as λ. The wedges on participation and education measure
the social welfare gains associated with a marginal increase in participation and
education:
ωL ≡
(
tL + b+
∆L (nL)
λ
)
,(2.48)
ωH ≡
(
tH − tL + ∆H (nH)−∆L (nH)
λ
)
.(2.49)
Thus, the wedge on participation, ωL, includes the tax benefits of an increase in
participation, tL + b, and the monetized difference between the utility costs and
well-being costs of participation, ∆L(nL)/λ. To understand why the latter term
enters the wedge on participation, note from equation (2.42) that the utility costs
of participation are set to equal the gains of increased consumption. If, for individ-
ual nL, the well-being costs are smaller than the utility costs of participation, such
that ∆L(nL) > 0, the well-being gains outstrip the well-being losses of participa-
tion. Similarly, the wedge on education, ωH , includes the tax benefits of increased
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education, tH − tL, and the monetized difference bewteen the utility costs and the
well-being costs of education, (∆H(nH)−∆L(nH)) /λ.
Maximizing social welfare, (2.46), subject to the budget constraint, (2.47), with
respect to b and tH , and substituting in wedges, (2.48) and (2.49), and elasticities,
(2.44), yields the following formulae for the optimal wedges:11
ωL =
(
u′ (b)
λ
− 1
)
/ηLb,(2.50)
ωH =
(
1− u
′ (wH − tH)
λ
)
/ (−ηHtH ) .(2.51)
The optimal wedge in condition (2.50) consists of two terms. The first term in
brackets measures the social welfare gain of distributing an additional unit of
income to the unemployed, minus the resource costs of doing so. The second
term gives the semi-elasticity of the number of unemployed with respect to the
unemployment benefit. Thus, the optimal wedge is set according to a familiar
logic (e.g., Gerritsen and Jacobs, 2013a, Chapter 4 of this Dissertation), and equals
the redistributional gain of a participation tax, divided by the magnitude of the
behavioral response. The same logic applies to the optimal wedge on eduation,
(2.51). It equals the social benefits of redistributing away from the high-skilled
(the bracketed term), divided by the negative semi-elasticity of the number of
high-skilled with respect to an increase of the high-skilled tax.
As was the case in previous sections, however, participation and education
wedges consist not only of the net participation tax and the net tax on high-skilled
workers. They also take into account the difference between the well-being based
and the utility-based assessment of participation and education. If net well-being
of participation exceeds net utility of participation, too few people are participating
in the labor market, providing a motive for lower participation taxes. If net well-
being of education exceeds net utility of education, too few people become high-
skilled, providing a motive for lower taxes on the high-skilled (or higher education
subsidies).
11Naturally, to fully solve for all three seperate tax instruments (b, tL, and tH), I would need
the first-order condition for tL as well.
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2.5 How far away from their bliss point are peo-
ple?
Thus far I have established that, if individuals do not behave in a way that maxi-
mizes their well-being, optimal tax rules are adjusted in a straightforward manner.
The formulae for the optimal wedges are largely in line with the standard formula-
tions of optimal tax schedules. The crucial difference is that the wedge consists of
the marginal increase in well-being, as well as the marginal increase in tax revenue,
associated with an increase in labor effort (or consumption, participation, educa-
tion). As shown, the total wedge consists of the sum of the tax wedge and the
wedge between the well-being-based MRS and the utility-based MRS. While simi-
lar results have been obtained in a comparable context (e.g., Kanbur, Pirttila¨ and
Tuomala, 2006; Blomquist and Micheletto, 2006), none of these studies came to a
quantification of the latter wedge. On the one hand, it is straightforward to obtain
empirical measures of the utility-based MRS as it by definition equals net relative
marginal prices. On the other hand, to obtain a measure of the well-being-based
MRS one first needs to determine what constitutes well-being, an issue likely to be
contentious. In this section I use survey data on subjects’ life satisfaction as ap-
proximation of their well-being. Using these data, I estimate a well-being function
to determine the well-being-based MRS of leisure for consumption and compare it
to the utility-based MRS. This provides an indication of how far away individuals
are from their bliss point, i.e., whether individuals work too much or too little.
The focus of the empirical analysis is on the case of direct nonlinear taxation,
discussed in Section 2.1. I am therefore interested in the wedge of equation (2.27).12
More specifically, I focus on two related empirical results. First I determine the
extent to which individuals tend to work too much, which I denote as ∆n:
(2.52) ∆n ≡ −gl,n/gc,n−ul,n/uc,n − 1.
Notice that ∆n is part of the second term of the wedge in equation (2.27). It has
a straightforward interpretation: recall that −ul,n/uc,n equals the net marginal
wage rate of individual n, whereas −gl,n/gc,n is the wage rate that individual n
should have earned to justify the actual amount of hours that he or she is working.
Hence, ∆n gives the marginal wage rate an individual should have earned given his
12In principle, the same type of analysis could be carried out for the wedges in the case of direct
linear taxation, (2.12), indirect taxation, (2.36), participation taxation, (2.48), or education
subsidies, (2.49).
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labor supply decision, relative to his actual marginal wage rate. If, say, ∆n =
1
2
,
individual n works too much: he works as if he is earning fifty percent more than
what he actually earns. On the other hand, if ∆n = −12 , individual n works too
little: he works as if his wage was only half his actual wage. Thus, ∆n is a natural
measure of the extent to which individuals work too much from a well-being point
of view.
Second, I am interested in the total wedge on labor income, ωn, the definition
of which I repeat for convenience:
(2.27) ωn ≡ T
′ (nln)
1− T ′ (nln) −
gc,n
λ
(−gl,n/gc,n
−ul,n/uc,n − 1
)
.
I am especially interested in the extent to which the total wedge deviates from
the tax wedge on labor income, T ′/ (1− T ′). This provides an indication of the
extent to which wedges on labor income are habitually over- or underestimated
by assuming that utility coincides with well-being. On the basis of preceding
sections, I concluded that the full wedge, ωn, rather than only the tax wedge,
should be taken into account when judging the optimality of a tax system. The
analysis below hence provides a qualification to studies that draw conclusions on
the optimality of current tax systems on the basis of the tax wedge alone.
2.5.1 Data and strategy
Dataset and sample selection
The empirical analysis uses data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),
which includes information on various variables for a representative sample of
individuals over consecutive years. Data are available for every year between 1991
and 2008, but a question on subjects’ well-being has been available since 1996,
with the exception of 2001. Thus, I am able to use data for the years 1996 to 2000
and 2002 to 2008, making for a raw sample of 27,699 unique individuals over a
period of up to 12 years, with on average 6.2 years of data per individual.
In order to obtain a relatively homogeneous group of people without losing too
many observations, and to limit the likelihood of omitted variable biases in my
empirical analysis, I impose further restrictions on this sample. For homogeneity,
I restrict the sample to heads of household, who are employed, without children,
and of prime working-age between 25 and 59 years old.13 In addition, I only
13For the definition of the head of household, the BHPS follows the General Household Survey,
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include people if they have the same job function as in the preceding year, i.e., I
exclude people whose function has changed, whether this was due to promotion
or demotion, due to a change of company, or because of new entrance into the
labor market. I do this because job changes are likely to have a direct impact
on life satisfaction, while at the same time affecting the number of hours worked.
As a result, without controlling for job changes, the effect of those changes on life
satisfaction would be absorbed by the coefficient of the number of working hours.14
Indeed, failure to control for changes of job function might well be an important
reason why some previous studies on life satisfaction did not find a significant
effect of hours worked (e.g., Booth and Van Ours, 2008). The remaining sample
contains 4,194 unique individuals, with on average 3.2 observations per individual.
Measuring well-being
An individual’s well-being is measured by the response when asked about satisfac-
tion with his or her life. The specific question asked is:
How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?
Possible answers range from 1 to 7, with 1 labeled ”Not satisfied at all,” and 7 la-
beled ”Completely satisfied.” I assume that the answer to this question accurately
reflects the well-being of the person answering the questionnaire, and is thus taken
to be the empirical measure of gn. Equivalently, the goal of optimal government
policy is assumed to be the maximization of this specific measurement of well-
being. This assumption can and should of course be subjected to criticism: the
ideal measure of well-being is probably some combination of a choice-based mea-
sure (i.e., utility) and various non-choice-based measures such as life satisfaction
(as argued by, e.g., Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2008). However, since there are numer-
ous studies on optimal taxation with utility as the sole measure of well-being, a
sensible first step towards Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s ideal is to compare the results of
these studies to the case in which life satisfaction is taken as the sole measure of
well-being.
i.e., the principal owner or renter of property, and (where there is more than one), the male taking
precedence, and (where there is more than one potential head of household of the same sex), the
eldest taking precedence.
14Instead of excluding job changers from the sample, I also directly controlled for changes in
job function. This does not change results much. I prefer excluding these observations from the
analysis entirely, because I cannot observe the reason for the job change, e.g., whether it was
due to a promotion or a demotion, which is potentially important.
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Figure 2.1: Histogram of life satisfaction scores and average life satisfaction by
income decile
Figure 2.1 contains two panels that describe the data contained in the life
satisfaction variable. The first panel illustrates the frequency at which a certain
life-satisfaction score is given as answer. The second panel illustrates the average
life-satisfaction score for each decile of net household income. Even without con-
trolling for any other variables and without using any fixed effects, there appears
to be a clear concave relationship between well-being and net household income.
Explanatory variables
Since ultimately I want to obtain a measure of the well-being based MRS of leisure
for consumption, the most important explanatory variables are measures of con-
sumption and work effort. As an approximation of consumption I choose to follow
Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2008) by using total real net household income. Nat-
urally, one would like to use permanent income when explaining overall life satis-
faction. However, in the absence of data on permanent income I need to rely on
current income. Some, but most likely not all, of the bias that originates from my
reliance on current income is eliminated by the sample restrictions on age. Income
is measured at constant household costs, and includes income from labor, invest-
ments, benefits, pension, and transfers, net of taxes. I choose not to normalize the
income variable by using equivalence scales to correct for the size of the household.
The reason I do not do this is because the choice of the particular equivalence scale
is always a controversial issue, and because for my main specification, in which
income enters the well-being equation logarithmically, the equivalence scale is in
any case absorbed by the marital-status dummies. The first panel in Figure 2.2
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Figure 2.2: Densities of real net household income and hours worked
illustrates the density of net weekly household income.
The second crucial explanatory variable measures the number of hours a person
works in a normal week. The second panel in Figure 2.2 illustrates the density of
these weekly hours worked. Not surprisingly, the amounts of working hours are
mostly concentrated around forty hours of work per week. Other explanatory vari-
ables I use include age dummies, subjective health evaluation dummies (answers
ranging from 1, “very poor”, to 5, “excellent”), year dummies, and marital status
dummies. On top of that I include person-fixed effects to capture the influence of
all person-specific time-invariant variables.
Empirical strategy
My main results follow from estimating the following linear equation:
(i) git = a0 ln cit + a1lit + a2l
2
it +
∑
j
bjxjit + ct + ci + vit,
where subscripts i and t denote individual i at time t, git denotes life satisfaction,
cit real net household income, and lit hours worked. Furthermore, xjit are control
variables, ct are time-fixed effects, ci individual-fixed effects, and vit is the error
term. Note that I assume that the functional form of well-being is, apart from a
constant, identical across persons and additive in nature. Moreover, it is assumed
to be logarithmic in income and quadratic in hours worked. The latter assump-
tions on functional form are somewhat relaxed when I turn to semi-parametric
analysis in the next section which is devoted to testing the robustness of my re-
sults. Crucially, I assume that observed changes in income and working hours
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are exogenous to life satisfaction. Naturally, this latter assumption is a source of
concern in the absence of a proper quasi-experimental design. As discussed above,
I tried to address these concerns by restricting my sample to exclude the most
obvious cases of endogeneity.
The well-being based MRS of leisure for consumption is given by:
(2.53)
−gl,it
gc,it
=
(−a1
a0
+ 2
−a2
a0
lit
)
cit.
Hence, the estimation of equation (i) provides the first ingredient of the extent to
which people work too much, ∆it, and thus of the wedge on labor effort, ωit. The
second ingredient is given by the utility-based MRS. The first-order-condition of
individual utility maximization, equation (2.18), indicates that the utility-based
MRS is given by the person’s net marginal wage rate:
(2.54)
−ul,it
uc,it
= (1− T ′ (nitlit))nit.
The wage rate nit is calculated by dividing the individual ’s gross labor income by
the number of hours worked. The marginal tax rate is obtained by the follow-
ing procedure. First, total taxes are determined by taking the difference between
households’ gross and net labor income, including income-dependent transfers and
subsidies. Next, the resulting variable is smoothed over gross income and a nu-
merical derivative is taken. This numerical derivative is taken to be the marginal
tax rate. It is thus implicitly assumed that effective labor taxes are a function of
household labor income. While this assumption is less accurate for moderate-to-
high income workers as the income tax system in the United Kingdom is individual
based, it is more accurate for low-income workers as eligibility for transfers and
benefits generally depend on household income (see, e.g., Brewer, Saez and Shep-
hard (2010)).15 Figure 2.3 depicts the total tax schedule (first panel) and marginal
tax schedule (second panel) found in this way. Due to the phasing out of transfers
and benefits, marginal taxes are relatively high for low-income levels.
This provides all the ingredients needed to calculate ∆it. In order to obtain a
measure of the total wedge, ωit, ∆it needs to be multiplied by gc,it/λ. For this, I
assume there are no income effects, such that λ equals the simple average of the
15I also performed the exact same analysis while focussing on individual taxation. As expected,
this resulted in much lower marginal tax rates at the bottom, since the phasing out of household-
income dependent transfers and benefits are not taken into account. However, the general results
of this section remain entirely intact.
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Figure 2.3: Empirical total tax and marginal tax schedules
marginal well-being of income: λ =
∑
i,t gc,it/N where N is the total number of
individuals.
2.5.2 Evidence on suboptimal behavior and the wedge on
labor
The results of estimating equation (i) are given in Table 2.1. The first column
shows results for the entire sample, while the second and third columns show the
results of separate regressions for male and female respondents. For all regressions
the coefficient on income is significant and around 0.18, which is to say that a
percentage increase of net household income is associated with an increase in life
satisfaction of (approximately) a hundredth of 0.18 point. While this effect seems
rather small, it is in fact comparable to earlier results, for example from Layard,
Mayraz and Nickell (2008). As can be seen from the first column, the coefficient
on the linear working hours term is positive while the coefficient on the quadratic
term is negative. This is suggestive of an inverted-‘U’ shaped relationship between
life satisfaction and hours worked. It is easily verified that the top of this parabola
is around 30 hours of work, after which every additional working hour corresponds
with decreased life satisfaction. These findings are confirmed when the sample is
restricted to male respondents, but loses its statistical significance when the sample
is restricted to female respondents. The insignificant result for female respondents
might well be due to the small sample size, especially considering the fact that,
in the remaining sample, the average number of sampled years per person is less
than three.
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Table 2.1: Estimation results for equation (i)
All Male Female
log income 0.182*** 0.146*** 0.217***
(0.0332) (0.0392) (0.0641)
hours 0.00762** 0.00953** 0.00137
(0.00346) (0.00384) (0.00790)
hours squared -0.000126*** -0.000158*** -7.72e-06
(4.62e-05) (5.05e-05) (0.000111)
Observations 13,529 9,908 3,621
R-squared (within) 0.033 0.031 0.065
Number of individuals 4,194 2,942 1,252
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: life satisfaction. All regressions include age
dummies, subjective health dummies (on a scale from 1 to 5), year
dummies, and marital status dummies, as well as person-fixed effects.
By using equation (2.53) and the estimation results of Table 2.1 I can deter-
mine, for every individual in the sample, the well-being based MRS of leisure for
consumption. Substituting this and the empirical observation of the utility-based
MRS into equation (2.52), I obtain for every person and year in my sample a value
for ∆it. As discussed above, this value indicates the extent to which he or she
works too much. If positive, the person works too much from a well-being point
of view; if negative, the person works too little. Since (corrective) taxation is
conditioned on labor income, it is most informative to show how ∆it varies over
gross household labor income. The smoothed values of ∆it are depicted in the first
panel of Figure 2.4. This graph illustrates that up to a weekly gross labor income
of around £850, individuals tend to supply too little labor. Conversely, individ-
uals that earn more than that tend to supply too much labor from a well-being
perspective.
Now I can readily determine the total wedge on labor effort, ωit, as given
in equation (2.27), by substituting for the empirical marginal tax schedule, the
measure of overwork ∆it, and the marginal welfare weights git/λ. The smoothed
values of the total wedge are illustrated by the blue line in the second panel of
Figure 2.4. The red line shows the tax wedge, which is normally taken as the total
wedge on labor effort by studies that do not distinguish between utility and well-
being. Naturally, the actual wedge is larger than the tax wedge for people that work
42
How far away from their bliss point are people?
Figure 2.4: Overwork and wedges, full sample
Figure 2.5: Overwork and wedges, male subsample
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too little, and smaller than the tax wedge for people that work too much. As the
marginal welfare weights, git/λ, are rapidly decreasing with income, the difference
is more pronounced for low-income workers than for high-income workers. Low-
income workers could increase their own well-being by simply working more, but
for some reason do not act in the interest of their own well-being. As the total
wedge measures the social welfare gain of increased labor effort, this wedge is larger
than the tax wedge alone. For high-income workers the opposite holds: they work
too much from a well-being perspective. While increased labor effort from high-
income workers would raise tax revenue, it would also decrease their well-being.
Therefore the total wedge for high-income workers is lower than the tax wedge
alone would suggest.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the extent of overwork (first panel) and the total wedge on
labor effort (second panel) if the analysis is restricted to male workers only. As is
apparent, the previous results more or less carry over to a male-only sample. This
time, however, only the very-low income workers work too little from a well-being
perspective, whereas the rest works far too much. As a result, the total wedge on
labor effort for median-to-high income workers is much lower than the tax wedge
alone. In fact, the total wedge hovers around zero for a significant range of the
income distribution. This implies that for these income groups the tax revenue
gain associated with an increase in working hours would be completely offset by
well-being losses.
2.5.3 Discussion of results
The results in Figure 2.4 convey a potentially important implication for applied
studies of optimal taxation. If we do not distinguish between utility and well-being,
which indeed we usually do not, we might misappreciate the actual wedge on labor
effort by focussing solely on the marginal tax revenue gains of labor effort. The
standard approach to applied optimal taxation is to determine the optimal wedge
and compare this to the actually observed tax wedge. Policy recommendations
are distilled from the difference between the optimal wedge and the actual tax
wedge. However, as the analysis of Sections 1-3 shows, the optimal wedge should
in fact be compared to the actual total wedge, not just the actual tax wedge. If
the results in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 are correct, standard applied studies of optimal
taxation underestimate the actual wedge for low-income workers and overestimate
the actual wedge for high-income workers. As a result, their recommendations
understate the required tax decrease for low-income workers, as well as the required
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tax increase for high-income workers.
As a concrete example, consider the tax reforms that have recently been sug-
gested by Brewer, Saez and Shephard (2010) and Blundell and Shephard (2012)
for the United Kingdom. Both studies call for a reduction of marginal tax rates for
low-to-moderate earners. They conclude that marginal tax rates for low-income
workers are currently so high that the distortions on intensive labor supply are
too large to be justified by any redistributional gains. Taking into account the
results from Figure 2.4, these recommendations hold a fortiori. After all, since
low earners work too little from a well-being point of view, the total wedge on
labor is even larger than what the tax wedge suggests. Consequently, marginal
tax rates should be lowered even further than above studies suggest.
An important caveat pertains to the question why low-income workers make too
little working hours. So far I assumed that it is a matter of supply, that low-income
workers refuse to make more hours even though it would enhance their well-being.
However, an alternative explanation is that low-income workers face demand re-
strictions due to above market-clearing wages, e.g., minimum wages, union wages,
efficiency wages, or other forms of downward wage rigidity. In that case, decreas-
ing marginal tax rates is not useful as the induced labor supply increase would not
affect labor demand and therefore not translate in more actual hours worked. In
fact, as I illustrate in Gerritsen (2013a, Chapter 5 of this Dissertation), demand
restrictions provide a motive for higher, rather than lower, marginal tax rates.
As is true for much of the literature on optimal taxation, the interpretation of the
results of this chapter is only valid in the case of supply-determined labor markets.
2.6 Robustness
Potentially crucial to the above analysis is the specific functional form of the well-
being function. In the previous section I simply assumed that well-being was
additive in its arguments, logarithmic in income, and quadratic in working hours.
In this section, I retain the assumption on additivity but attempt to determine
the sensitivity of the results to the way in which income and working hours enter
the well-being function. As theoretically very little can be said on the functional
form of well-being, I apply semi-parametric regression techniques that allow for a
large degree of flexibility with respect to the specific functional form.
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Figure 2.6: Non-parametric estimation results for income and working hours
2.6.1 Income
I first try to get a better understanding of the relationship between life satisfaction
and income. For this, I estimate the following partially linear model:
(ii) git = φc(cit) + a1lit + a2l
2
it +
∑
j
bjxjit + ct + ci + uit,
where all variables are the same as before, and φc(·) is an unspecified function. The
equation is estimated, using the algorithm developed by Lokshin (2006), who uses
a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess) estimator to determine φc(·).
The resulting values of φc(cit), for different levels of cit, are shown in the first
panel of Figure 2.6. The blue line illustrates the estimated values for both male
and female, and the green (red) line illustrates the estimated values if the sample
is restricted to males (females) only.16 These results are suggestive of a concave
relationship between well-being and income, although seemingly linear for females.
However, even if the relationship between well-being and income is concave, it
does not follow that a logarithmic specification is the correct one. For example,
Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2008) find in a similar setup that the relationship
is slightly more concave than a logarithmic relation would imply. To determine
whether the results of Section 4 are sensitive to the degree of concavity, I estimate
16Due to computational limitations because of the large number of individual dummies, I was
forced to randomly discard a fifth of the sample when estimating equation (ii) for both male and
female respondents. I therefore reiterated the same analysis many times, each time with highly
similar results.
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Figure 2.7: Overwork and wedges based on equation (iii), for ρ = 0.1 (upper
panels), ρ = 0.5 (middle panels), and ρ = 1.5 (lower panels)
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the following equation:
(iii) git = a0
(
c1−ρit − 1
1− ρ
)
+ a1lit + a2l
2
it +
∑
j
bjxjit + ct + ci + uit,
for various values of ρ, allowing for varying degrees of concavity. On the basis of
these estimations I derive the degree of overwork, ∆it, and the total wedge, ωit.
Results for ρ = {0.1, 0.5, 1.5} are depicted in Figure 2.7.17 As can be seen, the
conclusions on overwork and the total wedge remain in line with those of Section
4. Low-income workers work too little, while high-income workers work too much.
Consequently, the total wedge on labor for low-income workers exceeds the tax
wedge, whereas the total wedge for high-skilled workers is smaller than the tax
wedge. Only in the case of a very low degree of concavity (ρ = 0.1), even the
moderately poor seem to be working too much.
2.6.2 Working hours
Next, I further determine the results’ sensitivity to the way working hours enter
the well-being function. I estimate the following equation:
(iv) git = a0 ln cit + φh(lit) +
∑
j
bjxjit + ct + ci + uit,
with φh(·) an unspecified function to be estimated non-parametrically. The result-
ing estimated values for φh(lit), separately for the full sample (blue), and the male
(green) and female (red) subsamples, are shown in the second panel of Figure 2.6.
For both the full sample and the male subsample, the relationship between life
satisfaction and working hours appears to resemble an inverted ‘U’. This corrobo-
rates the results of the parametric regressions in which the quadratic specification
of working hours indicated a similar relationship. For female respondents no clear
relationship is visible, which also corroborates earlier findings.
Even if the semi-parametric estimation indicates an inverted-‘U’ shaped pat-
tern, this does not imply that the quadratic specification is correct. To test the
robustness of my results, I therefore determine the marginal well-being of labor
hours, gl,it, by numerically taking the derivative of the estimated values of φh(lit).
Together with the estimated value of gc,it from equation (iv), this allows me to
17To save on space, I only depict the results for these three values of ρ. The results remain
broadly the same for any other positive value of ρ that I tried.
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Figure 2.8: Overwork and wedges based on equation (iv)
determine values for ∆it and ωit. These values are illustrated in Figure 2.8. As
before, low-income workers appear to be working too little, whereas high-skilled
workers are working too much. Hence, the results of Section 4 appear insensitive
to the way in which income and working hours enter the well-being function.
2.7 Concluding remarks
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that integrates the large
empirical literature on the determinants of subjective well-being with the rigorous
study of public finance. It is based on the notion that utility and well-being are
not necessarily the same. Taking serious the potential divergence between utility
and well-being, I find that the resulting optimal wedge on labor (or a specific good,
labor participation, or education) is virtually identical to the one derived under
conventional studies. However, the wedge itself now consists of the well-being
consequences of drawing an individual farther from or closer to its well-being bliss
point, as well as the standard tax wedge. Optimal marginal tax rates should be
higher for workers that work too much from a well-being perspective, and lower
for workers that work too little.
Using data on life satisfaction as a measure of a person’s true well-being, I
estimate the effect of income and working hours on well-being for a large panel
of British individuals. On the basis of this estimation I conclude that low-income
workers work less than optimal from a well-being point of view. Higher-income
workers, on the other hand, work too much. Moreover, this finding is robust to
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varying assumptions on the functional form of well-being. Compared to standard
derivations of optimal tax rates, and provided low-income labor does not face
demand restrictions, these results thus endorse lower marginal tax rates at the
lower end of the income distribution, and higher marginal tax rates at the higher
end of the income distribution. Recommendations of recent studies, calling for a
reduction of marginal tax rates for low earners in the United Kingdom, therefore
hold a fortiori.
Perhaps more important, this study shows that it is possible to combine the
rigor and emphasis on incentives that is so typical for the theory of optimal tax-
ation, with an alternative measurement of well-being. My hope is that this might
contribute to (i) more attention to economic incentives and optimal policy within
applied studies of the determinants of subjective well-being, and (ii) a less dog-
matic approach to well-being within public finance.
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Minimum wages and taxation in
competitive labor markets with
endogenous skill formation
3.1 Introduction
The desirability of a minimum wage has been fiercely debated by both policy mak-
ers and academics.1 Proponents emphasize that a minimum wage leads to a higher
income for low-income employees. Opponents mainly stress that it leads to higher
unemployment rates as workers with productivity levels below the minimum wage
find themselves unable to secure a job. As of yet, this debate has not been settled.
Minimum wages were an important topic in the 2009 and 2013 federal elections in
Germany, one of nine countries within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) without a statutory minimum wage (Immervoll, 2013),
as well as in the American and French presidential elections of 2012. As noted by
Cahuc and Laroque (2013), the OECD itself changed its appraisal of a minimum
wage at least twice in the 1990s. The empirical literature on the effects of a min-
imum wage likewise seems to lack consensus. Some surveys report employment
effects of a minimum wage to be absent or even positive (e.g., Card and Krueger,
1995), while in a more recent survey, Neumark and Wascher (2006) argue that the
vast majority of the evidence points to a negative employment effect, albeit not
always statistically significant.
The evidence on the effect of minimum wages on human capital investments,
1This chapter is based on joint work with Bas Jacobs, see Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013b).
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whether it concerns adolescent education or on-the-job training, seems to be even
more ambiguous. As we argue below, it is a priori unclear how minimum wages
affect human capital investments. On the one hand, a higher minimum wage
drives down the skill premium, thereby undermining incentives to develop skills.
On the other hand, if mainly low-skilled wages are affected by the minimum wage,
it will lead to higher unemployment among the low-skilled, thereby providing more
incentives to develop skills so as to avoid involuntary unemployment.
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to our understanding of the eco-
nomic effects of minimum wages in two ways. From a positive perspective we
determine how minimum wages affect the incentives to acquire skills, and identify
conditions under which higher minimum wages lead to more skill formation. From
a normative perspective we aim to contribute to the debate on the desirability
of minimum wages by analyzing whether minimum wages are part of an optimal
redistributive policy when skill formation is endogenous - and how this depends on
the effect of minimum wages on skill formation. Importantly, we allow for income
taxes as an alternative instrument to redistribute income.
We develop a general-equilibrium model with perfectly competitive labor mar-
kets. Firms demand both low-skilled and high-skilled labor. Individuals are het-
erogeneous with respect to their disutility of work. They optimally decide, first,
to become either low-skilled or high-skilled, and, second, how many labor hours
to supply. Individuals with little disutility of work have both an absolute and
comparative advantage of working in high-skilled jobs, and thus end up becom-
ing high-skilled, whereas high-disutility individuals become low-skilled. Minimum
wages are binding for the low-skilled market segment, causing involuntary unem-
ployment among the low-skilled only. As such, a minimum wage simultaneously
discourages skill formation, by boosting low-skilled wages, and stimulates skill
formation through higher unemployment.
We demonstrate that the net effect of a minimum wage on skill formation
critically depends on the substitutability of high-skilled and low-skilled labor in the
production function. Intuitively, if substitutability is high, a given increase in the
minimum wage will cause firms to strongly substitute away from low-skilled labor,
leading to a large increase in unemployment. If the substitutability is high enough,
the increase in unemployment will outweigh the increase in the skill premium, and
skill formation will rise. More specifically we show that in the absence of skill-
dependent taxes and transfers, a minimum wage leads to more skill formation if
the elasticity of substitution is larger than one, which seems to be the empirically
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plausible case.
The government maximizes a social welfare function featuring redistributive
concerns. Due to informational constraints individualized lump-sum taxes are
ruled out, such that the government needs to resort to distortionary income taxa-
tion and minimum wages to achieve its redistributive goals. The welfare effects of
a minimum wage are studied in three different policy regimes, which are progres-
sively more complex in the government’s instrument set.
First, we determine the desirability of a minimum wage in the absence of in-
come taxation. While this regime is obviously unrealistic, it helps in understanding
the welfare consequences of a minimum wage in a relatively simple setup. In the
absence of taxation, the social welfare gains of a minimum wage are a higher de-
gree of income equality between low-skilled and high-skilled workers, and a higher
degree of income equality among high-skilled workers as a higher minimum wage
leads to lower high-skilled wages through general equilibrium effects. The social
welfare losses of a minimum wage are given by higher inequality among low-skilled
workers and the utility losses of laid off workers. Whether the gains outweigh the
losses, and thus whether a minimum wage is optimally implemented, is ambiguous
and crucially depends on initial inequalities, social redistributive preferences, and
the minimum-wage elasticity of unemployment.
Second, we study the welfare effects of a minimum wage in a policy regime
with skill-independent income taxation, i.e., taxation that cannot be conditioned
on skill type. We believe this policy regime is of practical relevance as in reality
redistributive taxes are hardly ever targeted on people’s skill type. Even if some
taxes and subsidies are targeted on skills, such as education subsidies, they are
highly restricted in their capacity to target minimum-wage workers (i.e., in prac-
tice there are both educated minimum-wage earners and uneducated workers that
earn more than the minimum wage). When the government sets taxes that are
not conditioned on skill type, a minimum wage tends to lead to additional welfare
losses as increased unemployment erodes the income tax base and therefore reduces
tax revenue. However, taxes cannot be targeted well to deal with both inequality
within skill groups and between high- and low-skilled workers. There might there-
fore be a role for the minimum wage in its capacity to redistribute income between
skill groups if, for a given amount of redistribution, the welfare costs associated
with a higher minimum wage (utility and tax revenue losses from higher unemploy-
ment) are sufficiently smaller than the welfare costs associated with higher income
taxes (tax revenue losses from lower intensive labor supply). Minimum wages can
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in that case be seen to correct for the distributional imperfection of taxes that
cannot be conditioned on skill type.
Third, we study the welfare effects of a binding minimum wage if the govern-
ment can condition its tax instruments on skill type. In this policy regime, there is
no distributional imperfection associated with taxes, and the government can use
its tax instruments to achieve the exact same distributional effects of a minimum
wage. That is, decreasing taxes on low-skilled income and increasing taxes on
high-skilled income results in a higher net income for the low-skilled and lower net
income for the high-skilled, just as a higher minimum wage would. This moreover
leads to the same degree of distortion on the intensive labor supply margin. A
minimum wage thus only differs from a distributionally equivalent tax-rate adjust-
ment by causing higher unemployment and, as a direct result of this, more skill
formation. Higher unemployment leads to utility losses and an erosion of the tax
base. Higher skill formation, on the other hand, constitutes a welfare gain through
higher tax revenues, provided that taxes are set progressively. A minimum wage is
desirable if the benefits of higher skill formation outstrip the costs of higher unem-
ployment. Thus, while in the policy regime with skill-independent tax instruments
the role of a minimum wage is primarily to help redistribute income, in the regime
with skill-dependent tax instruments its role is to reduce the inefficiency caused
by taxation.
In most of this chapter, we assume that every low-skilled worker has an equal
probability of becoming unemployed, i.e. that rationing occurs uniformly and on
the extensive margin. The uncomfortable fact is that we do not really know in
what way employment is decreased due to a minimum wage. We therefore also
study a separate case in which unemployment is ‘efficient,’ implying that hours of
work, rather than jobs, are rationed. In that case, there is no first-order utility loss
associated with the unemployment caused by a marginally binding minimum wage.
This ensures that a minimum wage is always optimal in the absence of taxation.
However, in the presence of skill-independent taxes and transfers, the optimality
of a minimum wage is still ambiguous. In the presence of skill-dependent taxes
and transfers, a minimum wage is redundant as it can be perfectly mimicked by
taxation.
Our work is most closely related to Lee and Saez (2012), Gerritsen and Jacobs
(2013a, Chapter 4 of this Dissertation), and Gerritsen (2013a, Chapter 5 of this
Dissertation). Lee and Saez (2012) also determine the desirability of a minimum
wage in competitive labor markets, but focus on the extensive margin and assume
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efficient rationing, whereas we incorporate an intensive-margin labor-supply deci-
sion and focus mainly on uniform extensive-margin rationing. In Gerritsen and
Jacobs (2013a), we determine how the desirability of a minimum wage depends
on specific assumptions on the efficiency of rationing, and, contrary to this chap-
ter, we focus purely on a policy regime with skill-dependent taxation and do not
discuss optimal tax policy. Finally, Gerritsen (2013a) studies how optimal tax
policy depends on the efficiency of rationing, but focusses on extensive-margin
labor-supply decisions and does not discuss the minimum wage.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 is devoted to a discussion of
relevant literature. Section 3.3 introduces the theoretical model, the comparative
statics of which are derived in Section 3.4. In Sections 3.5 and 3.6 we discuss
the welfare effects of a minimum wage in the presence of skill-independent and
skill-dependent tax instruments, respectively. In Section 3.7 we study the case of
efficient rationing. We close the chapter with some concluding remarks.
3.2 Related literature
3.2.1 Theory
There are roughly two approaches to studying the implications of a minimum wage.
One strand of the literature takes certain market imperfections in the labor mar-
ket as given and determines how a minimum wage affects efficiency, employment,
and/or social welfare. A popular assumption is that employers have a degree of
monopsony power over wages, leading to inefficiently low wages. The classical ar-
gument is due to Robinson (1933). Indeed, it is straightforward to show that, in
a partial-equilibrium setting with a monopsonist in the labor market, wages and
employment are set inefficiently low. In that case, a binding minimum wage might
be employed to ensure an efficient outcome. In a more realistic setting, however,
this argument quickly becomes problematic. As Stigler (1946) argues, the opti-
mum wage will vary with occupation, among firms and, often rapidly, through
time. Therefore, “[a] uniform national minimum wage, infrequently changed, is
wholly unsuited to these diversities of conditions”.
More recent studies bring further nuance to the discussion. For example, Man-
ning (2003), focussing on employment, considers a general-equilibrium model with
heterogeneous firms and concludes that a minimum wage might have opposing
employment effects for different firms, leaving the aggregate employment effect
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ambiguous. Bhaskar and To (1999) consider monopsonistic competition with exit
and entry of firms, firm-specific job types and heterogeneous preferences for job
types, and reach a similar conclusion. While a minimum wage increases employ-
ment per firm, it also forces some firms to exit the market, leaving aggregate
employment and welfare outcomes ambiguous. Still, as Cahuc and Laroque (2013)
show, with a sufficiently rich set of tax instruments the government can always
reach the second-best competitive allocation without any need to resort to mini-
mum wages.
The minimum wage is also studied in frameworks combining monopsony power
with other market imperfections. For example, Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) study
a model in which firms imperfectly monitor their employees and therefore set
efficiency wages to motivate them not to shirk. If higher labor supply leads to
costlier monitoring, they show that a minimum wage will increase employment over
the short term, with ambiguous results over the long term. Cahuc, Saint-Martin
and Zylberberg (2001) introduce a model where high- and low-skilled wages are
bargained over between employers and unions that represent high-skilled workers.
They show that a higher minimum wage might reduce the unions’ bargaining
power over the high-skilled wage, potentially leading to more employment for both
low-skilled and high-skilled workers through general equilibrium effects. Flinn
(2006) analyzes a matching model of the labor market and argue that if workers’
bargaining power is too low for the Hosios (1990) efficiency condition to hold, a
minimum wage might function as a crude measure to push labor market outcomes
towards efficiency. In a similar vain, Hungerbu¨hler and Lehmann (2009) find that
a binding minimum wage might be part of an optimal redistributive policy as an
indirect way to increase workers’ bargaining power, even if the government uses
non-linear income taxation to achieve its redistributive goals.
The second strand of the literature, which is closer in spirit to the present
study, applies an optimal-taxation framework to competitive labor markets and
heterogeneous workers with either continuous skill types as in Mirrlees (1971) or,
more often, two skill types as in Stiglitz (1982). In the latter tradition, Allen
(1987) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1987) show that a minimum wage might be
optimal as part of a redistributive policy if the government is confined to linear
taxation only. However, if non-linear taxation is available, a minimum wage is
never optimal as it raises the attractiveness for high-skilled workers to imitate
the low-skilled, thereby tightening the incentive-compatibility constraint. This
approach has been criticized by Lee and Saez (2012) on informational grounds.
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They argue that a government needs to be able to distinguish high-skilled from
low-skilled workers in order to enforce a minimum wage, thereby making incentive-
compatibility constraints irrelevant. The studies of Marceau and Boadway (1994)
and Boadway and Cuff (2001) are liable to the same criticism. They combine
a minimum wage with unemployment insurance and find that a minimum wage
might still be optimal in combination with a non-linear tax schedule. Assuming
that individuals can only apply for unemployment benefits if they are unable to find
a job, Boadway and Cuff (2001) show that a minimum wage provides information
about the bottom of the skill distribution, which can not be obtained by merely
using taxes.
Almost any study takes skill levels of individuals as exogenously given. Two
exceptions with endogenous skill formation on the extensive margin are Saint-Paul
(1996) and Cahuc and Michel (1996). In Saint-Paul (1996), as in our model, an in-
crease in low-skilled unemployment causes more individuals to become high-skilled.
As he assumes perfect substitutability between high- and low-skilled labor, higher
low-skilled unemployment might thereby lead to lower labor productivity and to
even higher levels of unemployment in the case of real wage rigidity. The imple-
mentation of a binding minimum wage might thereby induce increasing returns to
education and soaring low-skilled unemployment rates, reaching levels of up to a
hundred percent. As we assume imperfect substitutability, such an extreme result
is not attainable in our model. Cahuc and Michel (1996) develop an overlapping
generations model with a high-skilled and a low-skilled production sector. Fur-
thermore, high-skilled production exhibits positive externalities and, hence, serves
as a catalyst of endogenous growth. They show that if a minimum wage increases
human capital formation, this can lead to higher growth.2 Our model exhibits
similar extensive skill-formation as in Cahuc and Michel, although we analyze the
effects of a minimum wage in an optimal-taxation setting without externalities.
Lee and Saez (2012) and Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013a, Chapter 4 of this Dis-
sertation) are particularly closely related to the current study as they analyze the
optimality of a minimum wage alongside optimal taxes and transfers in models
with two skill types and competitive labor markets. Lee and Saez study the case
in which rationing is efficient, such that new entrants are unable to find a job in a
rationed low-skilled labor market. In that case, a binding minimum wage might be
optimal to implement as it effectively mutes the distortionary effects of a transfer
2Naturally, as in the case of monopsonistic labor markets, this begs the question why the
externalities are not internalized by appropriately setting taxes.
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towards low-skilled workers. In Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013a), we derive a general
optimality condition for a binding minimum wage that hold for any arbitrary ra-
tioning schedule, including but not restricted to efficient rationing. Calibration of
this condition shows that a minimum wage decrease yields a Pareto-improvement
in all countries under consideration, except possibly the United States. The cur-
rent study distinguishes itself from Lee and Saez (2012) mainly by its focus on
uniform rationing – i.e., a common probability of unemployment for every low-
skilled worker – and from Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013a) by its focus on the skill
formation and social welfare effects of a binding minimum wage under varying tax
regimes.
3.2.2 Informational inconsistency
Following the seminal analysis of Mirrlees (1971), modern literature on public
finance builds on the assumption that the fundamental source of heterogeneity
across individuals is private information, unverifiable by the government. Typi-
cally, heterogeneity is assumed to originate from varying wage rates, or earning
ability. The government can only observe total labor earnings, which is the product
of the wage rate and the total number of hours worked. Since tax policy can only
be conditioned on observables, and therefore not on earnings ability, a first-best
outcome cannot be attained. However, to be able to implement a minimum wage,
the government must observe individual wage rates. This leads to the problem of
informational inconsistency : in the Mirrlees (1971) framework it contradicts the
assumption that wage rates are private information and are thus not verifiable by
the government. Indeed, information on individual wage rates theoretically enables
the government to reach any desired redistribution without efficiency losses by im-
plementing individualized lump-sum taxes and transfers. Consequently, studies
that use the Mirrlees framework for the analysis of minimum wages usually make
an – often implicit – ad hoc assumption that information required for the imple-
mentation of minimum wages cannot be used for taxes and transfers. Guesnerie
and Roberts (1987, p.498), somewhat euphemistically, remark that “this is a some-
what mixed observability assumption.”
The informational inconsistency appears when the source of heterogeneity can
be defined in terms of observable variables. In the standard Mirrlees exercise, for
example, exogenous earning ability can be defined as n ≡ z
l
, z labor income, and
l the number of hours worked. First best is not attainable because only z, and
not l, is observable. If a minimum wage is introduced in this framework as, for
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example, in Boadway and Cuff (2001), first best is attainable since the wage rate
must be observable and, obviously, the exogenous ability can be defined in terms
of the wage rate n ≡ w.
The exact same inconsistency occurs when introducing minimum wage legisla-
tion in a model based on Stiglitz (1982), see for example Allen (1987), Marceau
and Boadway (1994), Cahuc and Michel (1996), Aronsson and Koskela (2008), and
Danziger and Danziger (2010). They all assume, contrary to Mirrlees, that workers
with different wage rates are imperfect substitutes. Still, because in these models
wage rates are generally exogenously given and the sole source of heterogeneity, we
can again write n ≡ w, which implies first best is attainable once the government
can observe wage rates. This result suggests that to be informationally consistent,
we need to direct attention away from models in which the source of heterogeneity
can be defined by the wage rate.
One way to do this is to introduce a labor-effort decision alongside an hours-of-
work decision. Denoting labor effort as e, we can define the wage rate w ≡ en, or
alternatively, earnings ability as n ≡ w
e
. As long as the government cannot observe
effort, exogenous ability cannot be defined by observables only, and first best is
not attainable. This approach is taken by Deltas (2007).
An alternative approach is taken by Lee and Saez (2012). The model of Lee
and Saez includes multiple job types and individuals supply one unit of labor if
employed (l = 1). Thus, earnings are given by z ≡ w, which is verifiable by the
government so that it can enforce a minimum wage and set income-tax policy. To
avoid a first-best outcome, without violating informational consistency, individuals
are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their costs of participation in a
particular job, which are unrelated to earnings and thus unobserved. These costs
of participation, θ, cannot simply be defined in terms of observables, making the
first-best allocation infeasible. In the model below, we adopt, like Lee and Saez,
disutility of work as the fundamental source of heterogeneity across individuals,
safeguarding us from informational inconsistency.3
3.2.3 Empirics
There is a large empirical literature on the effects of minimum wages on employ-
ment, which has recently been surveyed by Neumark and Wascher (2006). Most
3Nevertheless, in Section 3.5 we do study the social welfare effects of minimum wages in the
case that the government does not condition its tax instruments on skill type, and thus does not
fully use the information at hand.
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studies find that minimum wages reduce employment, although the estimates are
not always significant. This is in line with our model of competitive labor markets,
which predicts minimum wages to lead to a decline in labor demand. Still, there are
some notable exceptions that find non-negative employment effects , which would
be more difficult to reconcile with our model (e.g., Card and Krueger, 1995). Since
the seminal contribution by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), a smaller litera-
ture emerged on the effects of minimum-wage legislation on the wage distribution
(e.g, Lee, 1999; Teulings, 2000, 2003; Autor, Manning and Smith, 2010). This
literature often emphasizes general-equilibrium effects on wages rates that exceed
the minimum wage. Such general-equilibrium effects are taken into account in
our model, which predicts higher minimum wages to lead to a compressed wage
distribution by simultaneously raising low-skilled wages and reducing high-skilled
wages.
When it comes to the effect of minimum wages on skill formation, empirical
results are much scarcer and more ambiguous. A number of potential effects
of higher minimum wages on skill formation are recognized. When minimum
wages lead to a compression of wages, the net return of human capital investments
will drop, leading to less skill formation. However, if employment opportunities
decline for low-skilled jobs, skill formation might be boosted in order to avoid
unemployment. These arguments hold for investments in education and, perhaps
to a lesser degree, for employee-financed on-the-job training. However, for on-the-
job training additional arguments play a role. On the one hand, employees might
finance their training by accepting a lower hourly wage rate, the possibility of
which is diminished by a higher minimum wage (e.g., Rosen, 1972). On the other
hand, if training is firm-sponsored and labor markets are not perfectly competitive,
a minimum wage might decrease the rents on low-skilled labor, leading to more
investment in on-the-job training such that firms can obtain higher rents (e.g.,
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999).
The studies that try to capture the effect of minimum wages on skill formation
can be divided in those that explain school enrollment and related variables and
those that explain on-the-job training. The evidence on either of the two human-
capital variables is scarce and ambiguous. Moreover, most studies are unsuited to
evaluate the distinct effects of minimum wages on skill formation – i.e., through
a compressed wage structure and through higher unemployment – and analyze
which effect dominates. Empirical studies of school enrollment are often flawed in
this respect because they usually control for unemployment, such that estimates
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only show the direct minimum wage effect through the wage structure.4 Studies of
on-the-job training are often confounded, because minimum wages can impact the
training decision in many different ways as it is usually a joint decision of employer
and employee, each with their own incentives. For example, even if a minimum
wage would lead to higher demand for on-the-job-training from the perspective
of employees, an employer might be less interested in training its workers as the
returns to training cannot be deducted from the wage rate of a minimum-wage
worker. Data seem to be too weak to adequately take account of the different
incentives.5 Hence, amongst empirical ambiguity, we hope to contribute to our
understanding of minimum wage legislation by theoretically identifying under what
circumstances a minimum wage leads to more or less skill formation.
3.3 Model
We assume a unit mass of individuals and two job-types: high-skilled jobs and low-
skilled jobs. We assume that wages on the high-skilled labor market are perfectly
flexible to assure there is no unemployment among high-skilled workers. The
government might, however, impose a binding minimum wage on the market for
low-skilled labor. Unemployment will therefore be concentrated on the group of
low-skilled workers. Thus, workers can either be unemployed low-skilled, employed
low-skilled, or employed high-skilled workers. The fractions of each are denoted
4Studies that find that higher minimum wages lead to less schooling if controlling for the
unemployment rate, include Cunningham (1981); Neumark and Wascher (1995a,b, 2003); Landon
(1997); Chaplin, Turner and Pape (2003); Montmarquette, Viennot-Briot and Dagenais (2007);
Pacheco and Cruickshank (2007). Interestingly, Cunningham (1981) only controls for the white
unemployment rate and finds the schooling effect of minimum wages reversed for black youths.
Similarly, Pacheco and Cruickshank (2007) find that the negative effect of higher minimum wages
on enrollment rates is significant at a level of 1 percent when controlling for the unemployment
rate, but only significant at a level of 10 percent if not. A number of studies do not find a
significant effect of minimum wages on education, even when controlling for unemployment,
see Ragan (1977); Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982); Card (1992); Crofton, Anderson and Rawe
(2009). Only Mattila (1981) finds a positive effect of minimum wages on education, although
this might be caused by the fact that she controls for the unemployment rate among people
aged 35-44, which might be fairly irrelevant for students deciding whether to enroll for school.
These findings suggest the importance of distinguishing the distinct effects of a minimum wage
on skill formation. We express our hopes that future empirical research will give due attention to
minimum wage effects stemming from a compressed wage structure and minimum wage effects
stemming from higher unemployment.
5This is apparent in the contradictory findings. Negative effects of minimum wages on training
are found by Hashimoto (1982); Schiller (1994); Neumark and Wascher (2001). Positive effects are
found by Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2004); Dustmann and Scho¨nberg (2009). Insignificant,
or non-robust findings are presented by Mincer and Leighton (1981); Grossberg and Sicilian
(1999); Acemoglu and Pischke (1999); Fairris and Pedace (2004).
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by NU , NL, and NH , respectively (NU +NL+NH = 1). For short, we will denote
the unemployed low-skilled as the unemployed. Similarly, the employed low-skilled
workers are referred to as low-skilled workers. Type-specific variables are indexed
with superscripts U , L, and H.
We assume that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their ability, θ.
Rather than making the assumption, common in the optimal tax literature, that
θ reflects the productivity per hour worked, we instead assume that θ reflects the
utility cost per hour worked.6 A higher θ implies that utility costs per hour worked
are lower. This assumption is similar to Lee and Saez (2012), who also assume
that more able workers have lower costs of participation, rather than higher labor
productivity. Moreover, we assume that individuals with a higher ability enjoy a
comparative advantage of performing high-skilled work, whereas individuals with
a low level of ability enjoy a comparative advantage for low-skilled work. θ has
support [θ, θ] and follows a cumulative distribution function G(θ) with correspond-
ing density function g(θ). We assume that θ > 0, which in our model implies that
in the absence of unemployment insurance, individuals prefer being employed over
being unemployed.
Individuals decide on the number or working hours and on whether to invest in
human capital. The number of working hours is chosen to maximize utility, which
is increasing in income and decreasing in the number of hours worked. Since more
able high-skilled individuals have a lower cost of work, they supply more labor for
a given wage rate. Hours worked are denoted by lL for low-skilled workers and by
lH for high-skilled workers. Human-capital investment is made on the extensive
margin, i.e., it is a discrete decision to become a skilled worker. The skilled wage
is denoted by wH , and the unskilled wage rate is denoted by wL. If the individual
invests in human capital, he earns wH lH , if not, he earns wLlL.
3.3.1 Individual optimization
Utility is denoted by V and is assumed to be separable and quasi-linear in consump-
tion and working hours. Moreover, it exhibits a constant labor supply elasticity on
the intensive margin, ε, which is assumed to be equal for both low and high-skilled
6Due to this assumption we manage to avoid the informational inconsistency to which we
alluded in Section 3.2. It moreover ensures that hourly labor earnings are constant within groups
and that a non-negligible share of the population earns the minimum wage, which conforms with
reality. This cannot be the case if θ would reflect labor productivity. That is, had θ reflected
exogenously given marginal productivity, any person with θ above the minimum wage would be
hired and the mass of workers earning the minimum wage would be zero.
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workers.
Initially, we assume that tax instruments are not differentiated according to
skill type. Moreover, we restrict attention to linear instruments throughout this
chapter. Hence, labor income is taxed at a common rate, t. In addition, tax
revenue is rebated as a non-individualized lump-sum transfer, T . Later we explore
the robustness of our results by allowing for skill-dependent instruments. Thus,
with skill-independent tax policy, utility when unemployed, low skilled, and high
skilled are given by:
V U ≡ T,(3.1)
V Lθ ≡ T + (1− t)wLlL −
1
θβ
(lL)1+1/ε
1 + 1/ε
,(3.2)
V Hθ ≡ T + (1− t)wH lH −
1
θ
(lH)1+1/ε
1 + 1/ε
.(3.3)
Variables that depend on ability are denoted by a subscript θ. Note that there is no
disutility of labor for unemployed workers, since they do not work. For employed
workers, the marginal costs of labor supply are inversely related to ability, θ. As
we assume that β ∈ (0, 1), individuals with a higher ability have a comparative
advantage in doing high-skilled work. The higher is ability, the lower are the
costs of labor effort in high-skilled jobs relative to the costs of labor effort in low-
skilled jobs. This comparative advantage is stronger if β is lower. Since marginal
utility of consumption is constant, households are risk-neutral with respect to the
probability of becoming unemployed.7 Each worker first decides to invest in human
capital or not, and then, given the skill level, they optimally supply labor. We
solve this optimization problem backwards.
Optimal labor supply for high- and low-skilled employed workers is given by:
lHθ = (θ(1− t)wH)ε,(3.4)
lLθ = (θ
β(1− t)wL)ε.(3.5)
Labor supply is an increasing function of the gross wage rate, decreasing in the tax
rate and increasing with ability, θ. There are no income effects in labor supply,
7Allowing for risk-aversion would strengthen our result that a minimum wage leads to higher
human capital accumulation (if the substitution elasticity is larger than one), see below. In that
case, unemployment does not only raise skill formation by lowering expected utility of being low
skilled, but also by increasing the variance in low skilled earnings. However, if unemployment is
not concentrated on specific individuals, but instead spread uniformly across low-skilled workers,
risk aversion would disappear, since the variance in low-skilled earnings would be nil.
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which facilitates the analysis considerably. Substituting these expressions into
the utility functions for low-skilled and high-skilled workers yields the following
indirect utility functions:
V U = T,(3.6)
V Lθ = T +
θβε((1− t)wL)1+ε
1 + ε
,(3.7)
V Hθ = T +
θε((1− t)wH)1+ε
1 + ε
.(3.8)
Individuals decide to invest in human capital if and only if their ability, θ,
is such that their utility from being high-skilled is larger than or equal to the
expected utility of being low-skilled.8 We assume rationing is uniform so that
the probability of becoming unemployed is equal for every low-skilled individual
and does not depend on θ.9 Hence, individuals decide to become high-skilled if
V Hθ ≥ uV U + (1 − u)V Lθ , where u ≡ NU/(NL + NU) is the unemployment rate
amongst the low-skilled, defined as the share of the low-skilled population that
is unemployed. Thus, we obtain a cut-off ability, Θ, for the individual who is
indifferent between becoming skilled or staying unskilled:
(3.9) Θ = (1− u) 1ε(1−β)
(
wH
wL
)− 1+ε
ε(1−β)
.
The cut-off ability decreases with both the skill premium, w
H
wL
, and the unemploy-
ment rate, u. A larger skill premium increases the benefits of being high-skilled,
thereby leading to a decrease of the cut-off level of ability, Θ. Similarly, a higher
unemployment rate increases the relative benefits of being skilled, since high-skilled
workers are not affected by unemployment. Thus, a larger unemployment rate de-
creases the cut-off level of ability. The minimum wage therefore has an ambiguous
8Alternatively, we could speak of self-selection or sorting into skill levels. Our model is thus
equivalent to an occupational-choice model with a high-skilled (high-wage) occupation and a
low-skilled (low-wage) occupation.
9Our assumption of uniform rationing along the extensive margin, i.e., by laying off workers,
is not innocuous. Rationing could as well be dependent on the ability level, θ, or could occur
along the intensive margin by restricting hours. In Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013a, Chapter 4
of this Dissertation), we analyze the welfare consequences of a binding minimum wage in a
more general setup in which individual unemployment rates may or may not depend on θ. Had
rationing occurred along the intensive margin, it would be more efficient than rationing along the
extensive margin. In an unrationed situation the marginal gain of an extra hour of work equals
the marginal cost, such that a marginal level of intensive rationing does not have any welfare
cost. We discuss the implications of such efficient rationing in a later section.
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effect on skill formation. On the one hand, it lowers the skill premium. On the
other hand, it raises unemployment among low-skilled workers. Note that the
tax instruments do not affect skill formation. The reason for this is that skill-
independent taxes symmetrically affect both the costs of skill formation (foregone
low-skilled earnings) and the benefits of skill formation (high-skilled earnings). In-
dividuals respond more elastically to wage differentials and unemployment rates if
the elasticity of labor supply, ε, decreases, or if comparative advantage is weaker,
i.e. β higher. Intuitively, a low ε and a high β make individuals more similar
across skill types. As individuals are more similar, small changes in relative earn-
ings translate into large changes in Θ.
For later reference, we note that
(3.10) V HΘ = V
L
Θ − u
(
V LΘ − V U
)
.
Hence, if unemployment is strictly positive, utility for the marginal high-skilled
worker is below the utility of the marginal employed low-skilled worker: V HΘ < V
L
Θ .
The reason is that the marginal high-skilled worker avoids low-skilled unemploy-
ment, and is willing to accept lower earnings in return.
By denoting total high-skilled labor supply and total low-skilled labor supply
by LHS and L
L
S , the cut-off level, Θ, implies the following values for aggregate labor
supply and group-sizes for high-skilled and low-skilled workers:
LHS ≡
∫ θ
Θ
lHθ dG(θ),(3.11)
LLS ≡
∫ Θ
θ
lLθ dG(θ),(3.12)
NH ≡ 1−G(Θ),(3.13)
NL ≡ G(Θ)−NU .(3.14)
Note that LLS is the notional aggregate low-skilled labor supply. In the presence
of unemployment, not all low-skilled workers notionally supplying labor find em-
ployment.
3.3.2 Firms
There is a representative, competitive, profit-maximizing firm which produces out-
put, Y , by employing aggregate high-skilled labor, LH , and low-skilled labor, LL,
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as factors of production. The price of output is normalized to unity. The firm oper-
ates a neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale production technology, which satisfies
the Inada conditions:
Y = F (LH , LL), FH , FL > 0, FHH , FLL < 0, FHL > 0,(3.15)
lim
H→∞
FH = lim
L→∞
FL = 0, lim
H→0
FH = lim
L→0
FL =∞.
The subscripts H and L of the production function denote partial derivatives
with respect to LH and LL. The marginal products of labor are positive, but
diminishing for each type of labor. Both inputs are essential and cooperant factors
of production.
Firms demand labor, taking wage rates as given. The labor market is perfectly
competitive and frictionless. The first-order conditions for profit maximization
imply that the marginal labor productivities equal the wage rates of each type of
worker:
FH(L
H , LL) = wH ,(3.16)
FL(L
H , LL) = wL.(3.17)
These conditions, together with homogeneity of the production function, implicitly
define the equilibrium factor ratio, LH/LL, as a function of the minimum wage,
wL. The Inada-conditions, joint with the cut-off ability level, Θ, in equation (3.9),
imply that in equilibrium the numbers of high- and low-skilled individuals are both
strictly positive, i.e., θ < Θ < θ.
3.3.3 Labor market equilibrium
Labor-market equilibrium conditions for high-skilled and low-skilled workers are
given by:
LH = LHS =
∫ θ
Θ
lHθ dG(θ),(3.18)
LL = LLS −
∫ Θ
θ
ulLθ dG(θ) = (1− u)
∫ Θ
θ
lLθ dG(θ).(3.19)
High-skilled labor demand should equal high-skilled labor supply, since the high-
skilled wage adjusts to clear the labor market. Low-skilled labor demand equals
low-skilled labor supply, minus the potential working hours of the unemployed.
66
Comparative statics
The latter equality follows from the assumption of uniform rationing, i.e., inde-
pendence of u from θ.
3.4 Comparative statics
We derive comparative statics to determine how unemployment and labor supply
respond to a change in one of the policy variables. We do so by log-linearizing the
model to find the (semi-)elasticities of the endogenous variables with respect to the
policy variables: wL, t, and T . These elasticities are an important ingredient of the
government’s optimization problem that we solve later. Equilibrium is described
by equation (3.9) for Θ, the labor demand equations (3.16) and (3.17), and the
two labor market clearing conditions (3.18) and (3.19).
We denote a relative change in variable x by x˜ ≡ d lnx = dx/x. Exceptions
are variables that are already expressed in percentage terms: t˜ ≡ dt/(1 − t),
u˜ ≡ du/(1− u), and N˜ i ≡ dN i, i ∈ {H,L, U}. As the latter variables are already
expressed in percentage terms it is more convenient to write the elasticities of
these variables as semi-elasticities. Loglinearization of the cut-off ability level, the
first-order conditions for the firm, and the labor-market equilibrium conditions
yields:
Θ˜ =
1 + ε
(1− β)ε(w˜
L − w˜H)− 1
(1− β)εu˜,(3.20)
w˜H =
1− α
σ
(L˜L − L˜H),(3.21)
w˜L =
α
σ
(L˜H − L˜L),(3.22)
L˜H = − l
H
Θ Θg(Θ)
LH
Θ˜ + ε(w˜H − t˜),(3.23)
L˜L =
(1− u)lLΘΘg(Θ)
LL
Θ˜− u˜+ ε(w˜L − t˜),(3.24)
where α ≡ FHLH/Y denotes the share of skilled labor earnings in total income and
σ ≡ −d ln(LH/LL)/d ln(FH/FL) = FHFL/(FHLY ) is the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled workers in production.
Combining these equations, and substituting for Θg(Θ)Θ˜ = −N˜H , yields a
system of two equations: one for households and one for firms, relating changes in
high-skilled employment and the low-skilled unemployment rate to changes in the
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minimum wage:
(1− β)ε
Θg(Θ)
N˜H = −
(
1 + ε
α
)
w˜L + u˜,(3.25)
u˜ =
(
σ + ε
α
)
w˜L −
(
lHΘ
LH
+
(1− u)lLΘ
LL
)
N˜H .(3.26)
The first equation shows that, given the unemployment rate, a higher minimum
wage reduces the number of high-skilled, because of a fall in the skill premium.
Higher unemployment results in more skill formation, since individuals would like
to avoid unemployment, which is concentrated among the unskilled. The second
equation shows that, for a given number of high-skilled workers, a rise in the
minimum wage increases the unemployment rate. As the minimum wage rises,
firms start laying off low-skilled workers. A higher number of high-skilled workers
increases the return to low-skilled labor and thus decreases the unemployment rate
for a given minimum wage.
The equilibrium conditions can be solved for the changes in the number of
high-skilled workers and the unemployment rate to find:
N˜H
w˜L
=
σ − 1
αη
,(3.27)
u˜
w˜L
=
σ + ε− (σ − 1)κ
α
> 0,(3.28)
where η ≡ (1−β)ε
Θg(Θ)
+
(1−u)lLΘ
LL
+
lHΘ
LH
> 0 and κ =
(
(1−u)lLΘ
LL
+
lHΘ
LH
)
η−1 ∈ (0, 1). The sign
of (3.28) follows from σ + ε− (σ − 1)κ = (1− κ)σ + ε+ κ > 0.
As we can see from the first equation, there is a knife-edge condition that
determines whether a rise in the minimum wage increases or decreases the amount
of skill formation in the economy. If σ < 1, an increase in the minimum wage
leads to less high-skilled workers. Intuitively, if high-skilled workers and low-skilled
workers are poor substitutes, firms are less willing to substitute low-skilled workers
for high-skilled workers. Therefore, employment of low-skilled workers does not
fall enough compared to the drop in the skill premium to induce individuals to
invest more in human capital. For σ > 1 the converse is true, and unemployment
of low-skilled workers increases so much that individuals invest more in human
capital, even though the skill premium has decreased. For σ = 1, an increase in
the minimum wage has no effect on the share of high-skilled workers, since the
effects of a lower skill premium exactly offsets the effect of a higher unemployment
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rate.
This result might be sensitive to a number of simplifying assumptions we made.
First, the assumption of uniform rationing ensures that unemployment affects skill
formation. Had rationing been more efficient and had low-skilled workers with
ability Θ had a higher chance of obtaining a job than other low-skilled workers,
unemployment would have had a smaller effect on skill formation. Second, the
assumption of quasi-linear utility, or risk-neutrality, affects the effect of unemploy-
ment on skill formation. Had individuals been risk-averse, they would have been
more averse to the possibility of unemployment, and a minimum wage would have
had a more positive effect on skill formation. Finally, because in this simple setup
low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers face the same tax rates, t, and trans-
fer, T , these tax instruments do not affect the effect of a minimum wage on skill
formation. This changes once we allow for skill-specific tax rates and transfers, as
we show below.
What are plausible values for the substitution elasticity is an empirical ques-
tion. Estimates of the substitution elasticity between high- and low-skilled work-
ers are typically found to be larger than one. Katz and David (1999) find that
a common estimate for σ is around 1.4, although much higher estimates are also
reported. Hence, in the simple setup of our model, empirically plausible values for
the substitution elasticity imply that the introduction of a minimum wage would
typically lead to more skill formation. This finding is similar to the finding that,
in response to a minimum-wage increase, total wage income of the affected group
declines if labor demand elasticities for workers earning a minimum wage exceed
unity (e.g., Dolado, Felgueroso and Jimeno, 2000; Freeman, 1996).
From the second equation follows that a minimum wage unambiguously in-
creases the unemployment rate amongst the low-skilled. The first two terms in
equation (3.28), σ and ε, represent labor demand and intensive labor supply re-
sponses to a higher minimum wage. An increase in the minimum wage leads to
lower labor demand and higher intensive labor supply, both contributing to an in-
crease in unemployment. The third term −(σ − 1)κ represents the human capital
response. If σ > 1, the increase of the minimum wage leads to more skill formation,
which renders this term negative, so that the unemployment effect diminishes. In-
tuitively, if more low-skilled workers transfer to the skilled sector, less of them are
laid off.10 Assuming σ > 1, studies that do not take into account human capital
10There is a large empirical literature dealing with the effect of a higher minimum wage on total
employment. Although most of the evidence seems to point to negative employment effects (e.g.,
Neumark and Wascher, 2006), some present evidence of positive or non-negative employment
69
Chapter 3. Minimum wages, taxation, and skill formation
responses to a minimum wage might therefore underestimate the desirability of a
minimum wage.
Proposition 3.1 The minimum wage reduces (increases) the fraction of skilled
workers (NH) if the elasticity of substitution between low-skilled and high-skilled
workers (σ) is smaller (larger) than 1. If σ = 1, a change in the minimum wage
has no effect on the number of high-skilled workers. A higher minimum wage (wL)
increases the low-skilled unemployment rate (u). A higher minimum wage boosts
the unemployment rate more if σ is higher and if the elasticity of low-skilled labor
supply (ε) is higher.
3.5 Optimal skill-independent policy
So far, we discussed the equilibrium effects of higher minimum wages on skill
formation and unemployment. In the remainder of the chapter, we focus on the
welfare effects of a minimum wage. To illustrate these welfare effects in the most
basic setup, in this section we first discuss the social desirability of a minimum
wage in the absence of tax policy. The derivation of optimal minimum wages, joint
with optimal skill-independent taxes and transfers follows. A treatment of optimal
minimum wages and skill-dependent taxation is postponed to the next section.
3.5.1 Government’s objective
The government maximizes social welfare by optimally deciding on the minimum
wage, the income tax rate, and the non-individualized lump-sum transfer. We rule
out individualized lump-sum taxes and transfers. Consequently, the government
has to resort to distortionary policy instruments to implement its redistributive
goals. All individuals receive a lump-sum transfer T and, if employed, their labor
earnings are taxed at a rate t. The informational requirement to implement this
linear tax system is that the government observes aggregate labor earnings. We
assume for now that the government is unable to distinguish high-skilled workers
from low-skilled workers for tax purposes, which implies that we do not allow for
group-specific lump-sum taxes and transfers, such as education subsidies.
effects (e.g., Card and Krueger, 1995). In our model, it can be shown to be theoretically possible
that a minimum wage increases high-skilled employment by so much that the number of unem-
ployed, NU , decreases, even though the low-skilled unemployment rate, u, increases. However,
calibration points out that such a positive employment effect would only happen under extreme
parameter values with σ exceeding 10 or the unemployment rate, u, exceeding 80 percent.
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Social welfare, W , is a weighted sum of utilities:
(3.29) W ≡ NUΨ(V U) + (1− u)
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ(V Lθ )dG(θ) +
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ(V Hθ )dG(θ),
where Ψ(·) is a concave function of utility, with Ψ′(·) > 0 and Ψ′′(·) ≤ 0. Since
utility is assumed to be quasi-linear in income, any social desire for redistribution
enters through concavity of Ψ(·). Thus, if the government is utilitarian (Ψ(V iθ ) =
V iθ , Ψ
′ (V iθ ) = 1), the social objective exhibits no preference for redistribution. On
the other extreme, if the government is Rawlsian, it only values the utility of the
least well off (V U in the presence of unemployment, V Lθ otherwise).
The government budget constraint states that government expenditures on the
lump-sum transfer, T , and an exogenously given expenditure requirement, E, equal
total tax revenue from labor earnings. Hence, the budget balance, denoted by B
must equal zero in equilibrium:
(3.30) B ≡ t
(
(1− u)
∫ Θ
θ
wLlLθ dG(θ) +
∫ θ
Θ
wH lHθ dG(θ)
)
− T − E = 0.
By defining λ as the shadow price for the budget constraint, we can write down
the Lagrangian associated with the government’s optimization problem as:
(3.31) L ≡ W + B
λ
.
The government’s first-order conditions for the minimum wage, the transfer, and
the tax rate are given by:
(1− u)(1− t)
∫ Θ
θ
lLθ Ψ
′(V Lθ )dG(θ) + (1− t)
∫ θ
Θ
lHθ Ψ
′(V Hθ )dG(θ)
dwH
dwL
(3.32)
−
(
(1− u)
∫ Θ
θ
(Ψ(V Lθ )−Ψ(V U))dG(θ) + λtwLLL
)
1
1− u
du
dwL
+(Ψ(V HΘ )− (1− u)Ψ(V LΘ )− uΨ(V U))
dNH
dwL
= 0,
(3.33) NUΨ′(V U) + (1− u)
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )dG(θ) +
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ′(V Hθ )dG(θ)− λ = 0,
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−(1− u)wL
∫ Θ
θ
lLθ Ψ
′(V Lθ )dG(θ)− wH
∫ θ
Θ
lHθ Ψ
′(V Hθ )dG(θ)(3.34)
+λ(wLLL + wHLH)
(
1− ε t
1− t
)
= 0,
where we substituted for the derivatives of the utility functions, labor hours
worked, and for g(Θ)dΘ = −dNH .
3.5.2 Optimal minimum wages without taxes and transfers
To highlight the main mechanisms at work, we first determine whether the intro-
duction of a minimum wage above the market-clearing wage for low-skilled labor
is desirable in the absence of taxation. We thus set T = t = E = 0 in order to
abstract from taxation, and u = 0 to determine the desirability of a minimum
wage in an initial equilibrium without unemployment. Note that the utility of
the marginal low-skilled worker in this case exactly equals that of the marginal
high-skilled worker.11 Hence, we have Ψ(V HΘ ) = Ψ(V
L
Θ ). To interpret equation
(3.32), we follow Feldstein (1972) by introducing the distributional characteristics
of low-skilled and high-skilled labor income:
0 ≤ ξL ≡ 1−
1
G(Θ)
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )w
LlLθ dG(θ)
1
G(Θ)
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )dG(θ)
1
G(Θ)
∫ Θ
θ
wLlLθ dG(θ)
≤ 1,(3.35)
0 ≤ ξH ≡ 1−
1
1−G(Θ)
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ′(V Hθ )w
H lHθ dG(θ)
1
1−G(Θ)
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ′(V Hθ )dG(θ)
1
1−G(Θ)
∫ θ
Θ
wH lHθ dG(θ)
≤ 1.(3.36)
ξi, i = {L,H}, is the negative normalized covariance between the social welfare
weights and labor earnings. It measures the marginal social welfare gain expressed
in monetary units as a fraction of labor income from redistributing one unit of
income through a lower net wage rate in skill-group i. The distributional charac-
teristic is positive for a government that values redistribution from rich to poor, as
in that case social welfare weights are decreasing with income. For a government
that does not value redistribution (Ψ′(·) = 1), ξi equals zero. Similarly, if there
is no income inequality in either group, the distributional characteristic is also
zero. The distributional characteristic increases with stronger social preferences
for redistribution and with larger pre-tax income inequality.
11We henceforth refer to a low-skilled worker with ability Θ as ‘the marginal low-skilled worker,’
and to the high-skilled worker with ability Θ as ‘the marginal high-skilled worker.’
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By rearranging the first-order condition for the minimum wage, equation (3.32),
and substituting in the distributional characteristics and the elasticity of unem-
ployment, we find that it is desirable to implement a minimum wage if the following
condition holds:
(3.37) (1− ξL)Ψ′(V L)− (1− ξH)Ψ′(V H) >
(
Ψ(V L)−Ψ(V U)
wLLL
NL
)
u˜
w˜L
,
where Ψ′(V L) ≡ ∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )dG(θ)/G(Θ) and Ψ′(V H) ≡
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Hθ )dG(θ)/(1 −
G(Θ)) are the averages of the marginal social welfare of income of skilled and
low-skilled workers. Ψ(V L) =
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ(V Lθ )dG(θ)/G(Θ) is the average social welfare
of low-skilled workers.
In the absence of unemployment taxation, a minimum wage has two first-order
effects on social welfare. The left-hand side of inequality (3.37) shows the distribu-
tional benefits of a higher minimum wage, whereas the right-hand side shows the
efficiency costs of a higher minimum wage. A higher minimum wage affects both
inequality between the groups of low-skilled and high-skilled workers and inequal-
ity within the groups of low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The minimum wage
reduces inequality between high-skilled and low-skilled workers through general-
equilibrium effects on the wage structure. By raising the minimum wage, low-
skilled employment declines, lowering high-skilled productivity and wages. This
reduction in inequality is given by the first two terms of above condition. For a
government with redistributive preferences, this general-equilibrium effect raises
social welfare as the average social marginal utility of a low-skilled worker is larger
than that of a high-skilled worker: Ψ′ (VL) > Ψ′ (VH).
Besides between-group inequality, the minimum wage also affects inequality
within the groups of high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Since high-skilled indi-
viduals with high ability make relatively many working hours, they suffer more
from a decline in their wage rate than high-skilled individuals with a lower ability.
This reduction in inequality within the group of high-skilled workers contributes
to the desirability of the minimum wage as long as ξH > 0. However, by raising
the low-skilled wage rate per hour worked, a higher minimum wage also increases
inequality in low-skilled labor earnings if ξL > 0. Therefore, the minimum wage
is less attractive for redistributive reasons if it generates more inequality among
low-skilled workers, or if the government is strongly averse to inequality within the
group of low-skilled workers.
A minimum wage has, overall, favorable distributional gains, since (1−ξL)Ψ′(V L) =
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∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )
λ
(1−u)lLθ
LL
dG(θ) >
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ′(V Hθ )
λ
lHθ
LH
dG(θ) = (1 − ξH)Ψ′(V H). The second and
third terms give weighted averages of the social marginal utility of income for
low- and high-skilled workers. The inequality follows from the fact that, in the
case of u = 0, the social marginal utility of every low-skilled worker is higher
than the social marginal utility of any high-skilled worker. However, if unemploy-
ment is positive (u > 0) this inequality does not necessarily hold. For example,
if ξL >> ξH and unemployment is positive, the minimum wage might cause net
distributional costs rather than benefits. Intuitively, in that case the increase in
inequality within the group of low-skilled workers is not off-set by a reduction in
inequality between low-skilled and high-skilled workers and within the group of
high-skilled workers.
The second first-order welfare effect of a minimum wage increase is associated
with the resulting increase in unemployment. This welfare effect is given by the
right-hand side of equation (3.37). (Ψ(V L)−Ψ(V U))/wLLL measures the welfare
loss due to larger unemployment in terms of total low-skilled income. For every
laid off low-skilled worker society looses on average Ψ(V L) of social welfare and
gains Ψ(V U). Since the unemployed have lower utility levels than the employed,
larger unemployment results in lower social welfare. Notice that any social welfare
effect of the minimum wage on human capital investment is a second-order effect
when there is no unemployment, since the utility of a marginal high-skilled worker
in that case equals the utility of a marginal low-skilled worker: V LΘ = V
H
Θ .
The desirability of a minimum wage crucially depends on the elasticity of the
unemployment rate with respect to the minimum wage, u˜/w˜L, given by equation
(3.28). In particular, a minimum wage raises unemployment more if the elasticity
of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers, σ, is larger, the labor supply
elasticity of low-skilled workers, ε, is larger, and, assuming σ > 1, if the human
capital response, (σ − 1)κ, is smaller.
That unemployment results in a first-order welfare loss is an important devi-
ation from Lee and Saez (2012) who assume efficient rationing. In Lee and Saez,
the marginal laid-off worker has zero surplus from working, and is thus indifferent
between working and being unemployed. Consequently, starting from a situation
without unemployment, the social welfare loss of larger unemployment is only a
second-order effect. In our model this does not hold, since every low-skilled worker
prefers working over being unemployed. Contrary to Lee and Saez, individuals in
our model incur disutility of work on the intensive margin, so that lay-offs are
always inefficient. Later on, we briefly turn to the case of efficient rationing.
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As we can see from equation (3.37), the desirability of a minimum wage de-
pends on the redistributive preferences of the government. If it does not value
redistribution – i.e., in the case of a utilitarian social welfare function – Ψ′(V L) =
Ψ′(V H) = 1, and ξL = ξH = 0, such that the left-hand side of the inequality
vanishes. Therefore, the government would not want to introduce a distortionary
minimum wage as it produces no distributional benefits. If the government has
Rawlsian preferences, the social welfare function without unemployment is given
by W = V Lθ and with unemployment is given by W = V U . In that case, a mini-
mum wage always decreases social welfare, since the government only cares for the
utility of the least well off. On both extremes of the spectrum of redistributive
preferences – without any redistributive and with maximum redistributive pref-
erences – a minimum wage is not desirable. However, for intermediate cases of
redistributive preferences, this is not necessarily the case.
Proposition 3.2 Starting from an undistorted initial equilibrium, the introduc-
tion of a minimum wage has ambiguous welfare effects for any redistributive, non-
Rawlsian social welfare function. A minimum wage is more likely to be socially
desirable if the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled work-
ers (σ) is small, if the labor supply elasticity (ε) is small, if the welfare differential
between the low-skilled employed and the unemployed, Ψ(V L) − Ψ(V U), is small,
and if the general equilibrium effects on wages yield large distributional gains, such
that (1−ξL)Ψ′(V L)−(1−ξH)Ψ′(V H) is large. Distributional gains are higher with
larger inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, Ψ′(V L) >> Ψ′(V H), and
with larger inequality within the group of high-skilled workers compared to low-
skilled workers, ξH >> ξL. A minimum wage is never optimal if the social welfare
function is Rawlsian or when it exhibits no preference for redistribution.
To find the optimal minimum wage in the absence of taxes and transfers, we
rewrite the first-order condition for the minimum wage (3.32) to obtain:
(1− ξL)Ψ′(V L)− (1− ξH)Ψ′(V H) =
(
Ψ(V L)−Ψ(V U)
wLLL
NL
)
u˜
w˜L
(3.38)
−
(
Ψ(V HΘ )− (1− u)Ψ(V LΘ )− uΨ(V U)
wLLL
)
N˜H
w˜L
.
Notice that this is only an optimality condition provided that the desirability condi-
tion (3.37) holds. Given that a binding minimum wage is indeed welfare increasing,
the optimal minimum wage is set in such a way that the marginal redistributive
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gains due to lower income inequality between low-skilled and high-skilled workers
(left-hand side) equals the marginal welfare losses of raising involuntary unem-
ployment (right-hand side, first term) minus the marginal welfare gain (or loss)
associated with the change in skill formation (right-hand side, second term). The
first two terms are discussed above, the last one is new.
The second term on the right-hand side represents a positive externality from
skill formation. If the government has redistributive preferences, and thus if Ψ(·) is
strictly concave, we can establish that Ψ(V HΘ )−(1−u)Ψ(V LΘ )−uΨ(V U) > 0 if u >
0, since we know from equation (3.10) that V HΘ −(1−u)V LΘ −uV U = 0. Intuitively,
becoming high skilled can be seen as an insurance against unemployment. Due
to concave social preferences, the government attaches a higher cost to the risk of
becoming unemployed than risk-neutral individuals themselves. Therefore, in the
presence of involuntary unemployment, the social value of skill formation exceeds
its private value. A binding minimum wage, resulting in a positive unemployment
rate, thus leads to an externality on skill formation. Clearly, there is no externality
in the absence of unemployment as it vanishes for u = 0 or when the government
has no desire to redistribute income.12 A higher minimum wage changes human
capital formation if N˜H/w˜L 6= 0, and thus, as we have seen above, if σ 6= 1. As
discussed, if σ > 1, a higher minimum wage leads to more high-skilled workers.
Due to the positive externality associated with skill formation, a higher minimum
wage generates an additional welfare gain. If σ < 1 a higher minimum wage leads
to less skill formation, exacerbating the inefficiently low degree of skill formation.
3.5.3 Optimal minimum wages, taxes and transfers
Naturally, governments also employ tax instruments to redistribute income. Below,
we derive how the welfare effect of a minimum wage are altered if the government
optimally sets a skill-independent income tax rate, t, and a transfer, T .
Optimal transfer
The first order condition for the transfer, equation (3.33), can be rewritten to find
that the social marginal benefits of a higher transfer, T , should equal its social
12By assuming quasi-linear utility functions we abstracted from risk aversion at the individual
level. Risk aversion would reduce the positive externality from human capital investment, since
individuals hedge against against labor market risk by investing more in human capital (see also
Jacobs, Schindler and Yang, 2012). However, the positive externality will not disappear as long
as the social welfare function is a (strictly) concave transformation of the individuals’ private
utility functions.
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marginal costs:
(3.39)
Ψ′(·)
λ
≡ NU Ψ
′(V U)
λ
+ (1− u)
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )
λ
dG(θ) +
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ′(V Hθ )
λ
dG(θ) = 1,
where Ψ′(·) denotes the average social marginal utility of income. The first three
terms on the left-hand side give the increase in social welfare (expressed in mon-
etary units) of the unemployed, low-skilled employed and high-skilled employed
due to a marginally higher lump-sum transfer. This equals the transfer’s resource
costs on the right-hand side, equaling 1.
Optimal tax rate
In order to derive the optimal tax rate, we again follow Feldstein (1972) by intro-
ducing the distributional characteristic of total labor income:
(3.40) ξ ≡ 1−
(1− u) ∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )w
LlLθ dG(θ) +
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ′(V Hθ )w
H lHθ dG(θ)
(wLLL + wHLH)
(
NUΨ′(V U) +NLΨ′(V Lθ ) +NHΨ′(V H)
) ≥ 0
The interpretation of ξ is identical to the distributional characteristics of low-
skilled and high-skilled earnings introduced in equations (3.35) and (3.36). It
is the negative of the normalized covariance between the social welfare weights
and labor earnings across the entire population.13 We can establish a direct link
between the distributional characteristics of skilled and unskilled labor income and
the distributional characteristic for aggregate labor income:
(3.41) (1− ξ) ≡ (1− α)Ψ
′(V L)
Ψ′(·) (1− ξ
L) + α
Ψ′(V H)
Ψ′(·) (1− ξ
H).
Consequently, one minus the distributional characteristic of aggregate labor is a
weighted sum of one minus the distributional characteristics of skilled and unskilled
labor – where the income shares α and 1 − α have been used as weights and a
correction has been made for the differences in the average social marginal utility
of income. For a government without redistributive preferences, ξ = 0, for a
Rawlsian government, ξ = 1.
Labor income taxation distorts labor supply. The tax rate drives a wedge
between the private and social benefits of work, leading to a substitution effect
13Note that labor earnings of the unemployed are zero, and do not feature in the numerator.
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from consumption to leisure. The marginal deadweight loss associated with this
distortion, given by t
1−tε, is increasing in the elasticity of labor supply and the tax
rate. The optimal tax rate is set such that the marginal redistributive gains of the
tax rate equal its marginal efficiency costs. Rearranging the first order condition
for t, equation (3.34), thus yields:
(3.42)
t
1− t =
ξ
ε
.
From this equation we derive the familiar result of optimal tax theory, that the
optimal income tax rate is increasing in the distributional gain and decreasing in
the labor-supply elasticity, see for example Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
Optimal minimum wage
Again, we first analyze the desirability of a minimum wage, when taxes are opti-
mally set, by substituting for u = 0 in first-order condition (3.32). We furthermore
substitute for the partial derivative dwH/dwL, implied by equations (3.21) and
(3.22). A minimum wage is desirable if the following condition holds:
(3.43) (1− ξL)Ψ
′(V L)
λ
− (1− ξH)Ψ
′(V H)
λ
>
(
Ψ(V L)−Ψ(V U)
(1− t)wLLLλ N
L +
t
1− t
)
u˜
w˜L
.
As before, the first line gives the marginal redistributive gains of a minimum wage,
the second line gives the welfare loss associated with higher unemployment, mul-
tiplied by the semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to a higher minimum
wage. The first term in the second line again gives the welfare loss associated with
the direct utility drop of the workers who lose their job, this time normalized by
low-skilled income net of taxes. With positive taxes, low-skilled workers do not
reap the full benefits of a higher minimum wage as part of it is taxed away by the
government. Hence, a given distributional gain requires a larger increase in the
minimum wage and therefore increased unemployment is associated with a higher
welfare loss.
The second term in the second line, t/(1 − t), is new and captures the wel-
fare costs of a higher minimum wage associated with an erosion of the labor tax
base. Unemployed workers do not pay income taxes, whereas employed workers
do. t/(1− t)(u˜/w˜L) represents these losses in tax revenue from low-skilled workers
as a result of a higher minimum wage. Tax revenue declines more if the increase in
unemployment due to the minimum wage is larger. This is captured by the term
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u˜/w˜L = (σ+ ε− (σ− 1)κ)/α, the semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to
the minimum wage. This term has been extensively discussed above. t/(1 − t) is
the tax wedge on low-skilled labor supply. The larger are tax distortions on labor
supply – i.e., the larger is t – the costlier it is to raise the minimum wage. Thus
the minimum wage exacerbates the distortions of the labor tax on low-skilled labor
supply by further eroding the tax base.
Minimum wage versus income taxation
As equation (3.43) shows, the main benefit of a minimum wage is its capacity to
redistribute income from high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers. Furthermore,
it decreases inequality among the high-skilled but increases inequality among the
low-skilled, and creates unemployment, causing a drop of utility and tax revenues
from those who lose their jobs. A minimum wage is not the only means of re-
distributing income from high- to low-skilled workers. Redistribution can also be
achieved through a higher income-tax rate, while rebating revenue in the form of
higher transfers. A minimum wage will be optimal if, and only if, the marginal
costs of redistribution through a minimum wage are smaller than the marginal
costs of the same redistribution through higher income taxes, evaluated at the tax
optimum.
To see whether this is indeed the case, we first rewrite the first-order condition
for the optimal tax rate, equation (3.42), by substituting for ξ, using equation
(3.41):
(3.44)
t
1− tε = (α−N
H)
Ψ′(V L)−Ψ′(V H)
λ
+ (1− α)Ψ
′(V L)
λ
ξL + α
Ψ′(V H)
λ
ξH .
The left-hand side gives the marginal dead-weight loss of taxation. The right-hand
side gives the distributional benefits of taxation by reducing inequality between
skill groups (first-term), reducing inequality within the low-skilled group (second
term), and reducing inequality within the high-skilled group (third term).
To determine if a binding minimum wage is optimal, we derive the net welfare
effect of a marginal increase in the minimum wage, and compare this to the net
welfare effect of a marginal increase in the income tax rate that achieves the
exact same within-group redistribution as the minimum wage. Clearly, a binding
minimum wage is optimal if, at the tax optimum without a minimum wage, this net
welfare effect of a minimum wage increase outweighs the net welfare effects of the
tax-rate increase. To see when this is the case, we substitute for Ψ′(V L)−Ψ′(V H)
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from equation (3.44) into the desirability condition of a minimum wage, equation
(3.43). The desirability condition of the minimum wage can then be written as
follows:
t
1− t
(
ε
α−NH −
u˜
w˜L
)
>
(
Ψ(V L)−Ψ (V U)
(1− t)LLwLλ N
L
)
u˜
w˜L
(3.45)
+
(
1−NH
α−NH
)
Ψ′(V L)
λ
ξL +
(
NH
α−NH
)
Ψ′(V H)
λ
ξH .
The first term on the left-hand side gives the efficiency costs of attaining a given
between-group redistribution through an increase in the tax rate. The second
term gives the efficiency costs of attaining the same between-group redistribution
through higher minimum wages. The efficiency costs of a higher tax rate are given
by the tax base erosion that takes place due to the distortion of intensive labor
supply, t
1−t
ε
(α−NH) . The denominator, α − NH , is of special interest: the smaller
the high-skilled share of total income, relative to its population share, the more
difficult it is to redistribute from high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers by
using the income tax rate, t, which applies to both high-skilled and low-skilled
workers.
The efficiency costs of a higher minimum wage are given by the tax-base erosion
that takes place due to the distortion on the extensive employment margin, t
1−t
u˜
w˜L
.
Overall, a minimum wage might be more efficient in redistributing income from
high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers because it directly raises low-skilled
income and decreases high-skilled income. Uniform income taxes, on the contrary,
cause net wages of both low-skilled and high-skilled workers to decline in order to
redistribute the revenue back in the form of lump-sum transfers to both low-skilled
and high-skilled workers.
However, for minimum wages to be optimal, this larger efficiency must outweigh
its distributional losses relative to a tax increase. These losses are given by the
right-hand side and consist of the direct welfare losses of laid-off individuals (first
term) and the within-group distributional gains of a tax increase (last two terms).
The first term we encountered and discussed before. The last two terms indicate
the relative advantage of the income tax rate to achieve within-group inequality.
In order to achieve a given between-group redistribution, the tax increase leads to
more redistribution within the groups of high- and low-skilled workers than does
the increase of the minimum wage.
In short, the minimum wage complements the income tax to reduce between-
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group income inequality. A minimum wage helps to directly redistribute income
from high-skilled workers towards low-skilled workers without the tax-base ero-
sion on the intensive margin associated with taxation, and thereby alleviates the
distributional imperfection associated with the uniformity of the income tax.
Proposition 3.3 Optimal labor-income taxes increase with the level of earnings
inequality and decrease with the elasticity of intensive labor supply. Minimum
wages are more distortionary if the government sets high taxes on labor earnings,
since minimum wages erode the tax base by causing unemployment. Hence, a min-
imum wage is less desirable in the presence of taxes. The role of minimum wages
in an optimal skill-independent tax-benefit system is to complement the tax-benefit
system by reducing the distributional imperfections of the income tax. Minimum
wages help to redistribute income between skill groups, so that income taxes can be
better targeted at reducing inequality within skill groups.
3.6 Optimal skill-dependent policies
So far, we assumed that the government cannot differentiate tax instruments ac-
cording to skill type, whereas it did employ a minimum-wage policy, the enforce-
ment of which requires knowledge on individuals’ skill type. One may recognize this
as an informational inconsistency. To implement and enforce a minimum wage, the
government necessarily has information on the individuals’ wage rates, but it does
not use this information in determining optimal tax policy. This section, therefore,
explores the implications of allowing the government to optimize a skill-dependent
optimal tax and minimum-wage policy.14 Before deriving expressions for optimal
policy, we first repeat the comparative-statics analysis as the key elasticities of the
model change due to the introduction of skill-specific instruments.
14We do not study participation-dependent policies. That is, the government is still assumed
to be unable to condition taxes and transfers based on employment status. Allowing for separate
unemployment benefits would necessitate the introduction of a participation margin and hence
a second cut-off level for θ. To keep the model tractable we decided not to do so. In Gerritsen
and Jacobs (2013a, Chapter 4 of this Dissertation), we do model the participation margin along
with the skill decision. We do not, however, study optimal participation taxes or subsidies. See
Gerritsen (2013a, Chapter 5 of this Dissertation) where this is done for a model with laobr supply
on the extensive margin only.
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3.6.1 Comparative statics again
We introduce income taxes, tL and tH , that depend on skill type. Moreover, a
separate transfer, S, is given to high-skilled workers. Indirect utility is thus given
by:
VU = T,(3.46)
V Lθ = T +
θβε((1− tL)wL)1+ε
1 + ε
,(3.47)
V Hθ = T +
θε((1− tH)wH)1+ε
1 + ε
+ S.(3.48)
Note that the only changes as compared to equations (3.6)-(3.8) are the substitu-
tions of tL and tH for t, and the inclusion of an extra transfer, S, for the high-skilled.
As before, the critical value, Θ is determined by V HΘ = uV
U + (1 − u)V LΘ , and,
hence:
(3.49) ((1− tH)wH)1+εΘε − (1− u)((1− tL)wL)1+εΘβε = −(1 + ε)S.
The other equilibrium conditions of the model are unaffected.
The comparative statics for Θ are different in the presence of skill-dependent
tax instruments. We define ρ ≡ S
(1−tH)wH lHΘ /(1+ε)+S
, which gives the transfer to
high-skilled workers, S, as a share of the total return to working as a high-skilled
worker with ability Θ. The loglinearized equation for Θ is now given by:
(3.50) (1− β − ρ)εΘ˜ = (1 + ε)(w˜L − t˜L)− (1− ρ)(1 + ε)(w˜H − t˜H)− ρS˜ − u˜,
where S˜ ≡ dS/S. Thus, Θ increases in earnings for low-skilled workers and de-
creases in earnings for high-skilled workers and the unemployment rate.15
By redefining η ≡ (1−β−ρ)ε
Θg(Θ)
+
(1−u)lLΘ
LL
+
lHΘ
LH
, we can solve the log-linearized model
to find the elasticities of the number of skilled workers with respect to the policy
variables:
(3.51) ηN˜H =
(
σ − 1 + (1 + ε)(1− α)ρ
α
)
w˜L + t˜L − (1− (1 + ε)ρ)t˜H + ρS˜.
15For high-skilled workers to be located at θ > Θ and low-skilled workers at θ < Θ we require
that the difference between high-skilled utility and expected low-skilled utility is increasing in θ.
Taking the derivative of the equilibrium condition with respect to θ, we thus obtain the second-
order condition, which is necessary and sufficient for equation (3.49) to describe the equilibrium
value of Θ: (1− β − ρS) > 0.
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Observe that, for tL = tH and S = 0, the equation collapses to equation (3.27).
A transfer to the high skilled alters the result that skill formation increases (de-
creases) in response to a higher minimum wage if σ > 1 (σ < 1). In particular,
high-skilled workers now have an education subsidy or tax, S, which is unaffected
by a higher minimum wage. Thus, while the minimum wage depresses high-skilled
labor earnings, the effect of minimum wages on skill formation is cushioned due to
the presence of non-wage income if S > 0. The exact opposite holds for S < 0, in
which case wages make up for a larger share of net income for high-skilled work-
ers.16 Now that taxes are conditioned on skill type, they do affect skill formation.
Quite naturally, skill formation increases with low-skilled taxes tL and high-skilled
transfers S, and decreases with high-skilled taxes tH , provided that (1 + ε)ρ < 1,
which is what we assume.17 Note that, if high-skilled workers receive higher trans-
fers (ρ > 0 larger), the impact of the high-skilled tax rate on skill formation is
lowered, as the transfers remain untaxed.
As before, we can solve the linearized model to find the elasticities of unem-
ployment with respect to the policy variables:
u˜ =
(
σ + ε− κ(σ − 1)− κ(1 + ε)(1− α)ρ
α
)
w˜L(3.52)
− (κ+ ε)t˜L + (ε+ κ− κ(1 + ε)ρ)t˜H − κρS˜.
Again, for tL = tH and S = 0, this equation collapses to equation (3.28). The
minimum wage has a smaller effect on unemployment if S > 0 (ρ > 0). The
reason is that the impact of the minimum wage on skill formation is larger if
S > 0. Intuitively, compared to the case in which S = 0, a minimum wage results
in lower low-skilled labor supply, and (through input complementarity) higher
low-skilled labor demand. Of course, the opposite holds if S < 0. Furthermore,
low-skilled taxes decrease unemployment as it discourages low-skilled labor supply;
high-skilled taxes increase unemployment as it discourages high-skilled labor sup-
ply (and the less so if S is larger); and transfers to high-skilled workers decreases
unemployment as it encourages high-skilled labor supply.
16Naturally, to the extent that the subsidy S itself is negatively affected by the minimum wage
– for example, through the high-skilled wages of teachers – this effect is smaller and might even
disappear.
17If (1 + ε)ρ > 1 a higher tax on high-skilled labor earnings leads to lower intensive high-
skilled labor supply, lower low-skilled productivity, and higher unemployment, and thereby to
more skill formation. This effect would then outweigh the direct negative effect on skill formation.
However, notice that this presupposes a share of education subsidies in total high-skilled earnings,
ρ, exceeding 1/(1 + ε), which for plausible levels of ε would by highly unrealistic.
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3.6.2 Optimal minimum wages, taxes and transfers
First-order conditions of optimal policy
This subsection presents the first-order conditions for the optimal minimum wage,
low- and high-skilled income taxes, and lump-sum transfers for low-skilled and
high-skilled workers. To interpret the optimal tax expressions, we introduce some
simplifying notation. As usual, first-order conditions equate marginal distribu-
tional gains with marginal distortionary costs. Distortionary costs are represented
by wedges multiplied by elasticities. Wedges in our model are defined as follows:
∆H ≡ t
H
1− tH ,
(3.53)
∆L ≡ t
L
1− tL ,
(3.54)
∆U ≡ Ψ(V
L)−Ψ(V U)
λ(1− tL)LLwL N
L,
(3.55)
∆S ≡ Ψ(V
H
Θ )− (1− u)Ψ(V LΘ )− uΨ(V U)
λ(1− tL)LLwL +
tHwH lHΘ − S − (1− u)tLwLlLΘ
(1− tL)LLwL .
(3.56)
These wedges measure the welfare gains of marginally higher intensive high-skilled
labor supply, higher intensive low-skilled labor supply, lower unemployment, and
higher skill formation. The interpretation is straightforward. The first two wedges
measure revenue gains from higher labor supply as labor supply is distorted by
income taxation. They are both expressed in terms of after-tax income. The third
wedge gives the social welfare loss of higher unemployment due to a drop of utility
– expressed in monetary terms as a fraction of net low-skilled earnings. The fourth
wedge measures the welfare gains of higher skill formation. The first term gives
the welfare gain of skill formation associated with the fact that the government
is more averse to unemployment risk than individuals are. The second term gives
the revenue gains (or losses) associated with larger skill formation. Whether there
are revenue gains or losses depends on whether human capital formation is taxed
or subsidized on a net basis, i.e., whether tHwH lHΘ − S − (1− u)tLwLlLΘ ≷ 0. Both
are expressed in terms of net low-skilled labor earnings.
Armed with the additional notation, we can express the first order-conditions
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as:
wL : (1− ξL)Ψ
′(V L)
λ
−
(
1− tH
1− tL
)
(1− ξH)Ψ
′(V H)
λ
=(3.57) (
tH − tL
1− tL
)
(1 + ε) + (∆U + ∆L)
u˜
w˜L
−∆S N˜
H
w˜L
,
tH : 1− (1− ξH)Ψ
′(V H)
λ
= ∆Hε+ (ϕ∆U + ϕ∆L)
u˜
t˜H
− ϕ∆S N˜
H
t˜H
,(3.58)
tL : 1− (1− ξL)Ψ
′(V L)
λ
= ∆Lε+ (∆U + ∆L)
u˜
t˜L
−∆S N˜
H
t˜L
,(3.59)
S :
Ψ′(V H)
λ
− 1 = (γ∆U + γ∆L) u˜
S˜
− γ∆S N˜
H
S˜
,(3.60)
T : 1− N
UΨ′(V U) +NLΨ′(V L) +NHΨ′(V H)
λ
= 0,(3.61)
where we denoted ϕ ≡ (1−tL)LLwL
(1−tH)LHwH as total low-skilled labor income relative to total
high-skilled labor income, and γ ≡ (1−tL)wLLL
NHS
as total low-skilled labor income
relative to high-skilled transfers.
Each expression implies that the net redistributive gains (left-hand side) op-
timally equal distortionary costs (right-hand side). The net redistributive gains
always consist of the direct distributional impact (measured in monetary equiva-
lents) of increasing the particular instrument under consideration, plus the impact
of redistributing in lump-sum fashion any additional revenue. The efficiency costs
are always determined by the behavioral responses on the intensive labor supply
margins, the unemployment margin and the skill-formation margin. The first-order
condition for T in equation (3.61) remains unaltered, and will not be discussed any
further.
Optimal minimum wage
In equation (3.57), the first term on the right-hand side is new and the last term
is modified as compared to 3.37. The first term on the right-hand side captures
the marginal revenue gains (or losses) of the minimum wage, due to its effects on
gross wage rates. It affects tax revenue from low-skilled and high-skilled workers
differently if they face different tax rates. We say there is ‘tax-rate progression’
if taxes on skilled labor are higher than on unskilled labor, i.e., if tH > tL. The
minimum wage increases low-skilled wages and lowers high-skilled wages, hence
low-skilled labor supply increases and high-skilled labor supply falls. If there is
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tax rate progression, the minimum wage therefore causes a revenue loss, given that
both low-skilled and high-skilled workers have the same labor-supply elasticity.
These two effects exactly cancel out in the case of a flat tax rate, i.e., if tL = tH .
A second difference might originate from the last term, −∆SN˜H/w˜L. This term
could now turn negative if skill formation is so highly subsidized that revenue losses
outweigh the social-insurance gains of larger skill formation. Generally, however,
the government would want to redistribute from high-skilled to low-skilled workers,
implying a positive net tax on skill formation, such that ∆S > 0. This also seems
to be the empirically relevant case as most industrial countries tax skill formation
on a net basis (OECD, 2011a). In that case, and assuming that a minimum
wage boosts skill formation, (N˜H/w˜L > 0), a higher minimum wage would yield
higher tax revenues. If ∆S < 0, skill formation is subsidized on a net basis and,
provided that minimum wages boost skill formation, higher minimum wages result
in additional revenue losses.
The remainder of the optimal minimum-wage expression is unaffected, com-
pared to the case with skill-independent taxes and transfers.
Proposition 3.4 Minimum wages are less likely to be socially desirable under
skill-specific instruments if there is tax rate progression (tH > tL). If a minimum
wage increases skill formation, it is more likely to be desirable if skill formation is
taxed on a net basis (∆S < 0).
Optimal tax-rate progression
The first-order conditions for tH and tL in equations (3.58) and (3.59) are similar:
the left-hand side gives the net social welfare gains of redistributing a unit of
resources by raising the income tax rate. The marginal redistributive gains of
high-skilled taxes are larger than the redistributive gains of low-skilled taxes if (i)
the average marginal social value of income of high-skilled workers is lower than
that of low-skilled workers – i.e., if Ψ′(V H) < Ψ′(V L)) – and (ii) the government is
more concerned about within-group income-inequality in the group of high-skilled
workers than in the group of low-skilled workers – i.e., if ξH > ξL. While these
conditions depend on the specific social welfare function, they seem intuitively
plausible, so that taxes on high-skilled workers should be set higher on the basis
of redistributive reasons – not considering the efficiency costs.
The right-hand sides in equations (3.58) and (3.59) give the efficiency costs of
using either tax instrument in terms of lower intensive labor supply (first term),
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higher unemployment (second term), and higher skill formation (third term). The
formal structure of the first-order conditions is very similar, the implications for
the optimal values of the tax rates are not. Although either tax instrument reduces
intensive labor supply, as indicated by the first terms ∆Hε and ∆Lε, the other elas-
ticities have opposite signs in both equations. In particular, the number of high-
skilled workers increases with a higher low-skilled tax rate, but it decreases with
a higher high-skilled tax rate. Similarly, the unemployment rate decreases with
higher low-skilled taxation, whereas it increases with higher high-skilled taxation.
This means that low-skilled taxes alleviate the distortions associated with the min-
imum wage by reducing unemployment as they stimulate high-skilled labor supply
and discourage low-skilled labor supply. High-skilled taxes, on the other hand,
exacerbate distortions of the minimum wage by raising unemployment. Whether
there should be tax rate progression is therefore theoretically ambiguous.
Proposition 3.5 Distributional concerns tend to call for tax-rate progression.
Tax-rate progression is less desirable if minimum wages are set higher, as tax
rate progression exacerbates the labor-market distortions of the minimum wage by
increasing low-skilled labor supply. The case for tax rate progression is further
weakened (strengthened) if skill formation is taxed (subsidized) on a net basis, i.e.,
if ∆S > 0 (∆S < 0).
Optimal subsidy on skill formation
The first-order condition for S in equation (3.60) equates the marginal redistribu-
tive costs of directly distributing resources towards high-skilled workers, Ψ′(V H)/λ−
1, with the marginal welfare gains of lower unemployment and larger skill forma-
tion. The distributional gains of providing higher transfers to the high-skilled is
negative as it redistributes resources in the wrong direction. Indeed, using the
first-order condition for T we can derive that Ψ′(V H)/λ < 1. Thus, for redistribu-
tive reasons, the government would like to tax the high-skilled. However, subsidies
on skill formation reduce unemployment, since u˜/dS = −κρ/S < 0. Hence, sub-
sidies on skill formation alleviate the distortions associated with the minimum
wage. Moreover, subsidies on skill formation naturally boost skill formation as
N˜H/dS = ρ/(Sη) > 0. If skill formation is distorted downwards (upwards), such
that ∆S > 0 (∆S < 0), subsidizing the high-skilled reduces (exacerbates) the
distortion on skill formation. Consequently, it remains unclear whether skill for-
mation should be subsidized on a net basis.
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Proposition 3.6 Subsidies (taxes) on skill formation result in distributional losses
(gains), alleviate the distortions created by the minimum wage, and alleviate (ex-
acerbate) distortions of skill formation if skill formation is taxed (subsidized) on a
net basis.
Minimum wage versus income taxation: a reinterpretation
As a final exercise, we ask the question which instruments are more desirable for in-
come redistribution: minimum wages or income taxes? As can be inferred from the
first-order conditions (3.58), (3.59), and (3.57), a properly designed combination
of high-skilled and low-skilled income taxes can exactly replicate the distributional
effects of a minimum wage. Hence, the question whether minimum wages are desir-
able in addition to optimal income taxes boils down to the question: do minimum
wages entail larger or smaller distortions than income taxes to achieve the same
marginal distributional benefits?
To answer this question, we can combine the optimal-tax expressions for the
tax rates and the minimum wage to derive a new desirability condition for the
minimum wage. This is essentially equivalent to determining the welfare effects of
an increase in the minimum wage while offsetting its distributional effects by an
appropriate adjustment of the tax rates (i.e., a low-skilled tax increase, combined
with a high-skilled tax decrease). This yields the following desirability condition
for the minimum wage:
(3.62) ∆S
(
N˜H
u˜
)
> ∆U + ∆L,
where N˜H/u˜ denotes the partial effect of unemployment on high-skill labor supply.
By substituting for the wedges and the elasticity, we find:
(3.63)(
tHzHΘ − S − (1− u)tLzLΘ
(1− tL)LLwL
)
Θg(Θ)
(1− β − ρ)ε >
(
Ψ(V L)−Ψ(V U)
λ(1− tL)LLwL N
L +
tL
1− tL
)
.
The left-hand side gives the welfare gain from higher skill formation. The right-
hand side gives the welfare losses due to higher unemployment. These are the net
welfare effects of a higher minimum wage, when the distributional effects are offset
by an appropriate adjustment in income taxes. The ratio Θg(Θ)
(1−β−ρS)ε represents the
elasticity of the number of high-skilled workers with respect to a change in the
unemployment rate.
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The right-hand side gives the dead-weight loss of a minimum-wage increase,
over and above the costs of a tax change that features the same distributional
benefits. The first term represents the utility loss of those low-skilled individ-
uals that lose their jobs because of a higher minimum wage. The second term
expresses the marginal welfare loss associated with lower tax revenue, caused by
higher unemployment. These welfare losses can be avoided by using the income
tax rather than the minimum wage to redistribute income. The left-hand side
gives the marginal welfare gains from the increase in skill formation caused by
the higher unemployment rate.18 There can only be welfare gains of a minimum
wage if skill formation is taxed on a net basis, such that ∆S > 0. Indeed, if
∆S > 0, the minimum wage alleviates the net distortion on skill formation, caused
by redistributive taxation, by raising human capital investment through higher
unemployment. However, if skill formation is subsidized on a net basis, such that
∆S < 0, a minimum wage can never be socially desirable. Indeed, relative to a
distributionally equivalent reform of the income tax rates, a minimum wage in-
crease then only entails a dead-weight loss by causing both higher unemployment
and higher skill formation.
The expression for the optimal minimum wage is obtained simply by substitut-
ing an equality sign for the inequality sign. The only difference with respect to the
desirability condition is that the wedge on skill formation ∆S now also contains the
insurance benefit associated with skill formation,
Ψ(V HΘ )−(1−u)Ψ(V LΘ )−uΨ(V U )
λ(1−tL)wLLL , which
was nil for u = 0. This term has been extensively discussed before. Notice that
this optimality condition only holds if a binding minimum wage is desirable to
start with, such that inequality (3.62) holds for u = 0.
Summing up, allowing for skill-specific taxes has some important ramifications
regarding the desirability of a minimum wage. To see this, we compare equation
(3.45) with equation (3.63). By allowing for skill-dependent tax rates and trans-
fers, the government can directly redistribute income both within and between
high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Unlike in the case of skill-independent tax
rates, there is no benefit of having minimum wages to correct for a distributional
imperfection of the income-tax system in reducing between-group inequality. The
tax-benefit system can achieve exactly the same redistributive impact of a mini-
mum wage, but without the subsequent increase in unemployment. This explains
why the redistributive terms, that are still present in equation (3.45), are absent
18Note that, relative to a distributionally equivalent tax reform, a minimum wage increase has
no direct effect on the incentives to invest in human capital, i.e., the minimum wage’s effect on
the skill premium is equivalent to that of the tax reform.
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from equation (3.63).
However, there is now a new term in equation (3.63), which is associated with
the distortion on skill formation. With skill-independent tax instruments, human
capital formation is not distorted by uniform taxes or transfers. When taxes
and transfers are skill-dependent, the tax-benefit system is no longer neutral with
respect to skill formation. Hence, while tax instruments can be more accurately
targeted to distribute from high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers, doing so
generates a net tax on skill formation. This distortion was absent in equation
(3.45), but shows up as ∆S in equation (3.63). Increasing the minimum wage, and
simultaneously offsetting the distributional impact through the income tax system,
boosts skill formation by raising unemployment. Thus, minimum wages help to
alleviate the distortions of the tax-benefit system on skill formation. Recall that
this only holds if investment in human capital is indeed taxed on a net basis.
Proposition 3.7 If skill formation is taxed on a net basis, a marginal increase in
the minimum wage, compared to a distributionally equivalent tax reform, entails a
social welfare loss from higher unemployment and a social welfare gain from higher
skill formation. The minimum-wage increase is desirable if the social welfare gain
outweighs the loss. Minimum wages are more desirable if unemployment has a
larger effect on skill formation, if skill formation is more heavily taxed, and if
the utility and tax revenue losses associated with higher unemployment are lower.
Minimum wages are never desirable if human capital formation is subsidized on a
net basis.
3.7 Efficient rationing
3.7.1 Efficient versus inefficient rationing
A binding minimum wage leads to an oversupply of labor and hence to rationing
on the labor market. Up to now we only discussed uniform rationing on the
extensive margin, according to which every low-skilled individual has the same
chance of getting fired. We now also discuss efficient rationing. If individuals are
heterogeneous with respect to the disutility of extensive labor supply, rationing
is efficient if persons with the highest disutility of work lose their job first. If
workers are heterogeneous with respect to disutility of intensive labor supply, as
is the case in our model, rationing is efficient if it occurs on the intensive margin,
i.e. by restricting the number of hours people work. Every worker equalizes the
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marginal disutility of work with the marginal utility of higher income. Therefore,
a marginal decrease in working hours, forced upon workers by a binding minimum
wage, only has second-order effects on individuals’ utilities.
Theory provides little guidance when it comes to the efficiency of rationing. In
absence of a secondary or “black” market, in which the rationed good is traded,
there is little reason to assume the rationed goods are acquired by the individuals
who desire them most (Tobin, 1952). Empirically, as noted by Luttmer (2007),
this has been confirmed by studies of the U.S. residential market for gas (Davis
and Kilian, 2011), the gasoline market (Deacon and Sonstelie, 1989; Frech and
Lee, 1987) and on the housing rental market (Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003). As
there is no secondary market for jobs or hours of work, it is unlikely that rationing
due to a minimum wage is efficient. The only more or less direct evidence for the
efficiency of lay-offs due to a minimum wage is due to Luttmer (2007). He measures
the change in the average (proxy of the) reservation wage of low-skilled workers
after an increase in the minimum wage. For two out of four proxies, he finds a
statistically significant drop in reservation wages. This could have been interpreted
as evidence that workers with the lowest utility surplus of work are rationed first,
were it not that in the sensitivity analysis, he finds significant increases in two
proxies. Hence, he does not find convincing evidence that the efficiency of the
job allocation changed due to a change in the minimum wage. He does, however,
find some evidence that a higher minimum wage leads to lower employment. This
evidence supports our assumption of uniform rationing on the extensive margin,
according to which low-skilled workers are laid off without affecting the ability
composition of workers. The assumption of rationing through lay-offs is further
supported by a large body of evidence (Neumark and Wascher, 2006).
There is much less evidence on whether there is rationing on the intensive mar-
gin, let alone on its efficiency, and the evidence that exists seems to be conflicting.
For example, Zavodny (2000) finds that a minimum wage reduces employment,
but increases average hours worked, while Couch and Wittenburg (2001) find that
a minimum wage reduces both employment and hours worked.
3.7.2 Model and comparative statics
If rationing occurs exclusively on the intensive margin, there is no unemploy-
ment. The intensive labor-supply decision of high-skilled workers remains unal-
tered. However, in the case of a binding minimum wage, low-skilled workers face
a restriction on the number of hours they are allowed to work. We refer to this
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restriction as underemployment. We denote the effective labor supply – the actual
number of hours worked – as le, and the maximum number of hours an individual
with ability θ is allowed to work as l¯θ. The size of the minimum wage determines
the aggregate number of hours that firms can feasibly employ. How this aggregate
hour restriction translates into individual hour rations, and how these rations de-
pend on θ is a priori unclear. We assume that the rations are efficient and derive
the implications of this for the specific functional form of l¯θ below.
Low-skilled workers maximize utility, V Lθ = (1−t)wLle− 1θβ (l
e)1+1/ε
1+1/ε
, with respect
to effective labor supply, le, subject to the rationing constraint, l¯θ ≥ le.19 We
denote the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for this constraint as (1−t)wLµ. In equilibrium,
µ gives the shadow price of relaxing the rationing constraint in terms of the net
wage, (1− t)wL. The Lagrangian for the maximization problem of the individual
can thus be written as:
(3.64) L = (1− t)wLle − 1
θβ
(le)1+1/ε
1 + 1/ε
+ (1− t)wLµ(l¯θ − le).
We denote the optimal effective labor supply for an individual with ability θ as leθ.
It is determined by the first-order condition of the Lagrangian with respect to le
and by the rationing constraint:
leθ = (θ
β(1− λ)(1− t)wL)ε if µ = 0,(3.65)
leθ = l¯θ if µ > 0.(3.66)
In the absence of rationing, the constraint is slack, such that µ = 0, and the
solution for effective labor supply reduces to the one obtained in previous sections:
leθ = l
L
θ = (θ
β(1 − t)wL)ε. We call lLθ notional labor supply, i.e., the number of
hours the worker would optimally like to supply. If the constraint is binding, such
that µ > 0, effective labor supply is fully determined by the rationing constraint
and leθ = l¯θ. Notice from the first-order condition that a minimum wage acts as an
implicit tax on labor supply through raising the shadow price of labor supply µ.
Thus, an individual would like to work lLθ hours, but if rationed is forced to
work l¯θ < l
L
θ instead. Without loss of generality we denote the hours restriction as
a proportion of notional labor supply such that l¯θ ≡ (1− uθ)lLθ . We call uθ the ra-
19We restrict attention to skill-independent tax instruments. We do not formally analyze the
case of skill-dependent tax instruments as the results would be trivial. The effects of a higher
minimum wage can be shown to be exactly mimicked by an increase in the low-skilled tax rate
and a decrease in the high-skilled tax rate, leaving the minimum wage redundant (on this, see
also Lee and Saez, 2012).
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tioning schedule which may or may not depend on θ. It is important to distinguish
uθ from the unemployment rate as we have previously defined it. While in earlier
sections u stands for the proportion of low-skilled individuals that are unemployed,
in this section uθ stands for the proportion of hours that are underemployed.
To determine individual labor supply we need to know the specific functional
form of the rationing schedule. As discussed above, it is empirically unclear how
rationing should depend on θ, but we assume in this section that the rationing
schedule is efficient. This implies that the functional form of uθ is such that the
marginal utility of an extra hour of work is equal for every unskilled worker. Had
this not been the case it would be efficiency improving to marginally decrease
rationing of the high marginal utility worker and increase rationing of the low
marginal utility worker. The marginal utility of being allowed to work an extra
hour of work, in terms of the net wage, is given by the shadow price of labor supply
µ. Substituting for leθ = (1− uθ)(θβ(1− t)wL)ε in the first-order condition, we can
write the shadow price as µ = 1 − (1 − uθ) 1ε . For rationing to be efficient, the
shadow price should be independent of θ, and thus we require that:
(3.67)
dµ
dθ
=
1
ε
(1− uθ) 1ε−1 duθ
dθ
= 0.
This equation tells us that for rationing to be efficient, we necessarily have that
duθ/dθ = 0. Hence, efficient rationing requires that the ration, as a proportion of
the notionally supplied number of hours, is equal for every low-skilled worker. The
crucial assumption underlying this result is that the compensated elasticity of labor
supply, ε, is identical for every low-skilled worker. This assumption implies that
substitution effects and thus dead-weight losses are identical for every worker facing
the same ration uθ. Throughout the remainder of this section we are exclusively
interested in efficient rationing schedules and thus write uθ = u.
Substituting for effective labor supply, leθ, we can write the indirect utility
function for low-skilled workers as:
(3.68) V Lθ = T +
(
1− ε
1 + ε
(1− u) 1ε
)
(1− u)θβε((1− t)wL)1+ε.
Notice that, for u = 0, this collapses to the low-skilled utility in the case of
extensive rationing. Furthermore, it can easily be shown that, in the absence
of rationing, ∂V Lθ /∂u = 0, such that a marginal increase in rationing does not
affect low-skilled utility. However, for positive and increasing values of rationing,
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∂V Lθ /∂u is negative and decreasing.
20 As a direct consequence, in the absence
of rationing, an increase in rationing only has a second-order effect on the cut-
off ability level, Θ. Hence, a marginal increase in the minimum wage above the
market-clearing wage only affects the human capital decision through a decrease
in the skill premium, wH/wL. Only for higher levels of the minimum wage, further
rationing causes an offsetting response in human capital. See the appendix for a
full derivation of the comparative statics.
The comparative-statics equation for skill formation is now given by:
(3.69) N˜H =
(
σ − 1
σ
− (1− u) 1ε
)
σ
η′
w˜L
α
,
where η′ > 0 is a composite term describing the shape of the income distribution
around ability Θ (see appendix). A higher minimum wage will lead to more skill
formation if and only if σ−1
σ
> (1− u) 1ε . This is more likely to hold if σ and u are
large and if ε is small.
Table 3.1 shows the critical levels of u, above which a higher minimum wage
leads to higher skill formation and below which it leads to less skill formation.
We show this for values of σ between 1.5 and 2.5. A value of 1.5 seems to be
reasonable, although both lower and higher values are found in the literature (Katz
and David, 1999). Notice that for σ ≤ 1, a minimum wage always leads to lower
skill formation. Furthermore, we choose values of ε between 0.2 and 0.4, which
seems to be a reasonable range (see, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
Table 3.1: Critical values for u
u∗ = 1− (σ−1
σ
)ε
σ = 1.5 σ = 2.0 σ = 2.5
ε = 0.2 0.20 0.13 0.10
ε = 0.3 0.28 0.19 0.14
ε = 0.4 0.36 0.24 0.18
The critical values of the underem-
ployment rate lie between 0.10 (for ε =
0.2 and σ = 2.5) and 0.36 (for ε = 0.4
and σ = 1.5). Empirical evidence on
the degree of working-hour restrictions
varies widely. There are studies observ-
ing employees working less hours than
desired (e.g., Kahn and Lang, 1991;
Dickens and Lundberg, 1993; Bloemen,
2008) and studies observing employees
actually working more hours than they
desire (e.g., Stewart and Swaffield, 1997; Bo¨heim and Taylor, 2004). The largest
20The first derivative is given by ∂V Lθ /∂u =
(
(1− u) 1ε − 1
)
θβε((1 − t)wL)1+ε < 0, and the
second derivative by ∂2V Lθ /∂u
2 = − 1ε (1− u)
1−ε
ε θβε((1− t)wL)1+ε < 0.
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rationing proportion, which is based on a sample of low-income workers, is found
by Dickens and Lundberg (1993) and is with 20 percent well within the range of
above table. However, under more conservative underemployment rates of around
10 percent (as in Kahn and Lang, 1991), it is very unlikely that, with efficient
rationing, a minimum wage leads to more skill formation.
3.7.3 Optimal policy
As there are no unemployed when rationing occurs on the intensive margin, the
social welfare function simplifies to:
(3.70) W ≡
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ(V Lθ )dG(θ) +
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ(V Hθ )dG(θ),
whereas the government’ budget constraint is still given by equation (3.30). Form-
ing the Lagrangian and taking derivatives we find that the first-order conditions
for the tax rate and transfer do not change. We find the following first-order
condition for the optimal minimum wage:
(1− ξL)Ψ′(V L)− (1− ξH)Ψ′(V H)(3.71)
−
(
1− (1− u) 1ε
)
(1− ξL)Ψ′(V L)
(
wL
(1− u)
du
dwL
− ε
)
− λ t
1− t
(
wL
1− u
du
dwL
− (w
H lHΘ − wL(1− u)lLΘ)
LL
dNH
dwL
)
= 0.
The first line gives the redistributional gain of an increase in the minimum wage,
which is the same as before. The second line gives the utility loss associated with
more rationing due to a higher minimum wage. The third line gives the social
welfare loss of an eroding tax base.
To focus on the desirability of a minimum wage, we analyze the first-order
condition for u = 0. Note that in that case
(
1− (1− u) 1ε
)
= 0 and wH lHΘ −
wL(1 − u)lLΘ = 0. Substituting this into the first-order condition, we obtain the
following condition for a minimum wage to be desirable:
(3.72) (1− ξL)Ψ
′(V L)
λ
− (1− ξH)Ψ
′(V H)
λ
>
t
1− t
u˜
w˜L
.
This expression is almost identical to the analogue expressions in previous sections.
The only term that is missing is the marginal utility loss from rationing which, as
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we discussed above, is only second-order under efficient rationing. Hence, in the
absence of taxation, a marginal increase in the minimum wage above the market-
clearing wage only has distributional gains, equal to the left-hand side of equation
(3.72). With efficient rationing, and in the absence of taxation, a minimum wage is
therefore unambiguously desirable. This confirms Lee and Saez (2012) who derive
the same result in the case of efficient rationing on the extensive margin.
If there is a positive tax rate, a minimum wage erodes the tax base as more
rationing leads to fewer workers paying taxes. This welfare loss is represented by
the right-hand side of equation (3.72) and is increasing in the tax rate. In order
to determine the desirability of a minimum wage at the optimal tax system we
substitute for Ψ′(V L) − Ψ′(V H) from the first-order condition for the tax rate,
t/(1− t) = ξ/ε. This yields:
(3.73)
t
1− t
(
ε
α−NH −
u˜
w˜L
)
>
NL
α−NH
Ψ′(V L)
λ
ξL +
NH
α−NH
Ψ′(V H)
λ
ξH .
This condition is almost identical to equation (3.45), the only differences being the
utility loss of unemployment, which drops out, and a slightly altered elasticity of
underemployment u˜/w˜L = (σ+ ε+ κ
′)/α (see appendix). The left-hand side gives
the efficiency costs of redistributing between skill-groups by using income taxes in-
stead of a minimum wage. In the case of income taxes, the efficiency costs consist
of the tax-base erosion caused by downwardly distorted intensive labor supply of
both high-skilled and low-skilled workers. In the case of a higher minimum wage,
the efficiency costs consist of the tax-base erosion associated with underemploy-
ment. The right-hand side gives the within-group distributional advantage income
taxes have over the minimum wage.
Proposition 3.8 Similarly to the case with uniform unemployment on the exten-
sive margin, if rationing is efficient, the role of a minimum wage in an optimal
skill-independent tax-benefit system is to complement the tax-benefit system by re-
ducing the distributional imperfections of the income tax. Minimum wages help to
redistribute more income between skill groups, so that income taxes can be better
targeted at reducing inequality within skill groups. The desirability of a minimum
wage depends on whether this benefit outweighs the loss in tax revenue due to higher
rationing. Contrary to the case with uniform unemployment on the extensive mar-
gin, there is no direct utility loss associated with a marginally binding minimum
wage.
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3.8 Conclusion
This study indicates that the role and desirability of a minimum wage depends on
the available tax instruments. If taxation cannot be conditioned on skill type or
wage rate, a minimum wage might be useful as a means to directly redistribute
income from high- to low-skilled workers. If taxation can be conditioned on skill
type, such redistribution can also be achieved by appropriately setting taxes. The
redistributive role of a minimum wage in that case vanishes. However, a bind-
ing minimum wage might still be useful to alleviate a distortion on skill formation
caused by redistributive taxation. While a minimum wage exacerbates a tax distor-
tion by raising unemployment, it simultaneously alleviates a distortion by raising
skill formation. The net welfare effect determines the desirability of a minimum
wage. These results bring to mind the discussion on optimal indirect taxation. In
the absence of non-linear taxation, indirect taxation might be useful for redistri-
bution (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). If non-linear taxation is available (and
with homogeneous preferences), indirect taxation loses its redistributive role. It
might still help, however, in alleviating distortions caused by the non-linear tax
schedule (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976).
An important factor determining the optimality of a minimum wage is the
degree to which education increases as a result of higher unemployment among the
low-skilled. This is in turn driven by how strongly the job chances of low-skilled
workers on the skill margin are affected by unemployment. We assumed that every
low-skilled worker’s job chances are affected equally. Assuming, as Lee and Saez
(2012) mostly do, that workers on the skill margin are hit by unemployment first
would drastically improve the case for a minimum wage as it would lead to a
larger increase in skill formation. The welfare consequences of different rationing
schedules are discussed in more detail in Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013a, Chapter
4 of this Dissertation) and Gerritsen (2013a, Chapter 5 of this Dissertation). In
Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013a), we study the desirability of a minimum wage in
the presence of a more general rationing schedule and empirically calibrate the
resulting desirability condition. Gerritsen (2013a) treats the wage floor as given,
and derives implications for optimal tax policy.
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3.A Efficient rationing
In the case of efficient rationing, indirect utility is represented by:
V Lθ = T +
(
1− ε
1 + ε
(1− u) 1ε
)
(1− u)θβε((1− t)wL)1+ε,(3.74)
V Hθ = T +
θε((1− t)wH)1+ε
1 + ε
.(3.75)
For the cut-off level of ability, Θ, we need V LΘ = V
H
Θ , which implies:
(3.76) Θ(1−β)ε =
(
1− ε
1 + ε
(1− u) 1ε
)
(1− u)(1 + ε)
(
wH
wL
)−(1+ε)
.
The rest of the equilibrium conditions consist of the firms’ first-order conditions
and the market clearing conditions.
FH(L
H , LL) = wH ,(3.77)
FL(L
H , LL) = wL,(3.78)
LH =
∫ θ
Θ
lHθ dG(θ),(3.79)
LL = (1− u)
∫ Θ
θ
lLθ dG(θ).(3.80)
Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions around an initial equilibrium yields
the following equations:
(1− β)εΘ˜ = (1 + ε)(w˜L − w˜H)− 1− (1− u)
1
ε
1− ε
1+ε
(1− u) 1ε u˜,(3.81)
w˜H =
1− α
σ
(L˜L − L˜H),(3.82)
w˜L =
α
σ
(L˜H − L˜L),(3.83)
L˜H = − l
H
Θ Θg(Θ)
LH
Θ˜ + ε(w˜H − t˜),(3.84)
L˜L =
(1− u)lLΘΘg(Θ)
LL
Θ˜− u˜+ ε(w˜L − t˜).(3.85)
Moreover recall that NH = 1− G(Θ) and hence N˜H = −Θg(Θ)Θ˜. The equa-
tions above can now be solved to express N˜H and u˜ in terms of the exogenous
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variables, w˜L and t˜:
N˜H =
(
σ − 1
σ
− (1− u) 1ε
)
σ
η′
w˜L
α
,(3.86)
u˜ =
(
σ + ε−
(
σ − 1
σ
− (1− u) 1ε
)
σκ′
)
w˜L
α
,(3.87)
where η′ =
((
1− ε
1+ε
(1− u) 1ε
)
(1−β)ε
Θg(Θ)
+
(
1− (1− u) 1ε
)(
lHΘ
LH
+
(1−u)lLΘ
LL
))
and κ′ =(
lHΘ
LH
+
(1−u)lLΘ
LL
)
η′−1. The interpretation of these two comparative-statics equations
is similar to the case with extensive rationing. In particular, it shows that a higher
minimum wage leads to more skill formation if and only if (σ − 1)/σ > (1− u) 1ε .
Furthermore, it can be shown that rationing always increases due to a higher
minimum wage.
The Lagrangian for the government’s optimization problem is the following:
L(wL, t, T ) =
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ(V Lθ )dG(θ) +
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ(V Hθ )dG(θ)(3.88)
+ λ(twLLL + twHLH − T − E).
This leads to the following first-order conditions:
∂L
∂wL
= (1− t)
(∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )(1− u)lLθ dG(θ)−
LL
LH
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ′(V Hθ )l
H
θ dG(θ)
)
(3.89)
− (1− t)
(
1− (1− u) 1ε
)∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )(1− u)lLθ dG(θ)
(
u˜
w˜L
− ε
)
− λtLL u˜
w˜L
+ λ(twH lHΘ − twL(1− u)lLΘ)
dNH
dwL
= 0,
∂L
∂t
= −
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )w
L(1− u)lLθ dG(θ)−
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ′(V Hθ )w
H lHθ dG(θ)(3.90)
− ε
(
1− (1− u) 1ε
)∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )w
L(1− u)lLθ dG(θ)
+ λ
(
wLLL + wHLH − ε t
1− t(w
LLL + wHLH)
)
= 0,
(3.91)
∂L
∂T
=
∫ Θ
θ
Ψ′(V Lθ )dG(θ) +
∫ θ
Θ
Ψ′(V Hθ )dG(θ)− λ = 0.
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The first-order condition for the minimum wage can be simplified as follows:
(1− ξL)Ψ
′(V L)
λ
− (1− ξH)Ψ
′(V H)
λ
=(3.92) (
1− (1− u) 1ε
)
(1− ξL)Ψ
′(V L)
λ
(
u˜
w˜L
− ε
)
+
t
1− t
u˜
w˜L
− t
1− t
wH lHΘ − wL(1− u)lLΘ
wLLL
N˜H
w˜L
.
The left-hand side gives the distributional gain of a higher minimum wage. The
right-hand side gives the costs associated with higher unemployment and the in-
ability of low-skilled workers to react by altering their hours worked (first term)
and the costs associated with exacerbating the tax distortion due to stronger ra-
tioning (second term) and lower high-skilled labor supply (third term). In the case
of u = 0, the first and third terms only imply second-order welfare effects.
Rearranging, and substituting for ξ and ξL, yields the following expression for
the optimal income tax:
(3.93)
t
1− t =
ξ
ε
−
(
1− (1− u) 1ε
)
(1− α)(1− ξL)Ψ
′(V L)
λ
.
Hence, compared to the case with rationing along the extensive margin, there is
an additional cost of taxation, which lowers the optimal tax level. In the case of
extensive rationing, low-skilled workers coped with higher taxation by working less
hours, thereby absorbing part of the direct utility costs. However, if these workers
are intensively rationed, they will not reduce their working hours as they already
work less than they would prefer. In the case of u = 0 this cost naturally vanishes.
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Is a minimum wage an
appropriate instrument for
redistribution?
4.1 Introduction
The public debate on increasing, decreasing, or implementing a minimum wage is
not unlike the mythological hydra of Lerna. Not long after the debate is temporar-
ily settled in one country it rears its head in another.1 This regularity is suggestive
of the lack of consensus on the desirability of a minimum wage. Proponents em-
phasize its positive effects on the earnings of low-skilled workers; opponents stress
that a minimum wage tends to increase unemployment. As long as the debate is
framed in terms of the trade-off between these two opposing welfare effects, this
chapter’s title question is bound to remain contentious even among economists
that are not principally opposed to redistribution. This is why the merits and
demerits of a minimum wage should not be judged in isolation, but in contrast to
the merits and demerits of obtaining a similar degree of redistribution in a direct
way by means of the income-tax system. A minimum wage can only be desirable if
it is more effective than income taxation in supporting the earnings of low-skilled
workers.
The central purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the question whether
minimum wages are optimally employed alongside income taxes in order to redis-
tribute income. To that end, we develop a model with perfectly competitive labor
1In the same analogy, the modest ambition of this chapter is to take up the role of Hercules.
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markets, in which firms demand high- and low-skilled labor. Recent evidence sug-
gests that minimum wages have important general-equilibrium effects on the entire
wage structure (e.g., Teulings, 2000, 2003; Autor, Manning and Smith, 2010). Our
analysis allows for such effects by taking into account multiple job types that are
imperfect substitutes in production. For expositional reasons, we focus on the
case of two job types (high- and low-skilled) but can easily generalize this to n > 2
job types with varying degrees of complementarity. Individuals decide on hours
worked, participation, and education, that is, on being high- or low-skilled. In-
dividuals are heterogeneous in a single dimension: their disutility of work, which
we refer to as their ability. An individual’s ability determines whether he opti-
mally decides to be voluntarily unemployed, a low-skilled worker, or a high-skilled
worker. A minimum wage, if it binds, only does so for the low-skilled segment of
the labor market, thereby creating involuntary unemployment among low-skilled
workers.
Our first contribution is to determine whether and when a binding minimum
wage is part of an optimal redistributive policy. To that end, we consider a net-
income-neutral (NIN) increase in the minimum wage. As the name suggests, the
NIN minimum-wage reform raises the minimum wage, while keeping workers’ net
incomes constant by perfectly offsetting tax changes. Complementarity between
job types implies that a minimum-wage increase affects the gross wage rates of all
job types. We assume that taxation can be conditioned on job type or, equivalently,
on the wage rate, the observability of which is required to enforce a minimum wage.
This enables the government to neutralize the effects of a minimum-wage increase
on the net wages of both low- and high-skilled workers.2 As net incomes remain
constant, the reform has no direct effects on labor supply. As it raises firms’
wage costs for low-skilled workers, it does reduce low-skilled labor demand. This
reduced demand compresses the low-skilled labor market in two distinct ways.
On the one hand, low-skilled workers are pushed ‘downwards’ into unemployment.
On the other hand, the increased probability of unemployment induces low-skilled
workers to invest in education and move ‘upwards’ into the high-skilled segment
of the labor market.
The effects of a NIN minimum-wage increase are thus twofold: it raises both
2This is similar in spirit to Kaplow (2008), who analyzes policy reforms (e.g., larger public
good provision, changes in indirect taxes) by adjusting the tax schedule to keep individuals’
utilities fixed. We analyze a minimum wage reform while adjusting the tax system to keep the
net incomes constant of those who retain their jobs. Naturally, the optimality of a minimum
wage does not depend on the particular tax reform chosen.
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involuntary unemployment and education. The unemployment effect causes two
separate welfare losses: laid-off workers who strictly prefer employment over un-
employment suffer direct utility losses, and tax revenue declines if the government
employs progressive taxation to redistribute from the employed to the unemployed.
The education effect results in higher tax revenues and thus a welfare gain if high-
skilled workers are taxed more heavily than low-skilled workers. A NIN minimum-
wage increase is desirable if the welfare gains from more education outweigh the
welfare losses from higher unemployment. This is true regardless of the policy mix
in place. However, if this condition holds in the tax optimum without a minimum
wage, a minimum wage must be part of the optimal policy mix and therefore be
an appropriate instrument for redistribution. An alternative, but equivalent, way
to state this is the following. If the optimal tax system is progressive and taxes
education and participation on a net basis, the optimal tax system distorts both
education and participation decisions downward. A NIN minimum-wage reform
exacerbates the distortion on participation by increasing unemployment, but alle-
viates the distortion on education as low-skilled workers seek to avoid involuntary
unemployment. The net welfare effect determines a minimum wage’s desirability.
Our second contribution is to demonstrate that the net welfare effect of a mini-
mum wage critically depends on the specific assumptions we make on exactly which
low-skilled workers become unemployed – given heterogeneity among low-skilled
workers. We propose a general rationing schedule that specifies the probability
of unemployment at each ability level. We furthermore define the unemployment
incidence at a specific ability level, as the relative degree to which higher un-
employment is concentrated on this ability level. Therefore, a crucial difference
with previous studies is that we do not need to make specific assumptions on how
unemployment depends on the source of heterogeneity.
To illustrate what we mean by unemployment incidence, consider Figure 4.1.
The horizontal line represents the range of ability types, θ ∈ [θ, θ]. In our model’s
equilibrium, there are two critical ability levels, Φ and Θ. For individuals with low
ability, θ ∈ [θ,Φ), the disutility of work is so large that it is optimal for them to be
voluntarily unemployed. Individuals with intermediate ability, θ ∈ [Φ,Θ), supply
labor as low-skilled workers. Individuals with high ability, θ ∈ [Θ, θ], work as
high-skilled workers. Now consider an increase in low-skilled unemployment due
to a NIN minimum-wage increase. Panels (a)-(c) in Figure 4.1 depict, for three
different types of unemployment incidence, the change in individual unemployment
probabilities as a function of ability. In principle, there is an infinite number of
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possible assumptions on the exact unemployment incidence of a given increase in
aggregate unemployment.
Figure 4.1: The unemployment incidence of a minimum wage increase: examples
Earlier literature recognizes that the unemployment incidence is important to
assess the welfare effects of a minimum wage as it determines the utility losses
of laid-off workers (Lott, 1990; Palda, 2000; Lee and Saez, 2012). For example,
Lee and Saez (2012) assume that the unemployment incidence is as depicted in
panel (c) of Figure 4.1. They dub this case ‘efficient rationing’ as unemployment is
concentrated on those individuals that are indifferent between low-skilled work and
their outside option – be it non-participation or high-skilled employment. Panels
(a) and (b) depict cases of ‘inefficient rationing’ as part of the unemployment
incidence falls on individuals that are on neither the participation margin, nor
the skill margin, and therefore strictly prefer low-skilled employment over their
outside option. We show that the unemployment incidence of the minimum wage
is critical in two important ways: it determines not only the direct utility losses
of the unemployed, but also the education response to a minimum-wage increase.
To see this, consider the first two panels. In panel (a), the lion share of the
unemployment incidence falls on low-skilled workers who are close to the partic-
ipation margin Φ and thus relatively indifferent between having a job or being
non-participant. As a consequence, the education effect of higher unemployment
will be relatively small. In panel (b), most of the unemployment incidence falls
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on low-skilled workers close to the skill margin Θ. Consequently, many low-skilled
workers will decide to become high-skilled in order to avoid the increased probabil-
ity of unemployment. For the same increase in aggregate unemployment, the case
depicted in panel (b) leads to a larger increase in high-skilled employment than the
case depicted in panel (a). A minimum wage is thus more likely to be desirable in
case (b) than in case (a). More generally, the optimality of a minimum wage fun-
damentally depends on the incidence of unemployment. We prove that a minimum
wage can always be ‘made’ optimal by making the appropriate assumptions on the
unemployment incidence. Unfortunately, both theoretically and empirically, it is
unclear how unemployment probabilities depend on workers’ ability or disutility of
work. Any specific assumption on the incidence of unemployment implies a certain
degree of arbitrariness.
This brings us to the third contribution of this chapter, which is to reinter-
pret the desirability condition of a NIN minimum-wage increase in terms of three
sufficient statistics. These sufficient statistics allow us to forego the need to de-
termine deeper model parameters, in particular the unemployment incidence. We
assume that the low-skilled workers in our model correspond to actual workers
that did not complete upper secondary education. The three sufficient statistics
are then given by the social costs of low-skilled unemployment, the social gains
of more upper-secondary education, and the effect of low-skilled unemployment
on upper-secondary enrollment or graduation rates. The only element of the suf-
ficient statistics that cannot easily be measured are the direct utility losses of
laid-off workers. In our calibration we ignore these direct utility losses, thereby
biasing results in favor of a minimum-wage increase. Data on net tax-revenue
losses of unemployment and gains of education can be found for a large number
of member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD). Moreover, there is a sizable empirical literature on the effect
of unemployment on school enrollment. We make conservative assumptions when
calibrating the desirability condition, further biasing our findings in favor of a min-
imum wage. Our results indicate that a NIN minimum-wage decrease would result
in a Pareto improvement for almost all the countries under consideration. That is,
it would increase government revenue and enable some involuntarily unemployed
to find a job, while leaving no one worse off due to the net-income neutrality of
the reform. Only for the United States, using a highly conservative calibration,
we cannot reject the desirability of a minimum-wage increase outright.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We discuss the relation
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to previous literature in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 introduces the theoretical model.
The comparative statics of a NIN minimum-wage reform are developed in Section
4.4, while Section 4.5 provides the welfare analysis of the minimum-wage reform.
Section 4.7 discusses the empirical application of the model and we conclude with
some final thoughts.
4.2 Earlier literature
This chapter contributes to a small strand of the literature, which analyzes minimum-
wage legislation in models of competitive labor markets.3 The classic references are
Guesnerie and Roberts (1987) and Allen (1987), who adopt versions of the Stiglitz
(1982) model in which workers are predetermined to be high-skilled or low-skilled.
Apart from their skill type, individuals are identical so there is no need to spec-
ify a specific rationing schedule. The government sets a minimum wage which
might bind for the low-skilled segment of the labor market. It also uses non-linear
income taxes to optimally redistribute from high- to low-skilled workers, but can-
not directly observe a worker’s skill type. The goverment is thus restricted by
an incentive-compatibility constraint stipulating that high-skilled workers prefer
not to mimic low-skilled workers. Since this is the only constraint preventing full
income redistribution, a minimum wage can never be optimal as it tightens the
incentive-compatibility constraint by making it more attractive for a high-skilled
worker to mimic a low-skilled worker.
There are a number of drawbacks to this approach. First, workers cannot
choose their skill type. For high-skilled workers it is impossible to obtain a low-
skilled job; for low-skilled workers it is impossible to educate themselves to obtain
a high-skilled job. A second drawback is that, in order to enforce a minimum
wage, the government requires information on individual wage rates and, hence,
on skill types. The very absence of such information, however, is assumed to be the
reason for the government to resort to distortionary taxation in the first place.4
3Note that there is also a larger literature on minimum wages in non-competitive labor mar-
kets. In most of that literature, the effects of a minimum wage are studied in isolation from
income tax policy. See, for example, Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013b, Chapter 3 of this Disserta-
tion) and Lee and Saez (2012) for overviews and extensive references. A notable exception is
Hungerbu¨hler and Lehmann (2009), who find a role for a minimum wage alongside optimal non-
linear labor income taxes if workers’ bargaining power is inefficiently low and the government
has no means to directly control bargaining power. Our results should therefore be interpreted
with caution, keeping in mind that labor-market frictions might have a separate impact on the
desirability of a minimum wage.
4Guesnerie and Roberts (1987, p.498) are perfectly aware of this, stating that the assumption
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This approach thus suffers from an informational inconsistency in the optimal
redistribution problem.
These two drawbacks are avoided both by this chapter and by Lee and Saez
(2012). Lee and Saez, like us, assume individuals’ decisions on participation and
skill type are driven by their idiosyncratic disutility of work. Taxes are conditioned
on skill type but the first-best allocation is unattainable because workers can de-
cide on their skill type. As discussed above, Lee and Saez furthermore make the
very specific assumption that unemployment is concentrated on those low-skilled
workers with the lowest willingness to pay to remain a low-skilled worker. Under
this assumption, workers that are indifferent between non-participation and low-
skilled employment, or between low-skilled and high-skilled employment, are the
first workers to be rationed, as illustrated by panel (c) of Figure 4.1. A minimum
wage therefore enables the government to provide additional transfers to low-skilled
workers without causing any distortion; anyone (be it a non-participant or a high-
skilled worker) who tries to obtain a low-skilled job in response to these transfers
faces certain unemployment, and thus no one tries. Consequently, a minimum wage
is optimal if, in the optimum without a minimum wage, the government would like
to redistribute more income towards low-skilled workers (away from high-skilled
workers and non-participants), but is prevented from directly transferring more
income towards the low-skilled because the distortions of doing so would become
larger than the distributional gains.
The optimality condition of Lee and Saez crucially depends on their assumption
on how the probability of unemployment is related to unobserved disutility of
work. Since it is virtually impossible to empirically assess the plausibility of this
assumption it remains unclear whether their results are of practical relevance.
In this chapter we attempt to provide a solution to this concern by developing a
model in which individuals decide on participation and skill type, without imposing
restrictions on how the probability of unemployment depends on a low-skilled
worker’s disutility of work. We derive an optimality condition for a minimum
wage that holds regardless of the incidence of unemployment.5 In Section 4.5 we
provide a proof that this condition harbors the result of Lee and Saez as a special
case. We furthermore show that the effect of unemployment on education can
that the government cannot observe wages but can enforce minimum wages “is a somewhat mixed
observability assumption.”
5In a related study, Gerritsen (2013a, Chapter 5 of this Dissertation) determines how optimal
tax rules depend on the unemployment incidence when the government does not directly set the
wage floor.
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function as a sufficient statistic, foregoing the need to make a specific assumption
on the unemployment incidence. Thus, in contrast to earlier literature, our model
enables us to derive a condition for the desirability of a minimum wage, based
on sufficient statistics that can be determined empirically, without depending on
a pre-determined skill distribution, informational inconsistencies, or very specific
assumptions on the unemployment incidence of a minimum wage.
4.3 Model
This section describes in detail the behavior of individuals and firms. Individuals
choose (i) whether to participate in the labor market as a high-skilled worker, par-
ticipate as a low-skilled worker, or not to participate at all, and (ii) conditional on
being high-skilled or low-skilled, how many labor hours to supply. Firms demand
two types of labor, low-skilled and high-skilled, in competitive labor markets. In
case of a binding minimum wage, low-skilled labor demand will be insufficient to
match supply, causing involuntary unemployment among the low-skilled.
4.3.1 Preferences and budget constraints
Individuals differ in their ability θ, which has cumulative distribution G(θ), density
g(θ), and support
[
θ, θ
]
, with θ > θ ≥ 0. While in many studies of optimal
redistribution ability determines a person’s earning capacity, in our model it affects
his disutility of work.6 Specifically, take a worker with ability θ and skill type
i ∈ {H,L}, where H stands for high-skilled and L for low-skilled work.7 This
worker’s number of labor hours is denoted by liθ. His disutility of work, denoted q
i
θ,
is assumed to be a skill-specific function of labor hours and ability: qiθ ≡ qi(liθ, θ).
Disutility of work is increasing and convex in hours worked (qiθ,l, q
i
θ,ll > 0)
and decreasing in ability (qiθ,θ < 0).
8 Disutility of work could simply represent
6We assumed heterogeneity in disutility of work, rather than earning capacity for two reasons.
First, the ability to implement and enforce a minimum wage requires that the government has
information on individual wages. If individuals are only heterogeneous with respect to their earn-
ings ability, this information would enable the government to implement the first-best allocation.
This is avoided by assuming heterogeneity with respect to disutility of work. Second, if workers
are only heterogeneous with respect to their earning capacity, anyone with productivity below
the minimum wage would simply become involuntarily unemployed. A minimum wage would, in
that case, not raise any person’s wage rate and as such not be an instrument for redistribution
at all.
7Our results can readily be extended to a setting with more than two skill types. We briefly
return to this point later.
8For variables that depend on ability, the first subscript θ always denotes the ability level.
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the utility costs of sacrificing an hour of leisure, but could also encompass utility
losses associated with educational effort. Its functional form therefore depends on
whether the worker is high- or low-skilled. Specifically, disutility of a high-skilled
worker is assumed to decrease with ability faster than disutility of a low-skilled
worker, i.e., qHθ,θ ≤ qLθ,θ. This ensures that individuals with high ability have a
comparative advantage in high-skilled work, while individuals with low ability
have a comparative advantage in low-skilled work.9
Utility is a twice differentiable function of consumption, ciθ, and disutility of
work, qi(liθ, θ). This function is assumed to be identical across individuals and
given by:
(4.1) V (ciθ, q
i(liθ, θ)), Vc,−Vq > 0, Vcc, Vqq ≤ 0, i ∈ {H,L} , θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
.
Utility is increasing in consumption, but at a non-increasing rate. Naturally, utility
is decreasing in the disutility of work, and is so at a non-decreasing rate. Con-
sequently, since disutility of work is increasing in labor hours and decreasing in
ability, utility is decreasing in labor hours and increasing in ability: Vqq
i
θ,l < 0 and
Vqq
i
θ,θ > 0.
The household budget constraint stipulates that consumption cannot exceed
the sum of after-tax labor income:
(4.2) ciθ ≤ ωiliθ + T i, i ∈ {H,L} , θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
.
Here, ωi is the net wage rate per hour worked for skill type i, i.e., the wage that
is left after income taxes are paid. Skill-dependent government transfers are given
by T i. If we denote ti as the income tax rate and wi as the gross wage rate for
skill type i, we can alternatively write net wages as:
(4.3) ωi ≡ (1− ti)wi, i ∈ {H,L} .
When the minimum wage binds, the low-skilled gross wage, wL, equals the mini-
mum wage. Due to its analytical convenience we employ net wages and the mini-
mum wage as government instruments in the remainder of this chapter. Taxes on
low-skilled and high-skilled labor then follow residually from (4.3).
Other subscripts denote partial derivatives. Hence, qiθ,x ≡ ∂qiθ/∂x.
9For example, qHθ can include the utility costs of educational effort required to become high-
skilled. The assumption that qHθ,θ ≤ qLθ,θ could then be reinterpreted as an assumption that the
disutility of educational effort to become high-skilled decreases with ability.
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Implicit in our formulation are two assumptions. First, wages are identical
for all workers with the same skill type, while they differ between workers with
different skill types. Thus, workers of the same skill type are assumed to be perfect
substitutes in production, whereas workers with different skill types are not.
Second, tax rates are identical for all workers with the same skill type, but
differ between workers with different skill types. Allowing for fully non-linear
income taxation – taxation that can be conditioned on total labor earnings, wiliθ,
as well as on skill type i – does not qualitatively alter our results. The reason
is that a minimum wage is a skill-specific, linear policy instrument. Therefore,
its effects on net labor earnings can be perfectly replicated by linear, skill-specific
tax instruments. Consequently, judging the merits of a minimum wage relative to
redistributive taxation does not require income taxes to be non-linear. We come
back to this point in slightly more detail after deriving our main results.
So far, we discussed the utility function and budget constraints of the working
population. When an individual is not employed – be it voluntarily or involuntarily
so – he does not suffer any disutility of work, nor does he earn any labor income,
but instead receives benefits equal to TU . Hence, his utility is given by:
(4.4) vU ≡ V (TU , 0).
4.3.2 Intensive labor supply
Individuals first decide to participate as a low-skilled or as a high-skilled worker
or not to participate at all, then decide on how many hours of labor to supply.
Using backward induction, we first solve for the optimal number of labor hours
conditional on skill type. Every worker chooses his number of labor hours, liθ, so
as to maximize utility, (4.1), subject to the budget constraint, (4.2). Labor hours
are implicitly given by equating the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for
consumption with the net wage rate:
(4.5)
−Vq(ciθ, qi(liθ, θ))qil (liθ, θ)
Vc(ciθ, q
i(liθ, θ))
= ωi, i ∈ {H,L} , θ ∈ [θ, θ] .
Jointly with the household budget constraint, this first-order condition determines
an individual’s intensive labor supply as a function of the net wage rate, ωi, the
government transfer, T i, and his ability, θ:
(4.6) liθ = l
i(ωi, T i, θ), i ∈ {H,L} , θ ∈ [θ, θ] .
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4.3.3 Rationing schedule and expected indirect utility
Substituting optimal labor hours and the budget constraint into the utility function
yields skill-dependent indirect utility, viθ, as a function of the net wage rate, ω
i,
the transfer, T i, and ability, θ:
(4.7)
viθ ≡ vi(ωi, T i, θ) ≡ V (ωili(ωi, T i, θ)+T i, qi(li(ωi, T i, θ), θ)), i ∈ {H,L} , θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
.
Notice that the indirect utility function is ex post, in that it gives indirect utility
for an individual with skill i, conditional on obtaining a job. However, in the
case of a binding minimum wage, low-skilled workers face a positive probability of
involuntary unemployment. When deciding to be low-skilled or not, an individual
takes into account this probability of unemployment.10 The ex ante expected
indirect utility for a low-skilled individual depends on his probability of finding a
job and his utility when unemployed, as well as his ex post indirect utility when
obtaining a job. To formalize this, we first define the rationing schedule.
Definition 4.1 The rationing schedule, {uθ}, assigns a probability of low-skilled
unemployment to each level of ability θ ∈ [θ, θ].
We assume that this rationing schedule is differentiable with respect to θ. The
relationship between the probability of unemployment and ability is, as we shall
see, theoretically important, though empirically ambiguous. For that reason, we
prefer to impose as few restrictions on the rationing schedule as possible. Instead,
we determine the desirability of a minimum wage for any arbitrary rationing sched-
ule.
Individuals decide to be either voluntarily unemployed, supply low-skilled la-
bor, or supply high-skilled labor on the basis of the expected utility of the three
options. Utility of being voluntarily unemployed is non-random and simply equals
V (TU , 0). Similarly, as there is no unemployment among the high-skilled, utility
of being high-skilled is also non-random and equals vHθ . Utility of an individual
that decides to supply low-skilled labor, however, is random as he enjoys utility
vLθ with probability 1 − uθ, and utility V (TU , 0) with probability uθ. Thus, the
expected utility of becoming low-skilled equals:
(4.8)
vELθ ≡ vEL(ωL, TL, TU , uθ, θ) ≡ (1− uθ)vL(ωL, TL, θ) + uθV (TU , 0), θ ∈ [θ,Φ) .
10Thus, we assume individuals decide on their skill type before knowing with certainty whether
they become employed or unemployed if low-skilled. Also, individuals cannot renege on their
skill decision once unemployment is realized.
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4.3.4 Extensive labor supply
We have assumed that individuals with low levels of θ have a comparative advan-
tage in low-skilled work, whereas individuals with high levels of θ have a com-
parative advantage in high-skilled work. Therefore, in equilibrium, there are two
critical ability levels, Φ and Θ, for which anyone with ability θ ∈ [θ,Φ) becomes
voluntarily unemployed, anyone with ability θ ∈ [Φ,Θ) wants to become a low-
skilled worker, and anyone with ability θ ∈ [Θ, θ] becomes a high-skilled worker.
Figure 4.2 graphically illustrates this equilibrium. Notice that in the case of a
binding minimum wage, individuals who decide to become low-skilled will either
end up as low-skilled employed, or become involuntarily unemployed.
Figure 4.2: Graphical representation of an equilibrium
Participation decision
An individual with ability θ decides to be voluntarily unemployed if vU > vELθ .
Substituting for expected low-skilled utility from equation (4.8), this inequality can
be written as vU > vLθ . The critical level of ability that separates non-participants
from low-skilled workers, Φ, is therefore implicitly determined by:
(4.9) V (TU , 0) = vL(ωL, TL,Φ).
Thus, the individual with ability Φ is indifferent between participating as a low-
skilled worker and not participating at all.11 Individuals with ability below Φ do
not participate; those with ability above Φ do. As implied by equation (4.9), the
critical level Φ can be written as a function of the policy instruments ωL, TL and
11For there to be any voluntarily unemployed individuals at all, a necessary condition is that
individuals at the bottom of the ability distribution, i.e. those with ability θ, strictly prefer non-
participation over participation: V (TU , 0) > v
L(ωL, TL, θ). Violation of this condition would
imply everyone wants to participate. This case would have no bearing on our results and we
disregard it in what follows. Furthermore, uniqueness of Φ is ensured by our assumption that
low-skilled utility is strictly increasing in ability, i.e.: vLθ,θ = Vqq
L
θ,θ > 0 for all θ.
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TU :
(4.10) Φ = Φ(ωL, TL, TU), ΦωL ,ΦTL < 0, ΦTU > 0.
Naturally, if the low-skilled net wage, ωL, and transfer, TL, decrease or unem-
ployment benefits, TU , increase, more individuals decide to become voluntarily
unemployed and Φ increases as a consequence.
Skill decision
An individual with ability θ decides to become low-skilled rather than high-skilled
if vELθ > v
H
θ . The critical level of ability that separates the high-skilled from the
low-skilled, Θ, is therefore implicitly determined by:
(4.11) vEL(ωL, TL, TU , uΘ,Θ) = v
H(ωH , TH ,Θ).
Thus, the individual with ability Θ is indifferent between being high- or low-
skilled.12 Individuals with ability below Θ (and above Φ) decide to be low-skilled;
those with ability above Θ decide to be high-skilled.
Equation (4.11) implicitly determines the critical level Θ as a function of the
government instruments ωH , ωL, TH , TL, and TU , and the unemployment rate
uΘ:
(4.12)
Θ = Θ(ωH , ωL, TH , TL, TU , uΘ), ΘωH ,ΘTH ,ΘuΘ < 0, ΘωL ,ΘTL ,ΘTU > 0.
Notice that the higher is Θ, the lower is the number of high-skilled workers. Natu-
rally, if expected low-skilled earnings rise or high-skilled earnings fall, less individ-
uals decide to become high-skilled and Θ increases as a consequence. Therefore,
the number of persons that are high-skilled is increasing in the high-skilled net
wage rate, ωH , and the high-skilled transfer, TH . It is decreasing in the low-skilled
net wage rate, ωL, the low-skilled transfer, TL, and unemployment benefits, TU .
A crucial ingredient for our welfare analysis of minimum-wage legislation is
the effect of unemployment on skill formation. The partial derivative of Θ with
12A necessary condition for this to hold is that, at the critical level Θ high-skilled utility is
increasing in ability at a faster rate than expected low-skilled utility: vHΘ,θ > v
EL
Θ,θ + v
EL
Θ,uθ
uΘ,θ.
A sufficient condition for Θ to be unique is that this holds for every level of ability: vHϑ,θ >
vELϑ,θ + v
EL
ϑ,uθ
uϑ,θ for all ϑ. We assume this is indeed the case. Allowing for multiple equilibrium
levels of Θ would not compromise any of the economic insights, but only increase the complexity
of the analysis. We briefly return to this point later.
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respect to uΘ, obtained by taking the derivative of equation (4.11), is given by:
(4.13)
∂Θ
∂uΘ
= − v
L
Θ − vU
vHΘ,θ − vELΘ,θ − vELΘ,uΘuΘ,θ
< 0.
Notice that the numerator gives the difference between low-skilled utility and un-
employed utility for an individual with ability Θ, which is positive. It is assumed
that high-skilled utility vHΘ is increasing in ability faster than expected low-skilled
utility vELΘ , such that the denominator is positive as well (see also footnote 12).
Hence, the partial derivative of Θ with respect to uΘ is negative. An increased
probability of unemployment lowers the expected utility of being low-skilled, while
it does not directly affect high-skilled utility. An increase in the unemployment
rate uΘ, ceteris paribus, therefore leads to more high-skilled workers and a lower
level of Θ. Intuitively, when the low-skilled unemployment rate increases, some in-
dividuals escape the higher probability of low-skilled unemployment by becoming
a high-skilled worker.
4.3.5 Aggregate labor supply
Given individuals’ extensive labor supply decisions and their intensive labor supply
decision, aggregate low-skilled labor supply is given by:
(4.14)
∫ Θ
Φ
lLθ dG(θ).
Notice that this aggregate labor supply is only notional, i.e., it includes labor hours
of every low-skilled individual that would like to work, including the ones that are
ultimately unable to find a job. Aggregate high-skilled labor supply is given by:
(4.15)
∫ θ
Θ
lHθ dG(θ).
4.3.6 Firms
We assume workers of the same skill type are perfect substitutes in production,
whereas high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor are imperfect substitutes in pro-
duction. Denoting aggregate labor demand for high-skilled workers as LH and for
low-skilled workers as LL, we can write the production function as:
(4.16) Y ≡ F (LH , LL), Fi > 0, Fii < 0, FHL > 0, i ∈ {H,L} .
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For notational convenience, we let Fi denote the partial derivative of F with respect
to Li. Marginal products of each labor type are positive but diminishing, and F
is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one. A representative firm takes wages
as given and decides on aggregate high- and low-skilled labor demand so as to
maximize profits. This yields standard necessary (and sufficient) conditions for
profit maximization:
(4.17) Fi(L
H , LL) = wi, i ∈ {H,L} .
Notice that labor demand is a function of gross wages. An increase in the gross
wage of labor type i leads to lower demand for labor type i to realign marginal
productivity and labor costs.
4.3.7 General equilibrium
The determination of equilibrium in a labor market with a binding minimum wage
differs substantially from that in a labor market without a binding minimum wage.
For high-skilled labor we assume the minimum wage is never binding. In that case,
the high-skilled gross wage adjusts to equate labor supply and labor demand in the
conventional way: higher demand leads to higher wages, higher supply to lower
wages. In equilibrium, labor demand always equals labor supply:
(4.18) LH =
∫ θ
Θ
lHθ dG(θ).
If the low-skilled labor market is affected by a binding minimum wage, equi-
librium can no longer be determined by wage-rate adjustments as the gross wage
rate cannot be lowered. Instead, unemployment adjusts to ensure labor-market
equilibrium: higher demand leads to lower unemployment, higher supply to higher
unemployment. In equilibrium, labor demand equals effective labor supply, which
is less than notional labor supply:
(4.19) LL =
∫ Θ
Φ
(1− uθ)lLθ dG(θ).
Notice that we have an infinity of unemployment probabilities {uθ}, but only one
equilibrium condition. Thus, above equation simply provides the equilibrium con-
dition for aggregate unemployment, but does not determine individual unemploy-
ment probabilities, {uθ}. Individual probabilities are determined by the rationing
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schedule. This goes directly to the core of our argument: theory points to higher
unemployment due to higher minimum wages, but theoretically we know little
about which workers become unemployed.
Substituting the labor-market equilibrium conditions into the first-order con-
ditions of the firm, we get:
(4.20) Fi
(∫ θ
Θ
lHθ dG(θ),
∫ Θ
Φ
(1− uθ)lLθ dG(θ)
)
= wi, i ∈ {H,L} .
We can now define equilibrium in the private sector as follows.
Definition 4.2 For given values of government instruments
{
wL, ωL, ωH , TU , TL, TH
}
,
a competitive equilibrium in the private sector is defined as the allocation for which
labor supply, participation and skill decisions
{
lLθ , l
H
θ ,Φ,Θ
}
, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], the high-
skilled wage rate wH , and unemployment rates {uθ}, ∀θ ∈ [Φ,Θ), are such that the
optimality conditions for labor supply, (4.6), participation, (4.10), skill formation,
(4.12), and labor demand, (4.20), are satisfied.
4.4 Equilibrium implications of a minimum-wage
reform
4.4.1 A net-income-neutral minimum-wage reform
This section tracks the equilibrium implications of the decision to increase the
minimum wage, while keeping net incomes of high- and low-skilled workers con-
stant. That is, tH and tL endogenously adjust to changes in gross wages such that
net wages ωH and ωL remain fixed. Transfers T i remain constant as well. We
refer to this policy as a net-income-neutral (NIN) minimum-wage reform, since it
increases wL while keeping
{
ωL, ωH , TU , TL, TH
}
constant.13
How do income taxes adjust under the NIN minimum-wage reform? Recall that
ωi ≡ (1− ti)wi. Since dωi = 0, we must have that dti/(1− ti) = dwi/wi. Further-
more, notice that linear homogeneity of the production function implies that profits
are absent, such that d
(
F (LH , LL)− wHLH − wLLL) = 0. Solving for the deriva-
tive and using the firm’s first-order conditions, (4.17), yields LHdwH = −LLdwL.
13Comparative statics of a change in the minimum wage, for given tax rates, have straightfor-
ward interpretations but are mathematically tedious as we demonstrate in Gerritsen and Jacobs
(2013b, Chapter 3 of this Dissertation). A NIN minimum-wage reform allows us to ignore the
behavioral effects of changes in net wages.
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Intuitively, as the minimum wage increase reduces low-skilled employment, labor
productivity and gross wages of high-skilled workers decline since high- and low-
skilled workers are cooperant factors of production, i.e., FHL > 0. Thus, we can
define a net-income-neutral minimum wage increase as follows.
Definition 4.3 A net-income-neutral (NIN) minimum wage increase is a policy
reform that raises the minimum wage, dwL > 0, while keeping net wage rates,
ωL, ωH , and government transfers, TU , TL, TH , constant. In order to keep net
wages constant, income tax rates, tL, tH endogenously adjust, such that:
(4.21)
dtL
1− tL =
dwL
wL
,
dtH
1− tH =
dwH
wH
= − w
LLL
wHLH
dwL
wL
.
Under the NIN minimum-wage reform the low-skilled tax rate rises to offset
the higher low-skilled gross wage. Furthermore, the high-skilled tax rate declines
to compensate for the negative general-equilibrium effect on the high-skilled gross
wage.
4.4.2 Comparative statics of the NIN minimum-wage re-
form
To understand the welfare effects of the NIN minimum-wage reform, we first derive
the comparative statics of the reform for the model’s key variables. To that end,
it is helpful to introduce the concept of the unemployment incidence.
Definition 4.4 The unemployment incidence at ability level θ, denoted by Iθ,
gives the marginal increase in unemployment at that ability level, g(θ)duθ, as a
fraction of the total increase in rationing,
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ):
(4.22) Iθ ≡ g(θ)duθ∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ)
∈ [0,∞) , θ ∈ [Φ,Θ) .
What we refer to as the unemployment incidence, Iθ, is in fact a density func-
tion. Iθ measures the increase in unemployment at θ, g(θ)duθ, relative to the in-
crease in unemployment across all ability levels
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ). As with any density
function, Iθ takes on a value between 0 and ∞ and the integral of the unemploy-
ment incidence equals one, i.e.
∫ Θ
Φ
Iθdθ = 1. If none of the incidence of increased
unemployment is at ability level θ, then Iθ = 0. If the incidence of increased
unemployment is solely at ability level θ, then Iθ →∞.
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Lemma 4.1 The comparative statics results of a NIN minimum-wage reform,
given the equilibrium as described by Definition 4.2, and for given values of all
other government instruments, are:
dliθ = dv
U = dviθ = dG(Φ) = 0, i ∈ {H,L} , θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
,(4.23)
−dG(Θ) = − ∂Θ
∂uΘ
IΘ
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ),(4.24) ∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ) =
(∫ Θ
Φ
lLθ Iθ
LL
dθ
)−1(
εLw
dwL
wL
+ εLΘdG(Θ)
)
.(4.25)
Here, εLw ≡
(
−FLLLL
FL
)−1
> 0 is the low-skilled labor-demand elasticity with respect
to the low-skilled wage rate, wL, and εLΘ ≡
(
lHΘ
LH
+
(1−uΘ)lLΘ
LL
)
> 0 is the low-skilled
labor-demand elasticity with respect to high-skilled labor supply, 1−G(Θ).
Proof. From equations (4.4), (4.6), (4.7), and (4.10), follows that intensive labor
supply, indirect utility, and the participation margin, do not depend on the mini-
mum wage, which proves (4.23). Taking the derivatives of (4.11) and (4.20), and
substituting for Iθ from (4.22), yields (4.24) and (4.25).
First, equations (4.23) demonstrate that a NIN minimum-wage reform is neu-
tral with respect to intensive labor supply, indirect utility, and the number of
voluntary unemployed. Intuitively, individuals’ consumption and intensive labor
supply decisions, and hence utility, depend on their net wage, not their gross wage.
Provided that an individual remains (un)employed, his utility is unaffected by the
NIN minimum-wage reform. Similarly, the critical level Φ equates low-skilled util-
ity and unemployed utility and, therefore, also does not depend on the minimum
wage.
Second, equation (4.24) gives the effect of the NIN minimum-wage reform on
skill formation. The critical level Θ equates high-skilled utility with expected low-
skilled utility. As such, it does not directly depend on the minimum wage, but does
depend on the unemployment probability at the critical level, uΘ. From equation
(4.24) it follows that the change in Θ can be seen as the product of two terms. ∂Θ
∂uΘ
is the partial effect on Θ of a higher unemployment probability at ability level Θ,
which is strictly negative and finite. Intuitively, when the chances of obtaining a
low-skilled job diminish, individuals with ability Θ decide to become high-skilled
instead. IΘ
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ) gives the increase in the number of unemployed workers
with ability Θ. Hence, if the minimum wage raises unemployment, and the unem-
ployment incidence at ability level Θ is positive, the NIN minimum-wage reform
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leads to more high-skilled workers.
Third, equation (4.25) gives the effect of the NIN minimum-wage reform on un-
employment. A minimum wage reduces low-skilled labor demand, thereby raising
unemployment. This increase is seen to depend on three terms. First, it neg-
atively depends on the labor-weighted unemployment incidence,
∫ Θ
Φ
(lLθ Iθ/L
L)dθ.
If the unemployment incidence mainly falls on workers with high intensive labor
supply, fewer workers become unemployed for a given aggregate reduction in la-
bor demand. Second, εLw
dwL
wL
captures the direct unemployment effect of higher
minimum wages. For a given relative increase in minimum wages, dwL/wL, the
larger the labor-demand elasticity, εLw, the larger the increase in low-skilled un-
employment. Finally, εLΘdG(Θ) gives the unemployment effect of a change in
skill formation. If a minimum wage leads to more high-skilled workers, such that
dG(Θ) < 0, the increase in unemployment is smaller. Since low-skilled labor pro-
ductivity is increasing in the number of high-skilled workers, there is less need to
reduce low-skilled labor demand if skill formation increases.
The unemployment incidence at the skill margin, IΘ, is the critical determinant
of the comparative statics of a NIN minimum-wage increase. This is illustrated by
the following Corollary.
Corollary 4.1 The comparative statics of a NIN minimum-wage increase, dwL >
0, depend on IΘ as follows:
IΘ = 0 : −dG(Θ) = 0,
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ) > 0,(4.26)
IΘ →∞ : −dG(Θ) > 0,
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ) = 0,(4.27)
∀ IΘ ∈ (0,∞) : −d
2G(Θ)
dIΘ
> 0,
∫ Θ
Φ
d2uθdG(θ)
dIΘ
< 0.(4.28)
Proof. Solve equations (4.24) and (4.25) of Lemma 4.1 for−dG(Θ) and ∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ),
and rearrange to obtain:
−dG(Θ) = − ε
L
w∫ Θ
Φ
lLθ Iθ
LL
dθ + εLΘ
−∂Θ
∂uΘ
IΘ
dwL
wL
∂Θ
∂uΘ
IΘ ≥ 0,(4.29) ∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ) =
εLw∫ Θ
Φ
lLθ Iθ
LL
dθ + εLΘ
−∂Θ
∂uΘ
IΘ
dwL
wL
≥ 0.(4.30)
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Substitute for IΘ = 0, and the limit of IΘ →∞ into these equations to obtain the
first two lines of the Corollary. Take derivatives to obtain the third line.
Corollary 4.1 shows how changes in skill formation (−dG(Θ)) and total un-
employment (
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ)) depend on the unemployment incidence at the skill
margin (IΘ). Equation (4.26) indicates that if the incidence is 0, a NIN minimum-
wage increase does not affect skill formation, but does lead to more unemployment.
The intuition is straightforward: as no one at the skill margin is affected by the
rise in unemployment, the minimum-wage increase does not provide incentives to
become high-skilled.
Equation (4.27) indicates that the opposite occurs if the unemployment inci-
dence is concentrated solely at ability level Θ. In that case, a NIN minimum-wage
increase leads to more skill formation without affecting unemployment. Intuitively,
if IΘ →∞, all individuals that would be affected by an increase in unemployment
are located at the skill margin and decide to become high-skilled to escape low-
skilled unemployment. Therefore, any reduction in low-skilled labor demand is
completely offset by individuals moving from the low-skilled to the high-skilled
sector, and no one becomes unemployed.
In general, equation (4.28) establishes that the increase in high-skilled em-
ployment is monotonically increasing in the unemployment incidence at the skill
margin. For precisely that reason, the magnitude of the unemployment effect
is monotonically decreasing in the unemployment incidence at the skill margin.
Summing up, as IΘ goes from zero to infinity, the change in skill formation mono-
tonically goes from zero to some positive amount, and the change in unemployment
monotonically goes from some positive amount to zero.
4.5 Welfare analysis
4.5.1 Social objectives and government budget constraint
We assume that social preferences are utilitarian such that social welfare, W , is
given by the unweighted sum of individual utilities:
(4.31)
W ≡
∫ θ
Θ
vH(ωH , TH , θ)dG(θ) +
∫ Θ
Φ
vEL(ωL, TL, TU , uθ, θ)dG(θ) +G(Φ)V (T
U , 0).
It is relatively straightforward to allow for a social welfare function with social
welfare weights that decline with utility. This does not affect our results.
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Ability is private information, which precludes a first-best outcome as the gov-
ernment cannot condition its taxes on θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Instead, the government must
rely on distortionary taxes on verifiable labor income, or introduce a minimum
wage, to pursue its redistributional goals. As a result, the trade-off between eq-
uity and efficiency emerges. As we have done throughout this chapter, we assume
that the government can condition tax rates and transfers on skill type i ∈ {H,L}.
The government must observe wages, and thus skill levels, to implement and en-
force a minimum wage.
The government obtains resources from income taxation, while it spends re-
sources on transfers and some exogenous revenue requirement, R. Its budget B is
thus given by:
B ≡(wH − ωH)
∫ θ
Θ
lH(ωH , TH , θ)dG(θ) + (wL − ωL)
∫ Θ
Φ
(1− uθ)lL(ωL, TL, θ)dG(θ)
(4.32)
− (1−G(Θ))TH −
∫ Θ
Φ
(1− uθ)dG(θ)TL −
(∫ Θ
Φ
uθdG(θ) +G(Φ)
)
TU −R.
Notice that tax revenue per hour worked for workers of skill type i is given by
tiwi = wi − ωi. Thus, the first line gives total revenue from income taxation,
whereas the second line gives total expenditures on transfers and the exogenous
revenue requirement. The government is required to balance its budget, so that
B = 0.
4.5.2 Desirability of a minimum-wage increase
For any private equilibrium, a NIN minimum-wage increase, dwL > 0, is desirable
if the change in social welfare is positive. Denoting the Lagrange multiplier asso-
ciated with the government budget constraint by λ, the desirability condition for
an increase in the minimum wage is given by:
(4.33)
dW
λ
+ dB > 0.
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the desirability condition of the min-
imum wage, we define wedges on skill formation and unemployment as ∆Θ and
∆u. The welfare gain of an increase in high-skilled employment is given by ∆Θ. It
is the difference between the social and private value of increased skill formation,
which equals the increase in tax revenue when a low-skilled worker with ability Θ
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decides to become high-skilled:
(4.34) ∆Θ ≡ tHwH lHΘ − TH − (1− uΘ)(tLwLlLΘ − TL) + uΘTU .
When a low-skilled individual with ability Θ becomes high-skilled, the govern-
ment receives tax revenue tHwH lHΘ − TH , but foregoes expected tax revenue (1−
uΘ)(t
LwLlLΘ−TL) from employed low-skilled workers and −uΘTU from unemployed
low-skilled workers. For progressive tax systems, the tax wedge on skill formation
tends to be positive, ∆Θ > 0. In that case, more skill acquisition leads to higher
tax revenue and, thus, higher social welfare.
Similarly, ∆u is equal to the welfare loss of an additional involuntarily unem-
ployed individual:
(4.35) ∆u ≡
∫ Θ
Φ
(
vLθ − vU
λ
+ tLwLlLθ − TL + TU
)
Iθdθ.
Unemployment affects both individuals’ utility and tax revenue. Individuals that
were previously employed and enjoyed utility vLθ become unemployed and enjoy
utility vU ≤ vLθ . Hence, welfare losses due to direct utility losses (in monetary
equivalents) are given by the first term within brackets. Moreover, the govern-
ment foregoes tax revenue, tLwLlLθ −TL, and has to pay additional unemployment
benefits, TU . These revenue effects are given by the remaining terms within brack-
ets. The unemployment incidence, Iθ, determines the additional unemployment
at ability level θ. Thus, the total wedge is given by the integral over utility and
revenue costs, weighted by the unemployment incidence. If the government redis-
tributes towards the unemployed, ∆u tends to be positive as higher unemployment
leads to both utility and revenue losses.
The following Proposition gives the main theoretical result of the chapter: it
provides the desirability condition of a NIN minimum-wage increase.
Proposition 4.1 A NIN minimum-wage increase enhances social welfare if and
only if the resulting marginal benefits of increased high-skilled employment outweigh
the marginal costs of increased unemployment:
(4.36) −∆ΘdG(Θ) > ∆u
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ).
Equivalently, a NIN minimum-wage increase enhances social welfare if and only if
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the marginal benefits of higher unemployment are larger than its marginal costs:
(4.37) − ∂Θ
∂uΘ
IΘ∆Θ > ∆u.
Proof. Take derivatives of (4.31) and (4.32) and substitute into (4.33). Rearrange
and substitute (4.34) and (4.35) to obtain (4.36) (see the Appendix for the full
derivation). Note from (4.12) that dΘ
duΘ
= ∂Θ
∂uΘ
since
{
ωH , ωL, TH , TL, TU
}
remain
constant. Substitute (4.24) and rearrange to obtain (4.37).
Lemma 4.1 established that the only comparative statics of a NIN minimum-
wage increase consist of increases in involuntary unemployment and the number of
high-skilled workers, while leaving intensive labor supply, participation and utility
unaffected. In line with this finding, Proposition 4.1 establishes that a minimum-
wage increase is desirable only if the benefits of having more high-skilled workers
outweigh the costs of more unemployment. To see this, note that the left-hand
side of inequality (4.36) gives the marginal benefits of increased skill formation
while the right-hand side gives the marginal costs of higher unemployment.
Because a NIN minimum wage only affects welfare through unemployment,
its desirability is equivalent to the desirability of higher unemployment. For this
reason, we can rewrite the desirability condition as equation (4.37). Notice that the
left-hand side gives the marginal benefits of unemployment. The benefits increase
with the effect of aggregate unemployment on skill formation, given by − ∂Θ
∂uΘ
IΘ.
The incidence IΘ determines the effect of an additional unemployed individual
on uΘ, whereas
∂Θ
∂uΘ
determines the effect of uΘ on the number of high-skilled
workers. The marginal benefits of unemployment are furthermore increasing with
the marginal social gains of high-skilled employment, ∆Θ. As the minimum wage
leads to more high-skilled employment, such a policy is more likely to be desirable
if the social benefits of high-skilled work, ∆Θ, are high. The right-hand side of
inequality (4.37) gives the marginal costs of unemployment, ∆u. Since a minimum
wage leads to higher unemployment, it is less likely to be desirable if the marginal
social costs of higher unemployment, ∆u, are large.
14
Notice that if conditions (4.36) and (4.37) hold, a NIN minimum-wage in-
14Alternatively, the term − ∂Θ∂uΘ IΘ can be expressed in terms of an elasticity as (H/L)ζu
which is the ratio of high-skilled individuals (H ≡ 1 − G(Θ)) and low-skilled individuals
(L ≡ G(Θ) − G(Φ)), multiplied with the semi-elasticity ζu ≡ −dG(Θ)/(1−G(Θ))∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ)/(G(Θ)−G(Φ)) , which
gives the relative change in the number of high-skilled workers with respect to a one-percent
increase in all individual unemployment rates.
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crease raises social welfare, but it never constitutes a Pareto improvement if the
unemployment incidence is inefficient. After all, the individuals that become invol-
untarily unemployed are worse off because of the reform. Conversely, if conditions
(4.36) and (4.37) do not hold, a NIN minimum-wage decrease yields a genuine
Pareto improvement if it leads to both higher government revenue and positive
utility benefits for the involuntarily unemployed that are able to obtain a job due
to the reform.15
Proposition 4.1 demonstrates the critical importance of the unemployment in-
cidence IΘ for the desirability of minimum wages. To illustrate this graphically,
turn back to Figure 4.1. In the first panel, none of the unemployment incidence
is on workers with ability Θ. As a consequence, a NIN minimum-wage increase
merely leads to more unemployment and is therefore unambiguously welfare de-
creasing. In that case, it would be desirable to reduce the minimum wage – in
a net-income-neutral fashion by compensating tax changes. However, in the sec-
ond panel of Figure 4.1, much of the incidence falls on workers with ability Θ.
Consequently, a NIN minimum-wage increase has a large beneficial effect on high-
skilled employment, relative to its adverse effect on unemployment. In that case,
a minimum-wage increase might very well be desirable.
In the next section we calibrate the condition of Proposition 4.1 to get some
idea of the desirability of a NIN minimum-wage increase (or decrease) in various
OECD countries. Before doing so, however, we turn to the question of whether a
binding minimum wage is part of the optimal policy mix.
4.5.3 A binding minimum wage as part of the policy opti-
mum
Regardless of the initial equilibrium, Proposition 4.1 provides the condition under
which a NIN minimum-wage increase leads to a welfare gain. However, we are
especially interested in whether the minimum wage is also an appropriate instru-
ment for redistribution, that is, whether it is part of the overall policy optimum.
This must be the case if a NIN minimum-wage increase is desirable in the tax
optimum without a minimum wage. In this subsection we therefore determine if
condition (4.37) in Proposition 4.1 holds in the policy optimum without a binding
15Thus, the condition for a NIN minimum-wage decrease to be Pareto-improving is stronger
than the simple negation of condition (4.37). Denoting the public revenue loss due to an addi-
tional involuntarily unemployed individual as ∆Φ ≡ tLwLlL(Φ)− TL + TU ≤ ∆u, this condition
can be written as: − ∂Θ∂uΘ IΘ∆Θ ≤ ∆Φ.
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minimum wage. For this, we rely on the following Lemma, which establishes that,
in the absence of a minimum wage, the optimal wedges on unemployment (∆u)
and skill formation (∆Θ) are positive and finite.
Lemma 4.2 If the social marginal value of income is decreasing in ability, then
the wedges on unemployment and skill formation, ∆u and ∆Θ, are positive and
finite in the policy optimum without a minimum wage.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for a positive unemployment wedge (∆u > 0) is as follows. Recall
that the utility loss of a marginal increase in unemployment is non-negative, such
that it suffices to show that a marginal increase in unemployment generates a
net tax-revenue loss. If the government attaches a larger social marginal value
of income to the unemployed than to the employed, it will, in the tax optimum,
redistribute resources from the employed to the unemployed. In that case, an
increase in unemployment, ceteris paribus, causes revenue losses, implying that
∆u > 0. The intuition for ∆Θ > 0 follows a similar logic. If the government
attaches a lower social marginal value of income to high-skilled workers than to low-
skilled workers, it will redistribute resources away from the high-skilled towards the
low-skilled. In that case, an increase in high-skilled employment, ceteris paribus,
generates a revenue gain, such that ∆Θ > 0.
Lemma 4.2 allows us to formulate how the optimality of a minimum wage
depends on the incidence of involuntary unemployment.
Corollary 4.2 Given the policy optimum without a minimum wage, there exists
a value of the unemployment incidence I∗Θ =
∆u
∆Θ
(
− ∂Θ
∂uΘ
)−1
for which the introduc-
tion of a binding minimum wage has no effect on social welfare. For any value of
IΘ > I
∗
Θ, a binding minimum wage is part of the policy optimum. For any value of
IΘ < I
∗
Θ, a (marginally) binding minimum wage is not part of the policy optimum.
Proof. Lemma 4.2 establishes that ∆u and ∆Θ are positive and finite in the pol-
icy optimum without a minimum wage. Since there is no unemployment in this
optimum, ∆u and ∆Θ are necessarily independent of IΘ. Equation (4.13) estab-
lishes that −∂Θ/∂uΘ is positive and finite and independent of IΘ. Together with
the desirability condition (4.37) of Proposition 4.1, this implies that a marginally
binding minimum wage has no welfare effect for IΘ = I
∗
Θ, is welfare increasing for
all IΘ > I
∗
Θ, and is welfare decreasing for all IΘ < I
∗
Θ.
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From Corollary 4.1 we know that if the unemployment incidence IΘ goes to
infinity, a minimum wage does not lead to unemployment at all, but only to more
high-skilled workers. In that case, a minimum wage is strictly welfare enhancing
and optimally applied alongside taxes and transfers. If IΘ goes to zero, a minimum
wage only leads to higher unemployment and does not affect the number of high-
skilled workers, such that a marginally binding minimum wage is strictly welfare
decreasing and not a part of the optimal policy mix.16 Thus, a binding minimum
wage is an appropriate instrument for redistribution if the unemployment incidence
at Θ is large enough. That is, if the increased probability of unemployment falls, to
a large degree, on low-skilled workers that are indifferent between being low-skilled
or high-skilled. In that case, a binding minimum wage leads to a large increase
of high-skilled employment, relative to the increase in unemployment. The social
benefits of this increase in high-skilled employment then outweigh the social costs
of higher unemployment.
4.5.4 Robustness
In deriving our results we made a number of assumptions that warrant a brief
discussion. The results appear robust to relaxing these assumptions.
Number of skill types – We could extend the model by allowing for more than
two skill types in production, in which case only the lowest skill type would be
subject to a binding minimum wage. Our main results would be unaffected, pro-
vided that the government is able to tax each skill type separately. In particular,
a NIN minimum-wage reform, which neutralizes the general-equilibrium effects of
a minimum wage on the net returns of the additional factor inputs by appropriate
tax adjustments, would result in a similar desirability condition for a minimum
wage. With constant net factor returns, factor supply is unaffected, except to the
extent that increased unemployment causes some low-skilled workers to supply
labor as a different skill type. Again, the desirability of a minimum wage would
be determined by the net balance of the costs of unemployment and the benefits
of low-skilled workers deciding to become another skill type.
Uniqueness of Θ – Throughout the analysis, we assumed that the equilibrium
skill margin, Θ, is unique. Uniqueness is implied by the assumption that the
16Notice that a marginal increase in the minimum wage is not welfare enhancing if IΘ < I
∗
Θ.
This does not necessarily imply that larger increases of the minimum wage are not welfare
enhancing, as that would depend on the total inframarginal unemployment incidence. This is
the reason we employ the term ‘marginally binding minimum wage.’
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utility difference between high-skilled and low-skilled work is increasing in ability.
This facilitates the analysis and graphical representation. However, even when
Θ is not unique, the economic insights remain the same. Suppose that there are
three critical ability levels at which individuals are indifferent between being low-
skilled or high-skilled, Θa, Θb, and Θc, such that individuals with ability θ ∈
[Φ,Θa)∪ [Θb,Θc) become low-skilled, while individuals with ability θ ∈ (Θa,Θb]∪[
Θc, θ
]
become high-skilled. The comparative statics of a NIN minimum-wage
increase would again consist of higher unemployment and more skill formation.
The extent to which it leads to more skill formation, however, now depends on
the unemployment incidence at all three critical levels. Similarly, the desirability
condition would feature the unemployment incidence and wedges on skill formation
at all three critical levels. However, the intuition would remain the same: a NIN
minimum-wage increase is only desirable if the resulting social benefits from skill
formation outweigh the social costs of unemployment.
Social welfare function – Our results do not depend on the presumed utilitarian
social welfare function, and would remain valid for any concave social welfare
function. Naturally, a different social welfare function would affect the optimal
second-best allocations, and therefore the optimal wedges on unemployment and
skill formation (∆u and ∆Θ). They would, however, still be positive and finite
such that our results remain unaffected.
Non-linear taxation – Allowing for fully non-linear taxation, i.e., taxation con-
ditional on both skill type and the level of labor earnings, would simply have
brought more mathematical complexity without generating additional insights.
Recall that the relative changes in tax rates to keep the net incomes of high-
skilled and low-skilled workers constant should satisfy dti/(1 − ti) = dwi/wi for
i ∈ {H,L}. The NIN minimum-wage reform thus requires skill-specific, propor-
tional tax changes. Hence, linear tax instruments are sufficient, since a minimum
wage is also a linear policy instrument. Of course, any NIN minimum-wage reform
under a linear tax system can be perfectly replicated using a non-linear tax system.
The same welfare analysis carries over, leading to the same desirability condition
for a NIN minimum-wage increase, except that the wedges (∆u and ∆Θ) are de-
termined by the non-linear tax schedule. With social marginal utility of income
decreasing in ability, the government would still like to redistribute income from
high-skilled to low-skilled workers and from low-skilled workers to non-participants.
This implies, again, positive values for ∆u and ∆Θ in the optimum, confirming our
results.
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4.5.5 Comparison with Lee and Saez (2012)
Our findings can be seen to harbor the results of Lee and Saez (2012) as a special
case. They analyze the desirability of a minimum wage under the specific assump-
tion that the low-skilled workers who face unemployment are those that have the
lowest willingness to pay to remain low-skilled employed. In terms of our model
this implies that only individuals with ability Φ or Θ are rationed by a minimum
wage, as depicted in the third panel of Figure 4.1. Under this assumption, dubbed
‘efficient rationing’ by Lee and Saez, a minimum wage is shown to be part of an
optimal policy mix if, in the tax optimum without a minimum wage, the marginal
social value of income of low-skilled workers exceeds the marginal value of public
funds. In the Appendix we demonstrate that, in the special case of ‘efficient ra-
tioning’, this condition is equivalent to our desirability condition, (4.37), evaluated
at the optimum without a minimum wage.
Intuitively, if unemployment only hits those workers with the lowest net benefits
of remaining employed, the effect of a minimum-wage increase on the allocation of
jobs is identical to the effect of a lower low-skilled transfer TL. A lower transfer
leads workers with the lowest willingness to pay to remain employed to decide
on their outside option – be it unemployment or high-skilled employment. The
only difference then, between a NIN minimum-wage increase and a decrease in the
transfer TL, is that the lower transfer leads to a transfer of resources from low-
skilled workers to the government. If, in the optimum without a minimum wage,
the net social value of such a transfer from low-skilled workers to the government
is negative, then an unambiguous welfare gain can be made by a higher low-skilled
transfer, combined with a NIN minimum-wage increase which leaves the original
allocation of jobs unaltered. Such a reform would not affect the allocation of jobs,
but would redistribute resources from the government to low-skilled workers.
Naturally, this result only holds if the incidence of unemployment is efficient –
i.e., if the effect on the allocation of jobs of involuntary unemployment is identical
to the effect of a lower low-skilled transfer. For any other rationing schedule the
result of Lee and Saez breaks down. The plausibility of efficient rationing in the
specific sense of Lee and Saez, however, could be criticized on both theoretical
and empirical grounds. Theoretically, there is little to say in favor of any specific
assumption on the incidence of unemployment, simply because it is not clear why
and how the labor market would discriminate between workers which are identical
in all respects but their disutility of work.17 Moreover, there is no reliable empirical
17Furthermore, we have theoretical difficulties with the alleged ‘efficiency’ of the rationing
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evidence on the relationship between unemployment and disutility of work.18 We
try to circumvent these problems in the next section.
4.6 Minimum-wage reform: an empirical appli-
cation
4.6.1 A sufficient-statistics approach
We have seen, in Proposition 4.1 and Corollary 4.2, that the optimality of a mini-
mum wage, or even the desirability of a minimum-wage increase, depends crucially
on the unemployment incidence, IΘ. A cynic could argue that a minimum wage
can always be ‘made’ optimal by making the appropriate ad hoc assumptions on
this unobservable incidence. Note, however, that the unemployment incidence
enters the desirability condition, (4.37), solely because it partly determines the
effect of higher unemployment on skill formation. If we have a measure of this
unemployment-education effect, we can use this measure as a sufficient statis-
tic, avoiding the need to calibrate IΘ. In this section we illustrate how such a
sufficient-statistics approach might help us to bring the desirability condition to
the data.
To calibrate the effect of unemployment on high-skilled employment for a num-
ber of countries, we make the assumption that low-skilled workers in our model
are individuals that did not complete upper-secondary education. This is a strong
assumption: dropping out of secondary school does not condemn one to working
for a minimum wage, and upper-secondary education is hardly a guarantee for a
job at a higher wage rate. Nevertheless, schooling seems to be an important force
scheme of Lee and Saez. In their model, as in ours, unemployment realizations are made af-
ter individuals decide on their skill type. But, once individuals have decided on their skill
type, rationing individuals with ability Θ is in fact most inefficient as their utility surplus over
unemployment is the largest of all low-skilled workers. Once unemployment materializes and
individuals can no longer renege on their skill decision, the most efficient rationing would be
concentrated solely at ability Φ, rather than at both Φ and Θ.
18The only more or less direct evidence of the (in)efficiency of lay-offs due to a minimum wage,
and thus indirectly of the relationship between lay-offs and ability, is given by Luttmer (2007).
He measures the change in the average (proxy of the) reservation wage of low-skilled workers after
an increase in the minimum wage. For two out of four proxies, he finds a statistically significant
drop in reservation wages. This could be interpreted as evidence that workers with the highest
reservation wages, and thus highest disutility of work, are rationed first. In a sensitivity analysis,
however, he finds significant increases in reservation wages for the other two proxies, suggesting
that rationing is inefficient. There is, however, plenty of evidence on misallocation due to price
controls in markets for rental housing, gasoline, and natural gas. See, again, Luttmer (2007) for
references.
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driving both labor earnings and employment opportunities (e.g., Nickell, 1979;
Card, 1999). Moreover, there is a sizable empirical literature on the effect of
the low-skilled unemployment rate on enrollment rates for upper-secondary edu-
cation. Denoting the enrollment rate as e, and the low-skilled unemployment rate
as u¯ ≡ ∫ Θ
Φ
uθdG(θ)/(G(Θ)−G(Φ)), such studies generally attempt to measure
(4.38) η ≡ de
du¯
,
by regressing the enrollment rate on the unemployment rate (and various control
variables) for a panel of regions.19 We can use these estimates to avoid making
specific assumptions on the unemployment incidence IΘ. For this, we relate de
to the change in the number of high-skilled individuals, −dG(Θ), and du¯ to the
(weighted) change in unemployment rates
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ).
First, denote the cohort size of people that are eligible for graduation from
upper-secondary education by S. Assume that drop-out rates are negligible.20
In that case, an increase in the enrollment rate of de increases the number of
high-skilled individuals by Sde. Hence, we can write
(4.39) de =
−dG(Θ)
S
.
Second, denote the number of low-skilled individuals as L ≡ G(Θ)−G(Φ), and
note that du¯ can be written as:21
(4.40) du¯ =
1
L
(∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ) + (uΘ − u¯)dG(Θ)
)
.
The change in the average low-skilled unemployment rate does not directly corre-
spond to the weighted sum of changes in unemployment probabilities,
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ),
but also incorporates the effect of a change in high-skilled employment on the av-
erage unemployment rate, (uΘ − u¯)dG(Θ). This implies that we need to make a
19Note that a drop in enrollment rates does not necessarily imply a drop in upper-secondary
educational attainment levels, as people who drop out of high-school may decide to enter again
later. Card and Lemieux (2001), however, analyze trends in both enrollment rates and educa-
tional attainment and conclude that dropping out of high school is, by and large, a once-for-all
decision.
20By not allowing for drop out in upper-secondary education we overstate the effects of min-
imum wages on high-skilled employment, so that our results are biased in favor of minimum
wages.
21We substituted for dΦ = 0, as a NIN minimum wage reform does not affect the participation
margin.
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specific assumption on (uΘ − u¯) to write the desirability condition in terms of η.
The smaller is (uΘ − u¯), the more likely it is that a NIN minimum-wage increase
is welfare enhancing. Therefore, we make the highly conservative assumption that
uΘ− u¯ = −0.5, which is based on the theoretical minimum for the unemployment
rate at the skill margin (uΘ = 0), and a fifty percent average unemployment rate
among the low-skilled workers (u¯ = 0.5), which can be regarded as an empirical
upper bound. The following Lemma establishes how η relates to the desirability
condition for a NIN minimum-wage increase.
Lemma 4.3 Assume that low-skilled workers are workers without upper-secondary
education. Furthermore, assume that drop-out rates are negligible. Finally, assume
that uΘ − u¯ = −0.5. Then we can rewrite the desirability condition for a NIN
minimum-wage increase as:
(4.41) η > η∗ ≡ L
S
(
∆u/∆Θ
1 + 1
2
∆u/∆Θ
)
.
Proof. Substitute for
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ) in the desirability condition (4.36), by using
(4.40). Substitute for −dG(Θ) by using (4.39). Finally, substitute uΘ − u¯ = −0.5
and rearrange to obtain (4.41).
For given levels of L and S, which are readily available for almost any country,
the desirability of a minimum-wage increase is thus seen to depend on three suf-
ficient statistics: the effect of the unemployment rate on school enrollment rates,
η, the welfare gain of schooling, ∆Θ, and the welfare loss of unemployment, ∆u.
22
Since upper-secondary education is typically completed around the age of 18, S is
taken to be the size of the 18-year-old population cohort, which is reported for a
number of OECD countries in the first column of Table 1.23 The second column
gives L, the size of the labor force that completed at most primary education.
Below we discuss the calibration of the remaining sufficient statistics to determine
if a NIN minimum-wage increase could be welfare enhancing.
22Our formulation captures the marginal impact of the increase in skilled employment through
an increase in the enrollment rate in upper-secondary education. If the increase in the enrollment
rate would be permanently higher, the number of high-skilled workers would steadily increase,
whereas the number of unemployed workers would correspondingly fall over time. As the number
of low-skilled workers diminishes, the marginal cost of more low-skilled unemployment would thus
decrease, making minimum wages less harmful over time or maybe even desirable. However, our
desirability condition does not permit the analysis of such non-marginal changes; it should be
evaluated at the new allocation using updated values for e and L.
23The sample is restricted only by the availability of data on ∆Θ and ∆u.
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4.6.2 The welfare gain of schooling
Following our assumption on skill formation, ∆Θ measures the public revenue gain
from one additional person with an upper secondary educational degree. For a
number of countries these revenue gains are provided by OECD (2011a, pp. 172-73)
and are reported in column 3 of Table 1. The OECD considered revenue gains from
higher income taxes and employees’ social-security contributions, lower transfers,
and higher labor utilization, and the revenue losses from direct costs of financing
education and the foregone taxes on earnings associated with education. Gains
and losses are calculated over the entire life cycle and discounted at a three percent
annual real interest rate to obtain the public net present value of an additional
high-skilled worker: ∆Θ.
4.6.3 The welfare loss of unemployment
As discussed in the previous section, ∆u consists of both utility losses and public
revenue losses associated with unemployment. Unfortunately, we have no empirical
approximation for the direct utility losses and thus focus solely on the revenue
losses. This implies that our empirical approximation of ∆u is a potentially severe
underestimation of the total welfare costs of unemployment. It also implies that if
we find that η < η∗, a NIN minimum-wage decrease is not only welfare enhancing,
but also constitutes a Pareto improvement. Such a reform would then lead to
higher government revenue, in addition to higher utility for those unemployed
individuals that manage to find a job thanks to the lower minimum wage (also see
footnote 15).
Statistics on the revenue losses from low-skilled unemployment are extracted
from OECD (2011b, p. 56). The OECD reports the participation tax rate of an
individual moving from short-term unemployment to full-time work at 50 percent
of the average wage. These values take into account the losses from lower income
taxes and social-security contributions, and higher social, housing, family, and
unemployment benefits, together with the gains from lower in-work tax benefits,
if applicable. Multiplying these participation tax rates with the average minimum
wage income24, also obtained from the OECD, we calculate a value for ∆u as shown
24Calculated as the minimum wage, relative to the average wage, multiplied by average wage
income. For countries without a minimum wage we assume that the low-skilled workers that
would become unemployed due to the minimum wage would earn 25 percent of the average
wage. This percentage is our sample’s lower bound of the minimum wage in terms of the average
wage.
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in the fourth column of Table 1.25
4.6.4 The effect of unemployment on schooling
A recent study by Clark (2011) estimates the impact of the youth unemployment
rate among workers aged 18 and 19 on the enrollment rate for 16-year-olds for a
sample of English regions between 1975 and 2005. He finds that a one percentage-
point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 0.32 percentage-point increase
in the enrollment rate for boys, while for girls the increase amounts to 0.45 per-
centage point. He also provides a detailed survey of earlier estimates for the United
Kingdom and concludes that his estimate is at least twice as large as those found
in previous studies. In another recent study on the UK, Tumino and Taylor (2013)
find an effect similar to that of Clark, namely an increase in enrollment of 0.48
percentage point.26
While most studies on the impact of unemployment on school enrollment focus
on the UK, a few studies analyze the relationship for the United States, Spain, and
Denmark. For the US, Card and Lemieux (2001) use variations over states and
years to estimate the effect of unemployment on enrollment rates, and find that a
one percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate raises school enrollment
rates of 17-year-olds by 0.40 percentage point. They also determine the effect of
the unemployment rate in the state of birth at age 17 on educational attainment,
and find that a one percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a
0.17 percentage-point increase in the share of high-school graduates.27 In a study
on African-American students, Kane (1994) finds the effect to be as large as 0.6.
The disadvantage of the US studies is that data availability confines them
to using the prime-age unemployment rate, which is arguably a worse proxy for
low-skilled unemployment than the youth unemployment rate used in UK stud-
25One might wonder why the life-time value of the increase in tax revenues is taken for ∆Θ,
whereas ∆u is a one-year cost of higher unemployment. If we would analyze a multiperiod life-
cycle model with human capital formation, the marginal cost of a one-year increase in schooling
would be the one-year expected forgone net earnings as a low-skilled worker, whereas the marginal
benefits would consist of the discounted value of the increase in future net earnings. The cor-
responding wedge ∆u would then be equal to the net cost of a one-year unemployment spell,
whereas ∆Θ would capture the discounted value of the net taxes on all future earnings increases.
26When splitting their sample in home-owner and non-home-owner families, they find an even
larger effect on the enrollment rates of children from non home-owner families.
27This estimate is likely to suffer from attenuation bias because of interstate migration. After
all, the unemployment rate in the state of birth is not likely to affect the schooling decision
of a person who moved to another state. On the basis of interstate migration data, Card and
Lemieux suspect this attenuation bias to be in the order of 10-25 percent.
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ies. Similar to the UK studies, Petrongolo and San Segundo (2002) analyze the
impact of youth unemployment on school enrollment in Spain and find that a one
percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate leads to an increase in the
enrollment rate for boys of 0.44.
The Appendix gives a further overview of the estimates we discussed. Summing
up, the impact of a one percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate on
the enrollment rate in upper-secondary education is found to be in a range of 0.1
to 0.6, while all estimates except for one are well below 0.6.
4.6.5 The desirability of a minimum-wage increase
Column 5 in Table 1 provides values of η∗, the right-hand side of the desirability
condition (4.41). A NIN minimum-wage increase is only desirable if the effect of
the low-skilled unemployment rate on enrollment rates exceeds this critical value,
such that η > η∗. If, on the other hand, the effect of unemployment on enrollment
is smaller than the value in column 5, a NIN minimum-wage decrease leads to a
Pareto improvement. For all countries, values in column 5 range from 0.4 for the
United States to 10.3 for Spain.28
It is useful to consider the two extreme cases in some more detail. In the United
States, a NIN minimum-wage increase is only desirable if a one percentage-point
increase in the unemployment rate leads to a higher enrollment rate of at least 0.4
percentage point. At the other extreme, a minimum-wage increase in Spain only
enhances welfare if a percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate leads
to a higher enrollment rate of at least 10.3 percentage point. The reasons for
these differences between the United States and Spain are readily observable from
Table 1. For the United States, we see that the public benefits of more workers
with secondary education, (∆Θ), are relatively large. On top of that, the size
of the labor force with only primary education (L) is relatively small, such that
a percentage-point increase in the low-skilled unemployment rate is less costly.
Spain, on the other hand, shows a relatively small public return to secondary edu-
cation and a relatively large unskilled population, raising the costs of an increase
in the unemployment rate.
On the basis of an empirical calibration of the desirability condition (4.41),
28As can be seen from the bottom row of Table 1, in France net tax revenues from a person
completing upper-secondary education actually decline. Hence, regardless of the value of η, a
NIN minimum-wage decrease leads to a Pareto improvement in France as lower unemployment
and lower education both lead to higher public revenue.
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Table 4.1: Calibrating the desirability condition
Country S L ∆Θ ∆u η
∗ Minimum wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
United States 4245 14993 60 8 0.4 Y
Czech Republic 132 344 20 5 0.6 Y
Germany 969 6496 65 8 0.8 N
Hungary 126 585 33 6 0.8 Y
Austria 100 754 65 8 0.9 N
United Kingdom 813 6592 95 11 0.9 Y
Poland 548 1558 9 6 1.3 Y
Sweden 133 913 30 8 1.7 N
Norway 65 537 34 10 2.2 N
Canada 450 2537 25 13 2.3 Y
Denmark 68 766 45 11 2.5 N
Italy 606 9403 37 7 2.5 N
Slovenia 23 145 23 12 2.6 Y
Finland 67 452 16 8 2.7 N
Australia 299 3177 30 10 3.0 Y
Ireland 55 465 33 15 3.1 Y
Portugal 118 3761 43 8 5.3 Y
Spain 465 10213 15 9 10.3 Y
France 833 7327 -6 14 ∆Θ < 0 Y
All values 2009 or latest. L and S are measured in thousands; ∆Θ and
∆u are measured at 2009 prices, in thousands of PPP equivalent USD.
∆Θ is an average of male and female values using shares in age-18 co-
horts as weights. ∆u is the unweighted average of revenue losses from an
additional unemployed minimum- wage earning single, single parent with
2 children, one-earner married with 2 children, and two-earner married
with 2 children with a spouse earning 67 percent of the average wage. All
data are available in a separate spreadsheet, available upon request from
the authors.
Source: OECD (2011a, pp. 172-73), OECD (2011b, p. 56), Eurostat and
national statistical offices.
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we conclude that the effect of unemployment on enrollment should exceed 0.4 to
be able to build a case for a higher minimum wage for the United States. That
is, a percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate should, ceteris paribus,
lead to at least a 0.4 percentage-point increase in enrollment rates. As this is well
within the range of empirical estimates we found, we cannot reject that a NIN
minimum-wage increase might be beneficial for the United States. However, given
our very conservative assumptions when calibrating the desirability condition –
most importantly the fact that we ignore direct utility losses of unemployment –
we do not consider the case for a NIN minimum-wage increase in the United States
very strong. For all other countries, a percentage-point increase in the unemploy-
ment rate should lead to at least a 0.6 percentage-point increase in enrollment
rates. Since this is the upper bound of the empirical estimates, we conclude that
the case for a NIN minimum-wage increase is weak for those countries. Instead,
a decrease of the minimum wage, along with compensating tax changes to keep
net wages constant – a NIN minimum-wage decrease – would lead to a Pareto
improvement.29
4.7 Conclusion
Minimum-wage legislation distinguishes itself from redistributive income taxation
by raising employers’ labor costs, thereby reducing low-skilled employment. As
some low-skilled workers will seek to avoid an increased probability of unemploy-
ment by acquiring more skills, a minimum wage leads to both more unemployment
and more education. We show that the degree to which a minimum wage leads
to additional education rather than unemployment is crucially governed by the
unemployment incidence of the minimum wage. If the incidence falls mainly on
those low-skilled workers who are relatively inclined towards high-skilled work,
the education effect is large relative to the unemployment effect. If the incidence
falls mainly on low-skilled workers that are inclined towards non-participation, a
minimum wage mainly leads to higher unemployment.
The welfare consequences of a minimum wage are therefore theoretically am-
biguous. On the one hand, it leads to lower social welfare as the newly unemployed
suffer utility losses and pay less taxes. On the other hand, it leads to social welfare
gains as high-skilled workers tend to pay more taxes than low-skilled workers. A
29Naturally, such a decrease of the minimum wage is only possible in countries that have a
minimum wage. The final column of Table 1 indicates in which countries this is the case.
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minimum wage is optimally employed alongside income taxation if and only if the
gains from more education outstrip the losses from higher unemployment. This is
the case only if the incidence of rationing falls to a large enough extent on low-
skilled workers inclined towards high-skilled work, such that a given increase in
the unemployment rate leads to enough additional education.
We used data on the net revenue gains and losses of education and unemploy-
ment to calibrate the desirability condition of a net-income-neutral minimum-wage
increase. Naturally, the results from this exercise should be interpreted with cau-
tion. While at several junctions we have deliberately biased our empirical cali-
bration in favor of a minimum wage, we did not take into account the effect that
labor-market frictions might have on the desirability of a minimum wage. That
being said, we find that for a one percentage-point increase of the low-skilled un-
employment rate, we need an increase of school enrollment rates of around half
a percentage-point for a minimum-wage increase to be desirable in the United
States. This is well within empirical estimates of this effect and, accordingly, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that a net-income-neutral minimum wage increase
might be welfare enhancing in the United States. For any other country under
consideration, the required unemployment-education effect should be well above
empirical estimates of this effect. For these countries, the policy recommendation
is to decrease the minimum wage, while adjusting income taxes to offset effects
on net wages. Our model predicts that such a reform leads to a Pareto improve-
ment: it leads to (i) additional government revenue due to lower unemployment,
exceeding the loss in government revenue due to lower education, and (ii) higher
utility for those formerly unemployed individuals that can find a job due to the
lower minimum wage.
4.A Proof of Proposition 4.1
The change in welfare, dW , in response to a NIN minimum-wage increase, dwL >
0, is given by taking the derivative of welfareW , and substituting for dωi = dT i =
dΦ = 0:
dW =− (vH(ωH , TH ,Θ)− vEL(ωL, TL, TU , uΘ,Θ))dG(Θ)(4.42)
+
∫ Θ
Φ
vELu (ω
L, TL, TU , uθ, θ)duθdG(θ).
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The individual’s first-order condition (4.11) for the skill choice implies that the first
line is zero. Furthermore, use equation (4.8) to establish that: vELu (ω
L, TL, TU , uθ, θ) =
−vL(ωL, TL, θ) + V (TU , 0). Substituting this result into equation (4.42), we get:
(4.43) dW ≡ −
∫ Θ
Φ
(vU − vLθ )duθdG(θ).
The change in the government budget, dB, is obtained by taking derivatives of
B, and substituting for dωi = dT i = dΦ = 0. Rearranging then yields:
dB =
∫ θ
Θ
lHθ dG(θ)dw
H +
∫ Θ
Φ
(1− uθ)lLθ dG(θ)dwL
(4.44)
− ((wH − ωH)lHΘ − TH − (1− uΘ)
(
(wL − ωL)lLΘ − TL
)
+ uΘT
U)dG(Θ)
−
∫ Θ
Φ
((wL − ωL)lLθ − TL + TU)duθdG(θ).
From equation (4.21) we know that:
(4.45) dwH = −L
L
LH
dwL = −
∫ Θ
Φ
(1− uθ)lLθ dG(θ)∫ θ
Θ
lHθ dG(θ)
dwL.
This eliminates the first two terms in equation (4.44). Furthermore, substitute for
(wi − ωi) = tiwi to obtain:
dB =− (tHwH lHΘ − TH − (1− uΘ)(tLwLlLΘ − TL) + uΘTU)dG(Θ)(4.46)
−
∫ Θ
Φ
(tLwLlLθ − TL + TU)duθdG(θ).
Substituting equations (4.43) and (4.46) into condition (4.33), we get:
−
∫ Θ
Φ
(
vU − vLθ
λ
+ tLwLlLθ − TL + TU
)
duθdG(θ)(4.47)
−(tHwH lHΘ − TH − (1− uΘ)(tLwLlLΘ − TL) + uΘTU)dG(Θ) > 0.
Using the definition of the unemployment incidence in equation (4.22) to substitute
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for g(θ)duθ = Iθ
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ) yields:
−
∫ Θ
Φ
(
vU − vLθ
λ
+ tLwLlLθ − TL + TU
)
Iθdθ
∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ)(4.48)
−(tHwH lHΘ − TH − (1− uΘ)(tLwLlLΘ − TL) + uΘTU)dG(Θ) > 0.
Finally, substituting the wedges ∆Θ and ∆u from equations (4.34) and (4.35) we
obtain the final result of equation (4.36).
4.B Proof of Lemma 4.2
Without a minimum wage and, hence, without involuntary unemployment, social
welfare is given by:
(4.49) W ≡
∫ θ
Θ
vH(ωH , TH , θ)dG(θ) +
∫ Θ
Φ
vL(ωL, TL, θ)dG(θ) +G(Φ)V (TU , 0).
The government’s budget constraint is given by B:
B ≡
∫ θ
Θ
(wH − ωH)lH(ωH , TH , θ)dG(θ) +
∫ Θ
Φ
(wL − ωL)lL(ωL, TL, θ)dG(θ)
(4.50)
− (1−G(Θ))TH − (G(Θ)−G(Φ))TL −G(Φ)TU −R = 0.
Defining λ as the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, we can set up the
following maximization problem for the government:
(4.51) max
{TH ,TL,TU ,ωH ,ωL}
L =W + λB,
which is subject to Θ, Φ, wH , and wL as determined by the individuals’ and firms’
first-order conditions in equations (4.6), (4.10), (4.12), and (4.20). Notice again
that we chose net wages ωi, rather than tax rates ti, as the government’s control
variables.
The first-order conditions of this maximization problem are obtained by equat-
ing the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian to zero. These derivatives are given
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by:
∂L
∂ωH
=
∫ θ
Θ
(
V Hθ,c − λ
(
1−∆H ω
H
lHθ
∂lHθ
∂ωH
))
lHθ dG(θ)− λ∆Θ
dG(Θ)
dωH
− λ∆Φ dG(Φ)
dωH
,
(4.52)
∂L
∂TH
=
∫ θ
Θ
(
V Hθ,c − λ
(
1−∆HωH ∂l
H
θ
∂TH
))
dG(θ)− λ∆Θ dG(Θ)
dTH
− λ∆Φ dG(Φ)
dTH
,
(4.53)
∂L
∂ωL
=
∫ Θ
Φ
(
V Lθ,c − λ
(
1−∆Lω
L
lLθ
∂lLθ
∂ωL
))
lLθ dG(θ)− λ∆Θ
dG(Θ)
dωL
− λ∆Φ dG(Φ)
dωL
,
(4.54)
∂L
∂TL
=
∫ Θ
Φ
(
V Lθ,c − λ
(
1−∆LωL ∂l
L
θ
∂TL
))
dG(θ)− λ∆Θ dG(Θ)
dTL
− λ∆Φ dG(Φ)
dTL
,
(4.55)
∂L
∂TU
= G(Φ)(V Uc − λ)− λ∆Θ
dG(Θ)
dTU
− λ∆Φ dG(Φ)
dTU
.
(4.56)
We took a number of steps to arrive at these expressions. First, observe that
changes in Θ and Φ have no direct effect on individuals’ utility, but only af-
fect welfare indirectly through their effect on the government budget. This is
because individuals at Θ (Φ) are indifferent between low-skilled work and high-
skilled work (voluntary unemployment). Second, we applied Roy’s identity to
rewrite derivatives of indirect utility in terms of direct utility, i.e., viθ,ωi = l
i
θv
i
θ,T i
and viθ,T i = V
i
θ,c, where V
i
θ,c gives the marginal utility of consumption of an indi-
vidual with skill type i and ability θ. Third, from the firm’s first-order conditions
we substituted for LHdwH = −LLdwL, which implies that the effect on the gov-
ernment budget of any increase in one of the two gross wage rates is exactly offset
by a decrease in the other gross wage rate. This is the reason dwH and dwL do
not show up in the expressions. Fourth, and final, we defined wedges as follows:
∆H ≡ tH1−tH and ∆L ≡ t
L
1−tL are the wedges on high- and low-skilled net labor
earnings; ∆Φ ≡ tLwLlL(Φ) − TL + TU is the wedge on the participation margin;
∆Θ ≡ tHwH lH(Θ) − TH − tLwLlL(Φ) + TL is the wedge on the skill margin. In
other words, ∆i, i ∈
{
LH , LL,Φ,Θ
}
denote the gains in government revenue from
higher levels of ωH lHθ and ω
LlLθ , and lower levels of G(Φ) and G(Θ). Notice that
∆Θ corresponds to (4.34) in the absence of a minimum wage and unemployment.
We can now rewrite the first-order conditions for each control variable. To
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facilitate the derivations, we adopt a number of additional notational conven-
tions. We define uncompensated net-wage elasticities of intensive labor supply
as εi,u
θ,ωi
≡ ∂liθ
∂ωi
ωi
liθ
, and income elasticities as εiθ,T i ≡ −ωi ∂l
i
θ
∂T i
> 0. Applying the
Slutsky equation we can write the compensated net-wage elasticity of labor sup-
ply as εi,c
θ,ωi
= εi,u
θ,ωi
+ εiθ,T i . We define the income-weighted average compensated
elasticities of labor supply as:
(4.57) εL
ωL
≡
∫ Θ
Φ
wLlLθ
wLLL
εL,c
θ,ωL
dG(θ) > 0, εH
ωH
≡
∫ θ
Θ
wH lHθ
wHLH
εH,c
θ,ωH
dG(θ) > 0,
where the signs follow from the fact that compensated wage elasticities of labor
supply are always positive.
The semi-elasticities of participation and skill formation are defined as follows:
ηTU ≡ dG(Φ)G(Φ)dTU , ηTL ≡
−dG(Φ)
(G(Θ)−G(Φ)) dTL , ηωL ≡
−dG(Φ)
LLdωL
,
(4.58)
ζTL ≡ dG(Θ)(G(Θ)−G(Φ)) dTL , ζTH ≡
−dG(Θ)
(1−G(Θ)) dTH , ζωL ≡
dG(Θ)
LLdωL
, ζωH ≡ −dG(Θ)LHdωH .
(4.59)
The term ηj measures the change in G(Φ) due to a marginal change of j ∈{
TU , TL, ωL
}
, and ζk measures the change in G(Θ) due to a marginal change
of k ∈ {TL, ωL, TH , ωH}. All semi-elasticities are defined to be positive.
Following Diamond (1975), we define γiθ as the social marginal value of income
for an individual with ability θ ∈ [θ, θ] and skill level i ∈ {H,L}. This term
consists of the private marginal utility of income, minus the social value of the loss
in tax revenue due to the income effect on labor hours. Normalizing in terms of
resources, by dividing by λ, this yields:
(4.60) γU ≡ V
U
c
λ
, γiθ ≡
V iθ,c
λ
+ ∆iω
i ∂l
i
θ
∂T i
, θ ∈ [θ, θ] , i ∈ {H,L} .
The average values for the social marginal value of income for high- and low-skilled
workers are given by:
(4.61) γL ≡
∫ Θ
Φ
γLθ dG(θ)
G(Θ)−G(Φ) , γ
H ≡
∫ θ
Θ
γHθ dG(θ)
1−G(Θ) .
Finally, we define the distributional characteristics of the income tax bases as ξi
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(cf. Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p.388):
ξL ≡ 1− (G(Θ)−G(Φ))
∫ Θ
Φ
wLlLθ γ
L
θ dG(θ)∫ Θ
Φ
wLlLθ dG(θ)
∫ Θ
Φ
γLθ dG(θ)
= −cov
[
wLlLθ , γ
L
θ
]
wLlLγL
(4.62)
ξH ≡ 1− (1−G(Θ))
∫ θ
Θ
wH lHθ γ
H
θ dG(θ)∫ θ
Θ
wH lHθ dG(θ)
∫ θ
Θ
γHθ dG(θ)
= −cov
[
wH lHθ , γ
H
θ
]
wH lHγH
(4.63)
That is, ξi gives the negative of the normalized covariance between gross labor
income and the social marginal value of income for skill type i. The larger is
the term ξi, the more the social welfare weight γiθ is decreasing with income w
iliθ,
making the labor-income tax a more attractive instrument to redistribute income.
Due to the normalization, the distributional term takes on a value between zero
and one: ξi ∈ [0, 1].
This, then, allows us to rewrite the first-order conditions for TU , TL, ωL, TH ,
and ωH , respectively, as follows:
γU = 1 + ∆ΦηTU ,(4.64)
γL = 1−∆ΦηTL + ∆ΘζTL ,(4.65)
(1− ξL)γL = 1−∆LεLωL −∆ΦηωL + ∆ΘζωL ,(4.66)
γH = 1−∆ΘζTH ,(4.67)
(1− ξH)γH = 1−∆HεHωH −∆ΘζωH .(4.68)
Notice that if social welfare weights are decreasing in ability θ, we can write
γU > γL > γH . This allows us to combine the first, second and fourth first-order
conditions to find:
∆Φ (ηTU + ηTL) > ∆ΘζTL ,(4.69)
∆ΦηTU > −∆ΘζTH ,(4.70)
∆Θ (ζTL + ζTH ) > ∆ΦηTL .(4.71)
From the first line we establish that if ∆Φ < 0, then ∆Θ < 0. However, from the
second line we see that if ∆Φ < 0, then ∆Θ > 0. This is a contradiction. Thus, in
the optimum we must have ∆Φ > 0. Notice, from the definition of ∆u in equation
(4.35), that if ∆Φ > 0, we must necessarily have that ∆u > 0. From the third
line, it immediately follows that ∆Θ > 0. Combining the remaining first-order
conditions, it is relatively straightforward to show that the optimal wedges on
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high- and low-skilled labor earnings are positive as well: ∆H > 0 and ∆L > 0.
Furthermore, since individuals’ marginal utility of income is strictly positive, we
can readily deduce from the first-order conditions that all wedges are finite. This
proves Lemma 4.2.
4.C Efficient rationing: Lee and Saez (2012)
We derive the desirability condition for the minimum wage when rationing is ‘ef-
ficient’, i.e., when the involuntary unemployed are those that have the smallest
benefits of being low-skilled employed. In this case, the rationing schedule is no
longer continuous. Instead, rationing is concentrated on the extremes of the low-
skilled ability distribution, Φ and Θ. Individuals with ability Φ or Θ are indifferent
between low-skilled employment and their outside option – voluntary unemploy-
ment for Φ, high-skilled employment for Θ. In response to a NIN minimum-wage
reform, dwL, the change in welfare is therefore nil: dW = 0. Hence, the desirability
condition of a NIN minimum-wage reform simplifies to dB > 0.
In the case of efficient rationing, the minimum-wage induced increase in high-
skilled employment, relative to the increase in unemployment, is identical to the
increase in high-skilled employment, relative to the increase in voluntary unem-
ployment, due to a decrease in the low-skilled transfer TL. In response to a NIN
minimum-wage reform, dwL, this yields:
(4.72)
−dG(Θ)/dwL∫ Θ
Φ
duθdG(θ)/dwL
=
−dG(Θ)/dTL
dG(Φ)/dTL
.
Since only individuals with ability Φ or Θ are rationed, there is no direct utility loss
of unemployment and the loss of tax revenue is solely determined by the earnings
of a worker with ability Φ. Hence, we can write ∆u as:
(4.73) ∆u = ∆Φ ≡ tLwLlLΦ − TL + TU ,
where ∆Φ is the wedge on participation. Substituting above two equations, to-
gether with the elasticities as defined in (4.58) and (4.59), into the desirability
condition for a NIN minimum-wage increase, (4.36), we get:
(4.74)
ζTL
ηTL
>
∆Φ
∆Θ
.
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The values for the wedges on participation and skill formation, ∆Φ and ∆Θ, in
the tax optimum without a minimum wage, are given by the first-order condition
(4.65). Substituting this condition into above desirability condition yields:
(4.75) γL > 1.
Here, γL is the low-skilled average marginal social value of income as defined in
the proof of Lemma 4.2. The term γL exactly corresponds with g1 in Lee and
Saez (2012). Hence, we can see that our desirability condition is equivalent to
their Proposition 2. A binding minimum wage is optimal if and only if the social
marginal welfare weight of low-skilled workers (γL or g1) exceeds unity. In the case
of efficient rationing, the only difference between a NIN minimum-wage increase
and a low-skilled transfer decrease, is that the minimum-wage increase does not
redistribute away from the low-skilled. Hence, if redistribution away from the low-
skilled is socially costly, a binding minimum wage is part of the policy optimum.
4.D The effect of unemployment on school en-
rollment
Table 4.A1 gives an overview of empirical studies on the impact of unemployment
on school enrollment, as discussed in this chapter. Earlier UK evidence is surveyed
in a similar overview by Clark (2011), in his Table 1. The first column indicates
the study of interest; the second column indicates the country of analysis; the
third column indicates the time span of the analysis; the fourth column indicates
whether the schooling variable refers to enrollment rates (E), or high-school grad-
uation rates (G), whether it refers to boys (b), girls (g), or both (bg), and the
age group under consideration; the fifth column indicates to which age-group the
unemployment variable refers; the final column gives the estimate of η.
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Table 4.A1: Empirical estimates of η
Study Country Time Schooling Unemployment η
Clark (2011) UK 1975-
2005
E, b, 16 y/o 18-19 y/o 0.32
E, g, 16 y/o 18-19 y/o 0.45
Tumino and
Taylor (2013)
UK 1991-
2009
E, bg, 16 y/o 16-21 y/o 0.48
Kane (1994) US 1973-
1988
G, bg, 18-19 y/o Total 0.60
Card and
Lemieux (2001)
US 1968-
1996
E, bg, 15-16 y/o 25-54 y/o 0.14
E, bg, 17 y/o 25-54 y/o 0.40
1954-
1964
G, b 25-54 y/o 0.17
G, g 25-54 y/o 0.18
Petrongolo and
San Segundo (2002)
ES 1991 E, b, 16-17 y/o 16-24 y/o 0.44
The column on schooling indicates whether the dependent variable was the enrollment rate
(E) or the high-school graduation rate (G), whether it concerned boys (b), girls (g), or both
(bg), and the age group to which the schooling variable refers. Note that Kane (1994) uses
the graduation-rate of blacks. Estimates of Clark (2011) are found in his Tables 2 and 3 on
pages 533-534. Estimates for Tumino and Taylor (2013) are found in their Table 3 on page 22.
Estimates for Kane (1994) are found in his text, page 890. Estimates for Card and Lemieux
(2001) are found in their table 9.4 on page 467 and table 9.6 on page 471. Estimates for
Petrongolo and San Segundo (2002) are found in their text, page 364.
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Chapter 5
Equity and Efficiency in Rationed
Labor Markets
5.1 Introduction
It is well-understood that labor market policies and institutions that fix wage
rates above their market-clearing level lead to an inefficient allocation of produc-
tion factors.1 More people would like to work for prevailing wages than there
are jobs, causing involuntary unemployment. It is less well-understood that such
labor-market rationing entails two different types of inefficiency. First, there are
potential labor market transactions which carry a positive surplus for both worker
and firm, which are not executed due to inflexible wages. Second, without a
secondary market for jobs, the labor market mechanism cannot ensure that the
limited amount of jobs are allocated to the persons with the highest utility of
work. That is, the market does not discriminate between two persons with iden-
tical productivity but different levels of participation costs or, similarly, different
levels of reservation wages. In stark contrast with the first source of inefficiency,
the second has received little attention. If the way in which labor markets are
rationed is indeed inefficient, public policy that affects the degree of rationing –
obviously minimum wage legislation, but also participation policy and taxation –
requires reappraisal. This chapter is an attempt to fill this gap by providing a the-
oretical analysis of the implications for optimal government policies of inefficiently
rationed labor markets.
The main idea of this chapter is best illuminated by considering a simple econ-
omy in which one type of labor is the only factor of production. Workers differ with
1This chapter is based on Gerritsen (2013a)
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respect to their costs of participation, but are otherwise identical. If wages cannot
adjust to equate demand and supply, and thus if firms and workers cannot freely
transact, the number of jobs will be fixed below the number of potential workers.
As firms have no incentive to take into account workers’ costs of participation, and
if workers cannot freely exchange jobs among themselves, some of the employed
are likely to have higher costs of participation than some of the unemployed. The
first inefficiency originates from the absence of free job exchange between firms and
the unemployed, the second from the absence of free exchange between workers
and the unemployed.
In such case, government would find it optimal to increase the relative rewards
of being voluntary unemployed by increasing unemployment benefits, financed by
higher labor income taxes. Workers that derive least utility from their job would
decide to quit and reap the increased benefits of being unemployed. In clearing
labor markets, this decision entails an efficiency loss as aggregate employment, and
thus the tax base, would decline. In rationed labor markets there is no efficiency
cost because aggregate employment will not fall as there were more potential work-
ers than jobs in the first place. Instead there is an efficiency gain since, by giving up
their job, workers who derive little utility from working create jobs for unemployed
people who derive more utility from working. Hence, government can correct for
the absence of a job market between workers and the unemployed by appropriately
setting taxes. As a corollary, it is suboptimal to increase the degree of rationing by
implementing a binding minimum wage, or to stimulate participation in rationed
labor markets. Moreover, since the proposed tax reform entails transfers from the
employed towards the unemployed, it improves equity as well as efficiency, such
that its optimality is robust under redistributive social preferences.
I formally derive these results for the simple single-labor-type model with fixed
wages, and consequently determine to what extent the policy implications survive
in a richer context with additional types of labor, an endogenous wage floor, and
different types of tax instruments.
First, results do not necessarily carry over to a richer general equilibrium frame-
work with both skilled and unskilled labor as factors of production. If only the
unskilled segment of the labor market is rationed, while the skilled segment clears,
involuntary unemployment among the unskilled might encourage people to invest
to become skilled workers. Increasing unskilled taxes and unemployment bene-
fits to reduce the inefficiency of rationing now also affects people’s skill decisions.
The policy reform’s effect on skill formation is theoretically ambiguous: the in-
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creased tax burden on unskilled workers increases the relative attractiveness of
skilled labor, whereas the decline in unemployment makes unskilled labor supply
more attractive. If the reform leads to more skilled labor supply, it can be seen
to improve equity by transferring resources from the employed to the unemployed,
efficiency because it eliminates inefficient rationing and because the increase in
skilled labor supply implies an expansion of the tax base.
I derive a condition under which the policy reform that raises unskilled taxes
and unemployment benefits indeed leads to more skilled labor supply. A crucial in-
gredient of this condition is how rationing depends on individuals’ underlying costs
of participation. The policy reform is more likely to lead to higher skilled labor
supply if rationing is mainly concentrated among the unskilled with high costs of
participation, i.e., those close to the margin between voluntary unemployment and
unskilled employment. In such case, lower unemployment would not affect skill
formation and it would be optimal to increase unskilled taxes and unemployment
benefits to substitute voluntary unemployment for involuntary unemployment. If,
on the other hand, rationing is concentrated among those unskilled workers who
are relatively indifferent between being skilled or unskilled, decreased rationing
leads to less skill formation as skilled individuals reap the benefits of improved
probabilities of obtaining an unskilled job. Only in that case might rationing be
part of a policy optimum. This conclusion complements the studies by Lee and
Saez (2012) and Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013a, Chapter 4 of this Dissertation) who
find that under such type of rationing it might be optimal to impose binding
minimum wage legislation.
Second, the derived policy implications remain valid if the above-market-clearing
wage rate is endogenously determined by a labor union. The intuition behind this
result is that with endogenous wages, government can directly affect wage rates,
and thus employment, through its income tax policies. I assume the union sets
wages to maximize a goal function which features net wages and employment as
complements. In that case it is true that an exogenous increase in the income
tax rate leads unions to demand higher, compensatory, wages. However, regard-
less of the level of taxes, if government commits to raising them as a response
to increased involuntary unemployment, it incentivizes the union to moderate its
wage demands. After all, the union knows that higher wage demands now leads to
increased taxes. Thus, the conclusion that labor income taxes should depend pos-
itively on the rate of unemployment carries over to the case of endogenous union
wages.
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Third, I show that the logic of the derived policy implications is only applicable
to employees’ income taxation – i.e., supply-side taxation. Higher income for em-
ployees leads to lower labor supply, but keeps employment constant since supply
exceeds demand. However, higher labor income taxes for employers lead to higher
labor costs, and thereby to lower labor demand. Since there was already too little
demand, higher employer taxes lead to even less employment and higher unem-
ployment. Thus, in rationed labor markets, the conventional incidence equivalence
of supply- and demand-side labor income taxes no longer holds. Instead, increased
employee taxes lead to efficiency gains, whereas increased employer taxes lead to
efficiency losses.
An important ingredient of my analysis is the question to whom the limited
amount of jobs is allocated. Unfortunately, the literature on involuntary unem-
ployment provides little guidance when it comes to the efficiency of labor market
rationing.2 In general, in the absence of a secondary or “black” market in which
a rationed good is traded, there is little reason to assume the rationed goods are
acquired by the individuals who desire them most (Tobin, 1952). Empirically, as
noted by Luttmer (2007), this has been confirmed by studies on the U.S. residential
market for gas (Davis and Kilian, 2011), the gasoline market (Deacon and Son-
stelie, 1989; Frech and Lee, 1987) and on the housing rental market (Glaeser and
Luttmer, 2003). As there is no secondary market for jobs, it is unlikely that labor
market rationing is efficient. This point has first been made by Lott (1990), and
more recently repeated by Palda (2000), Luttmer (2007), Lee and Saez (2012), and
Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013a,b, Chapters 3 and 4 of this Dissertation). Empirical
evidence on the efficiency of labor market rationing is virtually non-existent. The
only more or less direct evidence for the efficiency of lay-offs due to an increase
in rationing is given by Luttmer (2007) who analyzes the effects of an increase
in the minimum wage. He measures the change in the average (proxy of the)
reservation wage of low-skilled workers after an increase in the minimum wage. He
finds conflicting results for different reservation wage proxies and can therefore not
find convincing evidence regarding the efficiency of labor market rationing. This
chapter builds on these earlier studies in an attempt to provide more insight into
optimal government policies, given that labor market rationing is not necessarily
2This is in stark contrast to the first source of efficiency, represented by the aggregate em-
ployment effects of above-market-clearing wage rates. See Neumark and Wascher (2006) for an
extensive survey documenting empirical studies on the employment loss due to minimum wages
and the literature survey in Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013b, Chapter 3 of this Dissertation) for
theoretical studies on the welfare implications of minimum wages.
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efficient.
In the next section I show that, in a simple model of labor market rationing,
higher labor taxes improve both efficiency and equity. In Section 5.3 I derive
conditions for which this still holds in the case of multiple labor types. In Section
5.4 I discuss endogenous wage setting and the differences in incidence of employee
and employer taxes. I conclude with a discussion.
5.2 A simple model of rationing
5.2.1 Model and policy implications
Below I present a highly stylized partial equilibrium model of a rationed labor
market to demonstrate the basic narrative of the chapter. To keep things as
simple as possible, I assume there is a fixed amount of available jobs m¯. For
now, I leave the exact reason for this demand constraint out of consideration. I
merely note that one possible explanation could be a combination of fixed wages
and a technology featuring decreasing returns to labor. I denote the number of
individuals by n, and assume that there are more individuals then jobs: n > m¯.
Since there are more potential workers than jobs, not every individual will succeed
in securing a job. Ultimately, there will be nL = m¯ employed individuals and nU
unemployed individuals (be it voluntarily or involuntarily), such that nL+nU = n.
For ease of expression I normalize the total number of individuals to one: n = 1.
Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their disutility of work, c. This
is distributed according to G(c), with density g(c) ≡ G′(c) and support [0, c¯], and
can be seen as a combination of monetary costs associated with work (e.g. travel
costs, costs of education, child care) and loss of leisure. An individual, if employed,
inelastically supplies one unit of labor. He then earns after-tax income w − tL,
with w the wage rate and tL a tax on income (if positive) or a government transfer
(if negative), and suffers disutility of work. If unemployed, he does not suffer any
work-related disutility and earns unemployment benefits −tU . Government is as-
sumed to be unable to distinguish the voluntary unemployed from the involuntary
unemployed, such that there is no distinction in transfers for the two different types
of unemployment. I assume utility is linear in consumption and disutility of work,
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yielding the following utility functions for employed and unemployed persons3:
V Lc = w − tL − c,(5.1)
VU = −tU .(5.2)
Variables that, in equilibrium, depend on disutility of work I denote with a sub-
script c.
An individual notionally supplies labor if V Lc > VU . Hence, there is a critical
level of disutility, c∗, leaving an individual indifferent between working and not
working. Every individual with disutility higher than c∗ prefers to be unemployed,
every individual with lower disutility prefers to be employed. This critical level is
determined by V Lc∗ = VU :
(5.3) c∗ = w − tL + tU .
I furthermore assume that absent taxation, i.e., in the case that c∗ = w, labor
supply exceeds labor demand such that G(w) > m¯. This requires the adoption of a
certain rationing schedule that prescribes which of the G(c∗) individuals that would
like to work obtain a job and which do not. I therefore define uc as the probability
of unemployment for an individual with disutility c. The density-weighted sum
of individual unemployment probabilities should add up to the aggregate number
of unemployed, that is:
∫ C
0
ucg(c)dc = G(c
∗) − m¯. Hence, in equilibrium I can
write a person’s unemployment probability as a function of the critical level c∗,
the number of jobs m¯, and his disutility of work c: uc = u(c
∗, m¯, c).
Lee and Saez (2012) and Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013b, Chapter 3 of this Dis-
sertation) discuss two special cases of rationing in the light of minimum wage
policies: efficient rationing and uniform rationing. Rationing is efficient if workers
with the highest costs of participation become unemployed first, such that uc = 0
for c ∈ [0, cer] and uc = 1 otherwise, with G(cer) = m¯. Rationing is uniform if
every worker faces the same probability of unemployment such that uc = u¯ for
all c ∈ [0, c∗]. Since there is little reason to suspect either case is a reasonably
accurate description of reality I intend not to impose too stringent assumptions
on the rationing schedule.
Government’s task is to collect taxes and pay out benefits, and finance some
exogenous revenue requirement r, such that the following budget constraint is
3As explained below, the policy implications drawn in this section hold a fortiori for any
concave transformation of these utility functions.
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satisfied:
(5.4) B ≡ nLtL + nU tU − r = 0.
Any positive outlays to transfers or exogenous expenditures need to be offset by
tax revenue. I assume, for now, that social preferences are utilitarian such that
government, given linear utility functions, does not care about the distribution
of income. Social welfare is therefore given by the simple sum of all individuals’
utilities:4
(5.5) W ≡
∫ c∗
0
(1− uc)(w − tL − c)dG(c)− nU tU .
By substituting in the budget constraint and nL = m¯, and after some rearranging,
I obtain:
(5.6) W = m¯w − r −
∫ c∗
0
(1− uc)cdG(c), G(c∗) ≥ m¯
Provided that G (c∗) ≥ m¯, the first two terms, m¯w and r, are constant. Hence,
government’s optimization problem simplifies to the minimization of total disutility
of labor,
∫ c∗
0
(1−uc)cdG(c), with respect to c∗ = w− tL+ tU , subject to the budget
constraint. Trivially, total disutility is minimized by setting c∗ as low as possible,
i.e. such that G (c∗) = m¯. This is obtained by raising the tax on labor income,
tL, redistributing the revenues in the form of higher unemployment benefits, −tU .
Hence, in the optimum, taxes and transfers are set such that supply equals demand
and nobody is involuntarily unemployed.
It is not surprising that this policy is optimal if marginal utilities of consump-
tion are constant and social preferences utilitarian. With such individual and so-
cial preferences, government is merely concerned with efficiency. Since the market
mechanism is not likely to generate an efficient allocation of jobs in the presence
of rationing, it is optimal for government to correct this inefficiency with its tax
instruments. This conclusion strictly holds for any rationing schedule that is not
perfectly efficient and weakly holds for an efficient rationing schedule. That is, had
rationing been efficient, the government would be indifferent between the laissez-
faire outcome and the outcome in which it actively rewarded/taxed the persons
with the highest disutility out of the labor market – after all, the allocation of jobs
would in both cases be identical.
4I can ignore any firm profits since they are fixed by the ration.
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As it turns out, above outcome is independent of the assumption of utilitarian
social preferences. Note that the policy reform suggested above requires a transfer
of resources from the working population towards the unemployed, i.e., higher tL,
lower tU , while keeping total employment, m¯, and thus the tax base constant.
Besides the efficiency gain, this reform therefore leads to a distributional gain
for any government that values redistribution from individuals with high utility
towards individuals with low utility. In fact, if marginal welfare is decreasing in
utility, optimal taxes might very well push c∗ below the point at which G(c∗) = m¯,
sacrificing production for a larger degree of equity.
Proposition 5.1 Consider an economy with a single type of labor as sole factor
of production in which labor supply exceeds demand. It is then optimal for the
government to increase both taxes for workers and benefits for the unemployed,
such that workers with a low utility of work voluntarily become unemployed, thereby
creating jobs for unemployed individuals that derive more utility from working.
This reform improves efficiency by reducing the inefficient ration, and improves
equity by transferring resources from workers to the unemployed. Government
optimally raises taxes and benefits to the point that involuntary unemployment is
entirely replaced by voluntary unemployment.
5.2.2 Graphical representation and discussion of results
Above analysis points to a little recognized inefficiency related to involuntary un-
employment, originating from heterogeneity of individuals’ disutility of labor par-
ticipation. Some of the unemployed are bound to have a lower disutility of par-
ticipation than some of the employed, since there is no market mechanism which
ensures otherwise. Thanks to the model’s uncomplicated nature, this basic nar-
rative can easily be illustrated by familiar graphical representation of the labor
market. Figure 5.1 illustrates the additional dead-weight loss created by ineffi-
cient rationing in the absence of taxes and benefits. Panel a. shows the extreme
case of perfectly efficient rationing in which the dead-weight loss equals the con-
ventional red triangle IV. Producer surplus is given by the blue area I. Individuals
that succeed in obtaining a job are the ones that have the highest utility surplus
of working, represented by the leftmost part on the labor supply curve. Worker
surplus is therefore given by the blue areas II and III. The opposite extreme is
illustrated in panel b. Only the people with the lowest positive utility surplus of
working obtain a job, represented by the rightmost part of the labor supply curve
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Figure 5.1: Deadweight loss for various rationing schedules
as shown in the first graph. As shown in the second graph, worker surplus now
equals area III, generating an additional dead-weight loss, equal to area II, over
and above the conventional dead-weight loss of area IV. As drawn in this figure,
the additional dead-weight loss exceeds the conventional dead-weight loss.
The intermediate case of uniform rationing, in which every worker has an equal
probability of unemployment such that uc = u¯ for all c ∈ [0, c∗], is illustrated in
panel c. Given a linear supply schedule, average disutility of work now equals
w/2. Therefore I can illustrate worker surplus by the blue rectangle II which gives
the number of workers multiplied by w/2. The additional dead-weight loss in this
case equals the red area III. As drawn in the figure, the additional dead-weight
loss again exceeds the conventional dead-weight loss. Palda (2000) provides some
calculations of the size of the two different dead-weight losses based on a simple
calibration of the uniform-rationing case. He shows that area III exceeds area IV
especially for low levels of rationing. This owes to the fact that the conventional
dead-weight loss of a marginal increase in unemployment is zero in the absence
of rationing, making it a second-order welfare loss. The additional dead-weight
loss, due to inefficient rationing, of a marginal increase in unemployment is strictly
positive in the absence of rationing and hence represents a first-order welfare loss.
Panel d. of Figure 5.1 summarizes the earlier panels for the case of an a
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priori unknown rationing incidence. Area II gives the potential dead-weight loss
of inefficient rationing. For any realistic rationing schedule in between the two
extremes of efficient and very inefficient rationing, area II will be part worker
surplus, part dead-weight loss. The proposed policy reform increases taxes for
the working population and transfers for the unemployed population as long as
involuntary unemployment is prevalent. Both aspects of the policy reform shift the
labor supply schedule to the left, and does so until it intersects the labor demand
schedule and the wage floor at the same point. At that point, the policy reform
effectively brought the economy back to panel a., in which case area II represents
a surplus divided between the employed and the unemployed.5 Hence, the policy
reform improves equity by transferring resources from workers to the unemployed,
and improves efficiency by removing the inefficiency of the rationing schedule. The
contrast with the standard analysis in public finance is striking. Without initial
involuntary unemployment, the same reform would result in the same labor supply
response. However, instead of generating an efficiency gain, this labor supply
response would result in an efficiency loss, represented by the familiar dead-weight
loss triangle of area IV. In the presence of involuntary unemployment, however,
this dead-weight loss is already prevalent and lower labor supply improves, rather
than worsens, efficiency.
Within the confinement of the model, Proposition 5.1 states that government
optimally uses its tax instruments to remove any involuntary unemployment. Con-
sequently, a binding minimum wage or other policies raising wages above market-
clearing levels are never optimal. My findings also shed new light on participation
policy which, by implication, is aimed at increasing the critical level, c∗. My
analysis shows that, if labor markets are rationed, it is optimal to decrease partic-
ipation. Higher participation leads, in the best case scenario of efficient rationing,
to no welfare change at all, but in any other scenario it leads to welfare losses
due to more inefficient rationing. Hence, the wisdom of participation policy cru-
cially depends on whether the relevant segment of the labor market is rationed
or not. If it is, increasing participation will merely lead some persons with a low
utility surplus of work to take over jobs of persons with a higher utility surplus
of work. Taking a cyclical interpretation of my results, the presence of inefficient
5One might be led to believe that area II equals the tax revenue of the government and thus
constitutes the utility surplus of the unemployed, such that workers’ utility is measured by area
III. However, the labor supply schedule shifts leftwards not only because of higher taxes, but also
because of higher unemployment benefits. Thus, tax revenue is necessarily smaller than area III,
and part of this area in fact constitutes workers’ utility.
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rationing suggests the optimality of anticyclical tax wedges on labor supply. After
all, the ‘normal’ distortionary effects of taxes and unemployment benefits are less
relevant in an economic slump characterized by rigid wage floors and concurrent
high involuntary unemployment.6
The model I discussed in this section is highly stylized, which naturally limits
the value of any policy implications that might be drawn from it. This problem is
partly confronted in the next section by expanding the model to include general
equilibrium effects as individuals might decide to work in a skilled and unrationed
segment of the labor market. Additional assumptions need to be made to derive
similar results. In a later section, I also consider endogenous wage floors, additional
tax instruments, and a dynamic setup of the model.
5.3 Rationing and skill formation
5.3.1 Model
Firms
In this section I assume there are two different types of labor - skilled and unskilled
- that are imperfect substitutes in production. Wages for workers are fixed at a
level above the market-clearing wage, which can be thought of as a consequence of
minimum wage legislation, union wage setting, efficiency wages or some other form
of institutionalized wage rigidity.7 There is a representative, competitive, profit-
maximizing firm which produces output, Y , by employing skilled and unskilled
labor as inputs. I normalize labor supply such that every worker supplies one unit
of labor, and I denote aggregate skilled labor as nH and unskilled labor as nL. I
furthermore normalize the price of output to unity. Production is a function of
skilled and unskilled labor and homogeneous of degree one:
(5.7) Y = F (nH , nL) , FH , FL > 0, FHH , FLL < 0, FHL > 0.
6This cyclical interpretation echoes the results of Landais, Michaillat and Saez (2013), who
argue in favor of anticyclical unemployment benefits for much the same reason.
7In this section, I do not explicitly model the specific source of rationing, but instead simply
assume it as exogenously given. I briefly return to this point in the next section, in which I
derive similar policy implications from a simple model with union wage setting.
157
Chapter 5. Equity and Efficiency in Rationed Labor Markets
Subscripts H and L of the production function denote partial derivatives with
respect to nH and nL. The marginal products of labor are positive, but dimin-
ishing for each type of labor. Both inputs are essential and cooperant factors of
production.
Firms demand labor, taking wages as given. The first-order conditions for profit
maximization imply that the marginal productivities of labor equal the gross wage
rates of each type of worker:
FH (nH , nL) = wH ,(5.8)
FL (nH , nL) = wL,(5.9)
where wH and wL denote skilled and unskilled wage rates. As the unskilled wage
is fixed above the market clearing wage, unskilled labor supply exceeds unskilled
labor demand, nL. This causes involuntary unemployment among the unskilled.
Notice that homogeneity of the production function allows us to rewrite the
first-order conditions as:
FH
(
nH
nL
, 1
)
= wH ,(5.10)
FL
(
nH
nL
, 1
)
= wL.(5.11)
The second condition implies that a fixed unskilled wage rate, wL, determines
the relative factor intensity, nH/nL, which, according to the first condition, deter-
mines the skilled wage rate, wH . Thus, fixed unskilled wages imply fixed skilled
wages, and unskilled employment can be written as a fixed proportion of skilled
employment: nL = γnH , with γ some constant.
Individuals
There is a continuum of individuals with mass normalized to one. As in the
previous section, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to c, which determines
their utility costs of participation and is distributed according toG (c), with density
g (c) and support [0, c¯]. Individuals decide whether to become skilled worker,
unskilled worker, or voluntarily unemployed. Disutility of being unskilled employed
equals c, disutility of being skilled employed equals (1 + β) c. I assume β > 0, such
that for every individual it is more costly to become a skilled worker than it is
to become an unskilled worker. As a result, only individuals with a low value of
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Figure 5.2: Graphical illustration of labor market equilibrium
c prefer to be skilled, while individuals with a high value of c prefer to remain
unskilled.
I assume government observes individual labor earnings (or wage rates), such
that it can set skill-specific tax instruments. Taxes for skilled workers, unskilled
workers, and the unemployed are given by tH , tL, and tU . Naturally, as government
is required to run a balanced budget, one or more of these taxes might be negative
and thus represent a transfer. Utility of the three types of individuals is given by:
V Hc ≡ wH − tH − (1 + β) c,(5.12)
V Lc ≡ wL − tL − c,(5.13)
VU ≡ −tU ,(5.14)
Subscripts c are meant to emphasize the fact that utility of skilled and unskilled
workers depend on their disutility of work.
There are now two critical levels of c. One critical level, denoted c∗s, separates
the skilled from the unskilled; the other critical level, denoted c∗u, separates the
voluntary unemployed from the unskilled employed. Individuals with c ∈ [0, c∗s)
prefer to be skilled, individuals with c ∈ [c∗s, c∗u) prefer to be unskilled employed,
and individuals with c ∈ [c∗u, c¯] prefer to be voluntarily unemployed. Thus, skilled
labor supply equals G(c∗s), unskilled notional labor supply equals G(c
∗
u) − G(c∗s),
and the number of voluntarily unemployed individuals is given by 1−G(c∗u). This
equilibrium is graphically illustrated by Figure 5.2.
The upper critical level of the disutility of participation, c∗u, equates the utilities
of being unemployed and unskilled employed: V Lc∗u = VU . Hence:
(5.15) c∗u = wL − tL + tU .
Any individual with c > c∗u decides to become voluntarily unemployed. Naturally,
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c∗u is increasing in the net income of the unskilled employed and in the tax rate of
the unemployed.
Individuals decide to be skilled or unskilled before knowing whether they are
actually able to secure a job as an unskilled worker. They do know their probability
of obtaining a job. This probability is governed by the rationing schedule, which
assigns a probability of involuntary unemployment, uc, to every level of c ∈ [c∗s, c∗u).
The expected utility of being unskilled is given by the probability-weighted average
of unskilled employed utility and unemployed utility, given by:
(5.16) V ELc ≡ (1− uc)V Lc + ucVU .
The lower critical value, c∗s, is determined by equating skilled utility and expected
unskilled utility: V Hc∗s = V
EL
c∗s . Substituting for utility and rearranging yields:
(5.17) (β + uc∗s)c
∗
s = wH − tH − wL + tL + uc∗sc∗u.
This critical value is increasing in the income of skilled workers and decreasing in
the income of unskilled workers. Moreover, as the last term in equation (5.17) in-
dicates, the critical value is increasing in the unemployment probability multiplied
by the upper critical value, uc∗sc
∗
u. A higher unemployment probability reduces
the expected income from being unskilled, the reduction given by the difference
between unskilled employed income and unemployment benefits which equals c∗u.
8
Labor market equilibrium
As the skilled segment of the labor market is not rationed, skilled labor demand
must, in equilibrium, equal skilled labor supply:
(5.18) nH = G(c
∗
s).
The unskilled segment of the labor market is rationed and notional labor supply ex-
ceeds labor demand, the excess being involuntary unemployment. Unskilled labor
demand thus equals the difference between unskilled labor supply and involuntary
8Additionally, the following second-order condition needs to be satisfied: χ(c∗s) ≡
d
(
V Hc∗s − V LEc∗s
)
/dc < 0. That is, at the critical level c∗s, skilled utility should be decreasing
in c faster than expected unskilled utility. For the critical level to be unique it is sufficient to
assume that χ (c) > 0 for all c. This condition will be imposed to ensure uniqueness of c∗s. For
completeness, note that χ(c) = −(β + uc) + ducdc (c∗u − c).
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unemployment:
(5.19) nL =
∫ c∗u
c∗s
(1− uc)dG(c).
Substituting the equilibrium values for nH and nL into the firm’s first-order
condition for unskilled labor, (5.9), yields:
(5.20) FL
(
G(c∗s),
∫ c∗u
c∗s
(1− uc)dG(c)
)
= wL.
Thus, unemployment can be seen to result from the representative firm’s first-
order condition. Notice, however, that this condition only determines aggregate
unemployment,
∫ c∗u
c∗s
ucdG (c), whereas the continuum of individual unemployment
rates, {uc}, are determined by the rationing schedule.
I can now define equilibrium in the private sector as a set of values for c∗s, c
∗
u, and
{uc}, which satisfies individuals’ and firms’ optimization as described by equations
(5.15), (5.17), and (5.20), along with a rationing schedule which determines how
aggregate unemployment translates into individual unemployment probabilities.
Government
Government sets taxes in a way that balances its budget:
(5.21) B ≡ nHtH + nLtL + nU tU − r = 0,
where nU = 1−nH−nL is the number of unemployed people and r is an exogenous
revenue requirement. Again, I assume for now that government is utilitarian such
that social welfare can be represented as a simple sum of individuals’ utility:
W ≡ nH(wH − tH) + nL(wL − tL)− nU tU(5.22)
− (1 + β)
∫ c∗s
0
cdG(c)−
∫ c∗u
c∗s
(1− uc)cdG(c).
5.3.2 The welfare analysis of a participation tax reform
Inelastic skill formation
In this subsection I analyze the welfare effects of a policy reform that raises un-
skilled taxes and unemployment benefits to substitute voluntary unemployment
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for involuntary unemployment. For expository purposes, I first perform the wel-
fare analysis in the case of a fixed supply of skilled labor. Thus, the change in
skilled labor supply due to the reform is assumed to be nil: ∆nH = 0.
9 Notice that
this implies, by equation (5.20), that the number of unskilled employed, and thus
the number of unemployed, remain constant: ∆nL,∆nU = 0. The policy reform
under consideration raises unskilled taxes by ∆tL > 0, and unemployment benefits
by −∆tU > 0, such that the government budget, (5.21), balances, and involuntary
unemployment is substituted entirely by voluntary unemployment. As in the pre-
vious section, the transfer from the employed to the unemployed constitutes an
equity improvement. Taking differences of equation (5.19), the reform thus implies
the following:
(5.23) −∆G(c∗u) = −∆
∫ c∗u
c∗s
ucdG(c) =
∫ c∗u
c∗s
ucdG(c).
Notice that the left-hand side of the first equation gives the increase in the number
of voluntary unemployed, which must equal the change in the number of involun-
tary unemployed. This must necessarily hold as the total number of unemployed
remains constant. The second equation imposes that the reform eliminates all
involuntary unemployment by replacing it with voluntary unemployment.10
As ∆nH ,∆nL,∆nU = 0, the tax base is fixed such that higher taxation does
not lead to tax base erosion. To see this, notice that budget balance requires
∆B = 0. Thus, taking differences of equation (5.21) and substituting for ∆B = 0
yields:
(5.24) − nU∆tU = nL∆tL.
This equation implies that the increase in outlays on unemployment benefits,
−nU∆tU , is equal to the mechanical revenue gains from increased taxes, nL∆tL.
In standard full-employment models of public finance, the outlays on unemploy-
ment benefits would be lower than the mechanical revenue gains as lower labor
supply leads to a smaller tax base. In the presence of involuntary unemployment,
however, the tax base is determined by labor demand, not labor supply. Hence,
the standard equity-efficiency trade-off is not present. In fact, efficiency improves
9This would for example be applicable if, for a large enough neighborhood around c∗s, the
density g(c) is nil.
10Feasibility of this reform is ensured by the fact that c∗u, and thus −∆G(c∗u), are increasing
in tL and decreasing in tU .
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as the inefficient rationing is removed. This can be seen by taking differences of
equation (5.22), the utilitarian social welfare function:
(5.25) ∆W =
∫ c∗u
c∗u+∆c∗u
cdG(c)−
∫ c∗u
c∗s
uccdG(c) ≥ 0.
As there is no tax base erosion, and productivity and wages remain constant, total
production in the economy remains constant as well. As a result, the only welfare
effects consist of changes in disutility of work. The first term gives the disutility of
work of the unskilled workers that decide to become voluntarily unemployed due
to the tax reform, i.e., every person with disutility of work c ∈ (c∗u+∆c∗u, c∗u). This
constitutes a welfare gain as those people will no longer suffer this disutility of work.
The second term is the disutility of work that is suffered by the previously unem-
ployed people that take over the jobs of the now voluntary unemployed. Equation
(5.23) implies that the additional number of voluntary unemployed exactly offsets
the number of previously unemployed people. Thus, the total disutility of work
(weakly) decreases due to the policy reform, such that equation (5.25) is greater
than or equal to zero.11
Notice that the welfare analysis of the policy reform is identical to the analysis
of Section 5.2. The only difference is that the constant producer surplus does not
constitute firm profits, but instead represents the utility surplus of skilled workers.
The reason that the above analysis is identical to the one of the previous section
is of course that the number of skilled workers is constant, an assumption I relax
below.
Elastic skill formation
The crucial question, then, is how the policy implications are affected by elastic
skill formation which allows for ∆nH 6= 0. I again consider a policy reform that
raises unskilled labor taxes and unemployment benefits, under a balanced budget,
which eliminates involuntary unemployment. Remember that profit maximization
and homogeneity of the production function implies that nL = γnH . Hence, taking
differences of this equation, the reform implies the following for the change in
11Notice that ∆W = 0 if and only if the rationing schedule is efficient. In that case, only the
people who were previously involuntarily unemployed become voluntarily unemployed. In that
case the allocation of jobs, and thus the total disutility of work, remains constant.
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involuntary unemployment:
(5.26) −∆G(c∗u) + (1 + γ)∆nH = −∆
∫ c∗u
c∗s
ucdG(c) =
∫ c∗u
c∗s
ucdG(c).
Notice that the first term of the first equation again gives the increase in voluntary
unemployment. Every additional voluntarily unemployed person yields a job for
one involuntarily unemployed person. The second term is new and gives the effect
of a change in skilled labor supply. Higher skilled labor supply leads to a direct
decrease in low-skilled labor supply, and increases labor demand by γ as higher
skilled labor supply increases productivity of unskilled workers. Both effects lead
to lower involuntary unemployment. I again assume that government raises un-
skilled labor taxes and unemployment benefits until all involuntary unemployment
is eliminated, as stated by the second equation.12
A sufficient condition for obtaining the same policy implication as under in-
elastic skill formation, is that the reform stipulated above leads to higher skilled
labor supply. Since the ratio nH/nL is constant, higher skilled labor supply leads
to higher unskilled labor demand. As a result, the policy reform does not only
increase equity and reduce inefficient rationing, but yields an additional efficiency
gain because of an expanding tax base. It is easiest to illustrate this result for-
mally by considering the marginal effect of a budget-neutral increase in the un-
skilled tax rate on the size of the unemployment benefits. This is obtained by
taking the derivative of the government budget, equation (5.21), and substituting
for dB = 0:13
(5.27) − nUdtU = nLdtL + ((tH − tU) + (tL − tU)γ)dnH .
Here, I used the fact that dnL = γdnH and dnU = −dnL − dnH . In contrast to
the case of inelastic skilled labor supply, the additional transfer to the unemployed
may be larger or smaller than the mechanical revenue gains from higher unskilled
12Feasibility of this policy reform requires that the left-hand side of equation (5.26) is increasing
in the unskilled tax rate. This is necessarily the case if skilled labor supply increases in response to
the policy reform, ∆nH > 0. If nH decreases too strongly with the unskilled tax rate, eliminating
involuntary unemployment with the unskilled tax rate and unemployment benefits alone is not
feasible. Below, however, I concentrate on the case of increasing skilled labor supply, for which
feasibility is not an issue.
13I present the marginal effects of a budget-neutral increase in unskilled labor taxes and un-
employment benefits, even though the proposed policy reform is designed to eliminate all invol-
untary unemployment. This allows me to save on the notation of inframarginal effects, which are
somewhat cumbersome, do not provide additional insights, and are not relevant for the results.
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labor taxes. Assuming, as seems reasonable, that taxes on the employed are larger
than taxes on the unemployed, tH , tL > tU , the final term in equation (5.27) is
positive for dnH > 0 and negative for dnH < 0. In other words, higher skilled
labor supply leads to tax base expansion, whereas lower skilled labor supply leads
to tax base erosion.14
The total efficiency gain from the policy reform can be derived by taking the
derivative of equation (5.22), the utilitarian social welfare function:
(5.28) dW = −
∫ c∗u
c∗s
(c∗u − c)ducdG(c) + ((tH − tU) + (tL − tU)γ)dnH ,
the derivation for which I used equation (5.27). The first term represents the
efficiency gain associated with eliminating inefficient rationing. Notice that c∗u− c
measures the utility difference between being unskilled employed and unemployed
for a person with participation costs c. The efficiency gains of lower involuntary
unemployment is given by the integral over this difference, multiplied by the change
in unemployment. The second term represents the social welfare effect associated
with the change in tax revenue due to expansion or erosion of the tax base. As
derived above, both terms are unambiguously positive if the policy reform leads
to higher skilled labor supply. If, on the other hand, the response of skilled labor
supply is negative, it is ambiguous whether the policy reform leads to an efficiency
gain. It then depends on whether the efficiency gain from eliminating involuntary
unemployment outweighs the efficiency loss from an eroded tax base.
Summing up, if a budget-neutral increase in both unskilled taxes and unem-
ployment benefits leads to higher skill formation, this policy reform improves equity
by redistributing from the employed to the unemployed, and improves efficiency
because it both eliminates the inefficient rationing schedule and expands the tax
base. A positive skilled labor supply response is therefore a sufficient condition
for the traditional equity-efficiency trade-off to break down. The important ques-
tion that remains to be answered, then, is whether the policy reform indeed leads
to higher skilled labor supply. This turns out to be ambiguous and depends on
whether, for an individual with disutility c∗s, the expected earnings of being un-
skilled increase or decrease as a result of the policy reform. This can be seen from
14Naturally, such tax base erosion could be avoided by simultaneously reducing taxes for
skilled workers. However, while the inefficiency due to tax base erosion would be averted, this
tax adjustment implies a transfer towards the skilled employed and hence an equity deterioration.
This is exactly the classic equity-efficiency trade-off which thus might appear if the policy reform
leads to lower skilled labor supply.
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taking differences of equation (5.17):
(5.29) β∆c∗s = ∆tL − uc∗s(c∗u − c∗s).
Remember that c∗s is the critical disutility level which separates the skilled from
the unskilled. Hence, an increase in this critical level implies higher skilled labor
supply. On the one hand, the policy reform tends to stimulate skilled labor supply
as it taxes unskilled labor. This is illustrated by the first term of equation (5.29),
which is positive. On the other hand, the policy reform discourages skilled labor
supply since it removes involuntary unemployment and thus raises the probability
of obtaining a job when supplying unskilled labor. This is illustrated by the second
term of equation (5.29), which is the product of the before-reform unemployment
rate at c∗s, uc∗s , and the utility difference between obtaining an unskilled job and
being unemployed, wL − tL − c∗s + tU = c∗u − c∗s. If the unskilled tax increase
is larger than the earnings increase due to a lower probability of unemployment,
skilled labor supply increases.
To obtain more insight into the conditions under which the policy reform
leads to higher skilled labor supply, I can further substitute for ∆tL in equation
(5.29). Before doing so, I define the average density between disutility c1 and c2 as
g¯(c1, c2) ≡ (G(c2) − G(c1))/(c2 − c1), and the average involuntary unemployment
rate as u¯ ≡ ∫ c∗u
c∗s
ucdG(c)/
∫ c∗u
c∗s
dG(c). As I show in the Appendix by substituting
for ∆tL in equation (5.29), the policy reform leads to more skilled labor supply if
and only if the following condition is satisfied:
(5.30)
nU
nU + nL
>
(uc∗s
u¯
) g¯(c∗u, c∗u + ∆c∗u)
g¯(c∗s, c∗u)
.
The left-hand side gives the size of the unskilled labor tax increase associated
with an increase in voluntary unemployment. If there is a relative large number of
unemployed, a given increase in unskilled tax revenue leads to only a small increase
in the unemployment transfer as it has to be shared among a large number of
unemployed. In that case, the necessary unskilled tax increase is relatively large,
encouraging skilled rather than unskilled labor supply. The right-hand side of the
condition features two fractions. The first fraction gives the unemployment rate
for a person with disutility level c∗s, relative to the average unemployment rate.
If uc∗s is relatively large, the elimination of involuntary unemployment strongly
raises the expected unskilled utility for a person with disutility c∗s. As a result,
skilled labor supply is more likely to decrease. On the other hand, if the average
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unemployment rate, u¯, is relatively large, a large increase in unskilled taxes is
required to eliminate involuntary unemployment, increasing the attractiveness of
skilled labor supply. The same logic applies to the last term which gives the
fraction of average population densities between disutility levels [c∗u, c
∗
u + ∆c
∗
u] and
[c∗s, c
∗
u]. If the density at the participation margin is relatively large, unemployment
responds relatively strongly on a given increase in unskilled taxes. If the population
density on [c∗s, c
∗
u] is relatively large, involuntary unemployment is also large (for
given unemployment rate), and a large increase in taxes is required to eliminate
involuntary unemployment.
Proposition 5.2 Consider a policy reform that substitutes voluntary unemploy-
ment for involuntary unemployment by increasing both unskilled taxes and unem-
ployment benefits. In an economy with both skilled and unskilled labor as factors
of production, in which unskilled labor is rationed, such a policy reform unambigu-
ously improves both equity and efficiency if it leads to higher skilled labor supply.
It improves equity by transferring resources from the employed to the unemployed.
It improves efficiency because it both eliminates inefficient rationing and increases
the tax base by increasing skilled and unskilled labor demand. The policy reform
increases skilled labor supply only if the unemployment rate at the skill margin,
uc∗s , is small enough for condition (5.30) to hold.
5.3.3 Discussion
Proposition 5.2 underlines the crucial importance of the rationing schedule. On
the one hand, the more inefficient is the rationing schedule, the higher are the
efficiency gains from eliminating involuntary unemployment as is evident from the
first term in equation (5.28). On the other hand, if rationing is so inefficient
that much of the unemployment is concentrated on individuals that are relatively
indifferent between skilled and unskilled work, eliminating unemployment might
lead to efficiency losses due to declining skilled labor supply and an eroding tax
base. This is illustrated by condition (5.30) and echoes the results of Gerritsen and
Jacobs (2013a, Chapter 4 of this Dissertation), who find that a minimum wage can
only be part of optimal policy if the resulting involuntary unemployment leads to
sufficiently more skilled labor supply.
It is useful to compare my results to those of Lee and Saez (2012) who find that
a finding minimum wage, and thus unemployment, might be optimal if rationing
is efficient. Proposition 5.2, however, implies that if all rationing is concentrated
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on those with the highest disutility of work, rationing is optimally substituted by
voluntary unemployment. The explanation of this seeming contradiction is that
Lee and Saez define efficient rationing to be concentrated at both the participation
margin and the skill margin – since those people at the skill margin have a low
utility surplus of unskilled work, relative to skilled work.15 Semantics aside, the
relevant question is not so much which definition of efficient rationing makes more
sense; rather it is what rationing schedule is the most plausible description of
reality.
In providing a provisional answer to this question, it might be helpful to dis-
tinguish between the short run – in which education is fixed – and the long run
– in which education is flexible. In the short run it is unlikely that involuntary
unemployment affects skilled labor supply as skill formation tends to be a time-
consuming investment. It is also unlikely that skilled workers will be rationed if
they want to switch to unskilled employment. In the words of Lee and Saez, “it
may be realistic that employers could preferentially hire the most qualified workers
even for minimum wage jobs” (footnote 15, p744). This effectively implies that
uc∗s = 0 and, according to Proposition 5.2, it is in that case both efficiency- and
equity-enhancing for government, in response to a short-run rationing shock, to
temporarily increase unskilled taxes and unemployment benefits.
In the longer run, students are likely to take into account the conditions on
the unskilled labor market when making educational decisions. Indeed, it is found
that a high rate of unemployment encourages school enrollment and discourages
dropping out from high school (e.g., see the surveys of empirical estimates of the
effect of unemployment on school enrollment and drop-out rates in Clark, 2011;
Gerritsen and Jacobs, 2013a, Chapter 4 of this Dissertation). Thus, in the long
run one could argue that involuntary unemployment contributes to skill formation
which, if the effect is large enough, could then justify the existence of some degree
of rationing. However, the same studies that find positive schooling effects of
unemployment also generally find that a higher remuneration for unskilled work
(the counterpart of higher rationing) discourages schooling. For the optimality
of rationing it is crucial to know the simultaneous effect of higher rationing and
higher unskilled wages on skill formation. To the best of my knowledge, however,
15The definition of efficient rationing, implicit in panel a. of Figure 5.1 could also be termed ex-
post efficient rationing: given the skill decisions made by individuals, rationing is most efficient if
it is concentrated on those unskilled workers with the highest cost of participation. The definition
of Lee and Saez then refers to ex-ante efficient rationing: before any skill decision has been made,
it is most efficient to ration those workers that are most willing to become unemployed or skilled,
rather than unskilled employed.
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this has never properly been tested empirically.
5.4 Further extensions
5.4.1 Endogenous union-set wages
So far, I assumed that involuntary unemployment was the result of an exogenous
wage floor which exceeds the market-clearing wage. In reality, one could argue,
wage floors are set endogenously by rational agents such as a labor-monopolizing
union. If such agent cares for workers’ net wages, which is presumably the reason
why he sets a wage floor, a policy reform that increases unskilled labor taxes might
induce him to increase the wage floor. As a result, the policy reform might reduce
labor demand as well as labor supply, leading to an erosion of the tax base and
causing the equity-efficiency trade-off to resurface. I show below that a higher level
of labor taxes is indeed likely to raise wage demands of a union that cares about
both net wages and employment. However, if government commits to raising taxes
in response to an increase of involuntary unemployment, it can directly incentivize
the union to moderate its wage demands.
I return to the model of Section 5.3, but now assume that unskilled wages are
set by a labor union. As is commonly observed (e.g., Booth, 1995), I assume that
the goal function of the union depends positively on (unskilled) net wages and
employment, according to:
(5.31)
Π ≡ Π (wL − tL, nL) , ΠwL−tL ,ΠnL ,ΠwL−tL,nL > 0, ΠwL−tL ,wL−tL ΠnL,nL < 0,
where subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to net wages and em-
ployment. The union maximizes this function, subject to firm behavior which
determines employment, nL, and government behavior which determines the tax
rate, tL. I assume that firms’ production function implies a constant elasticity of
labor demand which equals ε ≡ −dnL
dw
wL
nL
. First suppose that tL is exogenously set
by the government and thus independent of the level of unemployment. The labor
union then sets wages according to:
(5.32)
ΠwL−tL
ΠnL
wL
nL
= ε.
As long as the left-hand side is larger than ε, the union raises wage demands as the
marginal gains from higher net wages outweighs the marginal employment costs.
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For equation (5.32) to represent an equilibrium wage rate, I need to assume that
the left-hand side is declining with the gross wage rate. This holds true if the
complementarity between net wages and employment in the union’s goal function
is sufficiently strong.16
Equation (5.32) implies that gross wage demands increase in response to an
income tax increase. The direct effect of a tax increase is to raise the union’s
marginal rate of substitution of net wages for employment, Πw−tL/ΠnL , raising the
left-hand side of equation (5.32) above ε. Consequently, the union raises the gross
wage rate until equilibrium is restored. It would be wrong, however, to interpret
this as discrediting the results of Sections 5.2 and 5.3. After all, I argued that
income taxation should not be set exogenously but be determined by and depend
positively on unemployment. That is, income taxation should be endogenous
with respect to the union’s decisions that affect the degree of unemployment.
Abstracting from the assumption of an exogenously set wage rate, the equilibrium
wage rate can now be seen to equal:
(5.33)
ΠwL−tL
ΠnL
wL
nL
(
1− dtL
dwL
)
= ε.
Notice that the only difference with equation (5.32) is the additional term (1 −
dtL/dwL) on the right-hand side. This term implies that government can directly
influence the union’s marginal gains of increasing its wage demands. Regardless
of the level of taxation, if taxes depend positively on unemployment, dtL/dwL >
0, the union’s gains from raising wages is diminished since only part of a gross
wage increase is translated into a net wage increase. Thus, in the presence of an
endogenously set wage floor, government can directly influence this wage floor by
making taxes dependent on unemployment. According to the logic of previous
sections, government should make taxes depend positively on unemployment in
order to directly eliminate rationing.
5.4.2 Employer-paid vs employee-paid taxes
In conventional supply-determined models of public finance, it is irrelevant whether
taxes are levied on the employee or on the employer. Regardless of the statutory
16Hence, second-order conditions require that
ΠwL−tL
ΠnL
wL
nL
is decreasing in the wage rate wL.
As long as labor taxes are nonnegative, a sufficient condition for this is that
ΠwL−tL
ΠnL
wL−tL
nL
is decreasing in wL, which implies that the union’s elasticity of substitution of net wages for
employment at the equilibrium is smaller than one.
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incidence, the economic incidence of an income tax levied on employees is identical
to that of one levied on employers. Naively applying this principle on the analysis of
previous sections would imply that government could equivalently raise employers’
taxes and unemployment benefits without facing a trade-off between equity and
efficiency. It is, however, straightforward to see that this logic is false. In supply-
determined models the statutory incidence is irrelevant because of flexible wages.
If employers are taxed, they demand less labor, leading to lower wages and thus
a shared burden of the tax. If employees are taxed, they reduce labor supply,
leading to higher wages and an equivalently shared tax burden. Rationed labor
markets, however, are characterized by inflexible wages, causing the statutory and
economic incidence to coincide.
To see this, I expand the model of Section 5.3 by introducing an employer tax
on unskilled labor, τ , and compare the comparative statics of changes in τ and tL.
The firm’s first-order condition for unskilled labor demand is now given by:
(5.34) FL (nH , nL) = wL + τ,
I consider the comparative statics of changes in τ and tL, keeping other policy
parameters constant. The incidence of these two tax changes on unskilled workers
is derived by taking the derivative of unskilled net labor earnings, wL − tL:
(5.35) d(wL − tL) = −dtL.
Hence, due to a fixed unskilled wage rate, unskilled workers carry all the incidence
of an increase in the employee part of taxation. That is, net earnings decrease one-
to-one with the unskilled employee tax rate. On the other hand, unskilled workers
carry none of the incidence of an increase in the employer part of taxation. The
reason for this is, again, the fact that the wage rate is constant such that no
incidence can be shifted to the unskilled employed.
To determine the incidence of the tax changes on skilled workers, I need to
derive the comparative statics for net earnings wH − tH . For this, note that
homogeneity of the production function implies that profits are nil, such that
d(F (nH , nL) − wHnH − (wL + τ)nL) = 0. From this derivation, I obtain the
incidence of the tax changes on skilled workers:
(5.36) nHd(wH − tH) = −nLdτ.
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Thus, as all of the incidence of higher unskilled employee taxes is carried by un-
skilled workers, skilled workers carry none of the incidence of unskilled employee
taxes. However, skilled workers carry the full incidence of higher unskilled em-
ployer taxes. As can be seen from equation (5.36), skilled workers’ net income
declines one-to-one with the tax burden of the unskilled employer tax. 17
Hence, the incidence of employee taxes and the incidence of employer taxes are
very different in a rationed labor market.18 But how do the different taxes affect
efficiency? For expository purposes, I assume that skilled labor supply is inelastic.
First, consider the government budget, now given by B ≡ nHtH + nL (tL + τ) +
nU tU − r. Taking the total derivative yields:
(5.37) dB = nL (dtL + dτ) + (tL + τ − tU) dnL.
The first term gives the mechanical revenue gains associated with a higher tax
rate. Since employee and employer taxes have the same tax base, the mechanical
revenue effects are identical for equal increases in either tax. The second term
gives the revenue effect associated with a change in the tax base. Assuming that
workers are taxed more heavily than the unemployed, such that tL + τ > tU , an
erosion of the tax base, dnL < 0, is associated with lower tax revenue. It is readily
observable from equation (5.36) that the tax base is declining in the employer tax
rate, dnL/dτ = F
−1
LL < 0, while it is independent from the employee tax rate,
dnL/dτ = 0. Thus, echoing results of earlier sections, employee taxes do not affect
labor demand. On the other hand, employer taxes lead to lower labor demand and
thereby to an efficiency loss through tax base erosion.
The difference between the efficiency consequences of employer and employee
taxes are even more dramatic when it comes to the inefficiency of the rationing
schedule. Substituting for nL ≡
∫ c∗u
c∗s
(1− uc)dG(c) into equation (5.34) and taking
the total derivative, I obtain the following equation for the change in involuntary
unemployment:
(5.38)
∫ c∗u
c∗s
ducdG(c) = −(1− uc∗u)g(c∗u)dtL +
1
−FLLdτ,
17Notice that if government can freely and separately set both employer and employee taxes, the
fixed wage rate becomes irrelevant. Government can then effectively determine both employees’
net wages and employers’ labor costs, which is equivalent to setting a minimum wage along with
employee income taxes. I shortly return to the optimality of minimum wages in my concluding
remarks.
18A similar difference between the incidence of employer taxes and employee taxes has recently
been documented empirically for France by Lehmann, Marical and Rioux (2013).
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where I substituted for dc∗u = −dtL. The first term shows that involuntary unem-
ployment is decreasing in the employee tax. The reason is that higher employee
taxes lead to lower labor supply, and thus to a smaller difference between supply
and demand. The second term, however, shows that higher employer taxes lead
to even more involuntary unemployment. Higher employer taxes raise the costs
of hiring unskilled labor, thereby reducing labor demand even further. Summing
up, while higher unskilled employee taxes do not affect the tax base and improve
efficiency by reducing rationing, higher employer taxes worsen efficiency as they
lead to tax base erosion and more rationing.
5.5 Concluding remarks
My analysis of rationed labor markets stresses an inefficiency which has not re-
ceived much attention. With too little jobs for too many potential workers, the
market mechanism does not necessarily allocate jobs to the persons that derive
most utility from the job. Because of this inefficiency, government might find it
optimal to tax the individuals who derive least utility from working out of the
labor market, while using the additional revenue to increase unemployment bene-
fits. Proposition 5.1 establishes that, under fixed skill formation, such tax reform
improves efficiency as well as equity. The efficiency improvement, originating from
the reallocation of jobs, is in stark contrast to public-finance orthodoxy which
predicts a trade-off between equity and efficiency as lower labor supply erodes the
tax base. In rationed labor markets this orthodoxy is invalid as the tax base is
determined by labor demand, which is smaller than labor supply.
I argue that the assumption of fixed skill formation might be appropriate for the
short run, but less so for the long run. Relaxing this assumption, Proposition 5.2
establishes that the reform enhances both equity and efficiency if it leads to higher
skilled labor supply. This holds true if rationing is relatively efficient in the sense
that it is not concentrated on the unskilled workers that are relatively indifferent
between skilled and unskilled work. I moreover show that the policy implication
– government should raise taxes and unemployment benefits in response to higher
unemployment – holds a fortiori if a binding wage floor is endogenously determined
by a labor union. Such an unemployment-sensitive policy incentivizes a union to
moderate its wage claims as it can rationally expect higher taxation in retaliation
to higher wage demands. Finally, I show that the incidence of labor taxes for
employer and employee are wildly different in the presence of labor rationing –
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again in stark contrast to public-finance orthodoxy. Higher employee taxes improve
efficiency by reducing involuntary unemployment, whereas higher employer taxes
increase involuntary unemployment.
These results have implications for government policies beyond optimal taxa-
tion. Naturally, if rationing is optimally removed by appropriately setting taxes,
government-imposed rationing arising from a binding minimum wage can never be
optimal. Government can use the same information required to enforce a mini-
mum wage to set taxes and transfers in such a way that the minimum wage is no
longer binding, thereby removing the inefficiency of rationing while redistributing
income from rich to poor. With efficient rationing, a minimum wage has the same
efficiency properties as the tax-transfer schedule but inferior distributional prop-
erties. When rationing is not efficient, the tax-transfer schedule strictly dominates
a minimum wage on both efficiency and distributional grounds.19
Policies that encourage participation are also ill-advised if the relevant labor
market is rationed. Normally, participation policies are justified by pointing out
that a positive income tax wedge distorts the participation decision. Encouraging
participation might lead to efficiency gains as it partially offsets this tax distortion.
However, if the relevant labor market segment is rationed, this argument has no
bite and higher participation will lead to an efficiency loss as more individuals
with relatively high costs of work begin competing with others for a fixed amount
of jobs. Hence, in determining the wisdom of participation policies it is crucial to
understand whether the additional labor supply can add to aggregate employment
or whether it merely increases unemployment among workers who derive more
utility from working.
The material point of this chapter is that the presence of involuntary unem-
ployment drastically alters the efficiency properties of taxation. Discouraging labor
supply, which would be inefficient in the case of full employment, turns out to be
efficient in the presence of involuntary unemployment. This can also be interpreted
in a cyclical sense. During times of high unemployment – for example due to a
negative productivity shock combined with downward wage rigidity – the welfare
costs of labor income taxation and unemployment benefits are relatively low. This
suggests the optimality of anticyclical labor taxation and unemployment benefits.
19Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013a, Chapter 4 of this Dissertation) determine how the desirability
of a minimum wage depends, among other things, on the rationing schedule and conclude, on
the basis of an empirically grounded calibration, that minimum wages are optimally decreased
in every OECD country under consideration except the United States.
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5.A Appendix
This Appendix contains the full derivation of condition (5.30). Taking differences
of equation (5.15) yields:
(5.39) ∆c∗u = −(∆tL −∆tU).
Taking differences of equation (5.21) and imposing ∆B = 0, yields:
(5.40) − nU∆tU = nL∆tL + ωH∆nH ,
where I defined ωH ≡ (tH − tU −∆tU) + (tL + ∆tL − tU −∆tU) as the tax wedge
on skilled labor supply. Combining these two equations by substituting for ∆tU
yields:
(5.41) ∆c∗u = −
(
1 +
nL
nU
)
∆tL − ωH
nU
∆nH .
Next, notice that I can write ∆G(c∗u) = g¯(c
∗
u, c
∗
u + ∆c
∗
u)∆c
∗
u. Substituting this,
along with ∆c∗u, into equation (5.26), I get:
(5.42) − g¯(c∗u, c∗u + ∆c∗u)∆c∗u =
∫ c∗u
c∗s
ucdG(c)− (1 + γ)∆nH .
Substituting for ∆c∗u by using equation (5.41) yields:
(5.43)
(
nU + nL
nU
)
∆tL =
∫ c∗u
c∗s
ucdG(c)
g¯(c∗u, c∗u + ∆c∗u)
−
(
1 + γ
g¯(c∗u, c∗u + ∆c∗u)
+
ωH
nU
)
∆nH .
Finally, using this equation to substitute for ∆tL in equation (5.29), and substi-
tuting for u¯ ≡ ∫ c∗u
c∗s
ucdG(c)/
∫ c∗u
c∗s
dG(c) and
∫ c∗u
c∗s
dG(c) = g¯(c∗s, c
∗
u)(c
∗
u − c∗s), yields:
β∆c∗s +
(
nU
nU + nL
)(
1 + γ
g¯(c∗u, c∗u + ∆c∗u)
+
ωH
nU
)
∆nH =(5.44)
(c∗u − c∗s)
(
g¯(c∗s, c
∗
u)
g¯(c∗u, c∗u + ∆c∗u)
(
nU
nU + nL
)
u¯− uc∗s
)
.
Imposing that ∆c∗s > 0, and, by implication, ∆nH > 0, yields inequality (5.30).
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Postscript: of triangles, gaps,
heaps
The research exhibited in this Dissertation allows us to answer one of the defining
questions of the scientific discipline of economics, if not of science itself: How many
Harberger triangles does it take to fill one Okun gap?1 The first step towards
answering this question came from James Tobin, who in 1977 formulated what
is now generally known as the Tobin Conjecture: ‘It takes a heap of Harberger
Triangles to fill an Okun gap’ (Tobin, 1977, p.468). However, far from providing
a definitive answer to the Question, the Tobin Conjecture only generated more
questions and confusion. Did Tobin provide sufficient argumentation to back up
his Conjecture? Could it be proven? What constitutes a heap? Especially this last
question sparked heated debates, which rage on to this day. Stephen Williamson,
for example, evidently believes that heap = 1, as he states that
[i]t takes a heap of Harberger triangles to fill a heap of Harberger
triangles. ... The inefficiencies that arise in New Keynesian models
are indeed identical to the ones which would be generated by a set of
good-specific taxes. ... If I argue that Keynesian sticky wage/price
distortions are large, and that tax distortions are small, that’s a con-
tradiction.2
According to Williamson, there is no difference between a triangle and a gap,
which, if the Tobin Conjecture holds, necessarily implies that heap = 1. Paul
Krugman, on the other hand, seems convinced that heap = lot > 1 when he states
that:
Macro Trumps Micro. Or, as the late James Tobin used to say, it
takes a lot of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap. ... [I]t’s a more
1I shall henceforth refer to this question as ‘the Question.’
2Stephen Williamson. Gaps and Triangles. From his weblog, New Monetarist Economics, 12
September 2012.
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general observation that even bad microeconomic policies, which lead
to substantial distortions in the use of resources, have a hard time doing
remotely as much damage as a severe economic slump, which doesn’t
misallocate resources – it simply wastes them.3
In an ultimate attempt to bring the two rival camps closer together, N. Gregory
Mankiw calls for more rigorous research on the matter to enable us to quantita-
tively determine the exact value of heap more precisely:
That [i.e., the Tobin Conjecture] is a great slogan for the Keynesian
team. But I agree ... that it would be better to go beyond quips and
try to quantify the issue with real data and real models.4
Still, even this lucent voice of reason is seduced to speculation on the value of heap
when he states, not without a hint of drama, that
Harburger [sic] triangles loom larger now than they did in Tobin’s day.5
Figure 5.1 gives a visual representation of the answer that my Dissertation pro-
vides to the Question. To determine the value of heap, we first need to determine
triangle and gap. I define the Harberger triangle as the welfare loss associated
with reducing employment through increased distortionary taxation. In the figure,
this welfare loss is given by the red triangle of area IV. I define the Okun gap as
the welfare loss associated with reducing employment through direct wage controls,
causing involuntary unemployment. Or, equivalently, the welfare loss associated
with a reduction of employment caused by a combination of a negative produc-
tivity shock and downward rigid wages. The size of the Okun gap, then, depends
on the rationing schedule. If rationing is efficient, the Okun gap is simply equal
to the Harberger triangle given by area IV. However, under inefficient rationing,
the Okun gap equals the Harberger triangle plus part of area II. The reason is
that under inefficient rationing the employment reduction due to wage controls is
partly carried by workers who derive relatively much utility from working. In case
of an employment reduction through taxation, on the other hand, only those who
least value their job will opt out of the labor market.
This gives us a first rough answer to the Question: it takes at least one Har-
berger triangle to fill an Okun gap, and potentially more than one, the exact
3Paul Krugman. Macro Trumps Micro. From his weblog, The Conscience of a Liberal, 12
September 2012.
4N. Gregory Mankiw. Triangles vs Gaps. From his weblog, Greg Mankiw’s Blog, 13 January
2012.
5Ibid.
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amount crucially depending on the particular rationing schedule. The quarrel
between Williamson and Krugman, rather than being a matter of fundamental
discord, can therefore be reduced to a disagreement about which rationing sched-
ule is most plausible. Williamson, by stating that heap = 1, implicitly believes
that the rationing schedule is efficient. Krugman, by stating that heap = lot > 1,
implicitly believes rationing to be inefficient. Indeed, as I mention multiple times
in my Dissertation, there is little reason to suspect rationing is anywhere near
efficient. In that sense, Krugman seems to have a stronger case than Williamson’s.
It is possible to be more precise. Notice that preexisting distortions are not
present in Figure 5.1.6 This would imply that, for only a marginal decline of
employment, an infinite number of Harberger triangles fit in one Okun gap. After
all, the marginal dead-weight loss of taxation is nil in an undistorted market.
To make matters more interesting, I consider the relative sizes of triangles and
gaps associated with a reduction of employment, over and above any preexisting
distortions in the economy. For this, consider Figure P.1, in which LD depicts
labor demand, LS0 initial pre-tax labor supply (i.e., labor supply as function of
the net wage), and LS1 post-tax labor supply (i.e., labor supply as function of the
gross wage). The red triangle represents the preexisting distortion in this economy,
caused by a tax rate t on labor income of, in this case, fifty percent.
For simplicity, let us further focus on a marginal reduction of employment.
First consider the Harberger triangle. An employment reduction due to increased
taxation causes more voluntary unemployment. That is, people with the lowest
utility surplus from work decide to exit the labor market. These people are repre-
sented by the position eff on the horizontal axis of Figure P.1. Their utility is not
directly affected by the employment reduction as they are anyway indifferent be-
tween participation and non-participation. The welfare loss therefore only consists
of tax-revenue losses, illustrated by the vertical red line at position eff, equaling
tw. Now consider the Okun gap, which is the welfare loss associated with invol-
untary unemployment. Again, government loses tax revenue due to the reduction
of employment, equaling tw. On top of that, the newly involuntarily unemployed
might suffer a direct utility loss, the size of which depends on the rationing sched-
ule. At one extreme, if the newly unemployed are represented by the position eff
on the horizontal axis, rationing is efficient and there are no additional welfare
losses. In that case, the Okun gap equals the Harberger triangle. At the other
6I furthermore ignored the possibility that unemployment might cause substitution towards
different tax bases, e.g., due to skill formation as in Chapter 3-5 in my Dissertation. Such
substitution might lead to both smaller triangles and gaps.
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Figure P.1: Marginal Harberger triangle and Okun gap
extreme, if the newly unemployed people are represented by the origin of figure
P.1, they suffer utility losses equal to (1− t)w. In that case, the Okun gap simply
equals w and it takes w/tw = 2 Harberger triangles to fill the Okun gap.
Naturally, this conclusion depends on the implicit assumption that the labor
supply curve goes through the origin, such that the maximum utility loss of an
unemployed worker equals his net wage.7 Given this assumption, we can determine
an upper and a lower bound for the amount of Harberger triangles that fit into
one Okun gap. As a lower bound, we know that it takes at least one Harberger
triangle to fill an Okun gap. As an upper bound, we know that it takes at most
1/t Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap. As the theoretical or empirical case
for either the upper or the lower bound is not very strong, the true answer to the
Question is likely to be found somewhere in between these two extremes. Another
special case, which might garner more intuitive appeal than either extreme, is
the case of uniform rationing – in which every worker faces the same probability
of unemployment. Under uniform rationing, and with the additional assumption
of a linear labor supply curve, the direct utility losses of the unemployed are
7It is easy to provide reasons why this might not be a good assumption, but it is less straight-
forward to evaluate whether the maximum utility losses should be larger or smaller than the
net wage. Valuable leisure suggests the utility losses should be less than the net wage; the ob-
servation of charity workers and the idea that employment might be intrinsically valuable – or
unemployment intrinsically hurtful – to people suggests the opposite.
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Table P.1: How many Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap? (I)
Tax rate Upper bound Uniform rationing Lower bound
0.00 ∞ ∞ 1.0
0.10 10.0 5.5 1.0
0.20 5.0 3.0 1.0
0.30 3.3 2.2 1.0
0.40 2.5 1.8 1.0
0.50 2.0 1.5 1.0
0.60 1.7 1.3 1.0
0.70 1.4 1.2 1.0
0.80 1.3 1.1 1.0
0.90 1.1 1.1 1.0
The upper-bound and uniform-rationing values are conditional on the
assumption that the labor supply curve goes through the origin, and
on the assumption that the reduction in employment does not enlarge
other tax bases (e.g., due to skill formation). The uniform-rationing
values are conditional on the assumption that the labor supply curve is
linear. Upper-bound values are given by 1/t, uniform-rationing values
by (1+t)/2t, lower-bound values by 1.
represented by the vertical red line at position unif on the horizontal axis of
Figure P.1.8 The direct utility losses of uniform rationing equal half of the utility
losses of upper-bound inefficient rationing: (1 − t)w/2. This yields an Okun gap
equal to tw + (1 − t)w/2. The number of Harberger triangles that fit into this
Okun gap, with a tax rate of fifty percent, thus equals (1 + t)/2t = 1.5.
More generally, Table P.1 provides the number of Harberger triangles it takes to
fill an Okun gap for varying levels of distortionary taxation. It is striking to see that
both the upper-bound and uniform-rationing values relatively quickly converge to
values below 2. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) has provided data, for most OECD countries, on the participation tax
rate faced by low-income workers earning fifty percent of the average wage – repre-
senting a part of the working population that is most vulnerable to unemployment
(OECD, 2011b). These participation tax rates are determined on the basis of an
individual moving from either long-term or short-term unemployment to full-time
work. Both long- and short-term measures of t are given in Table P.2 for a variety
of countries. Along with the tax rates, the table provides the upper-bound (UB)
and uniform-rationing (UR) values of the number of Harberger triangles required
to fill an Okun gap.
8Both the Harberger triangle and the Okun gap would be larger with convex supply curves,
e.g., in the case of a constant labor supply elasticity.
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Table P.2: How many Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap? (II)
Long-term tax rates Short-term tax rates
Country t UB UR t UB UR
Greece 0.04 23.8 12.4 0.92 1.1 1.0
Italy 0.08 11.8 6.4 0.75 1.3 1.2
Slovak Republic 0.31 3.3 2.1 0.41 2.5 1.7
United States 0.31 3.2 2.1 0.58 1.7 1.4
Israel 0.41 2.5 1.7 0.74 1.4 1.2
Portugal 0.44 2.3 1.6 0.81 1.2 1.1
Spain 0.44 2.3 1.6 0.74 1.4 1.2
Estonia 0.46 2.2 1.6 0.62 1.6 1.3
Hungary 0.47 2.1 1.6 0.86 1.2 1.1
Australia 0.49 2.0 1.5 0.49 2.0 1.5
Korea 0.52 1.9 1.5 0.30 3.3 2.1
France 0.53 1.9 1.4 0.76 1.3 1.2
Poland 0.53 1.9 1.4 0.79 1.3 1.1
Canada 0.54 1.8 1.4 0.73 1.4 1.2
Ireland 0.57 1.7 1.4 0.64 1.6 1.3
New Zealand 0.62 1.6 1.3 0.62 1.6 1.3
Belgium 0.64 1.6 1.3 0.77 1.3 1.1
United Kingdom 0.64 1.6 1.3 0.65 1.5 1.3
Finland 0.65 1.5 1.3 0.82 1.2 1.1
Austria 0.66 1.5 1.3 0.78 1.3 1.1
Czech Republic 0.66 1.5 1.3 0.82 1.2 1.1
Sweden 0.68 1.5 1.2 0.88 1.1 1.1
Norway 0.70 1.4 1.2 0.86 1.2 1.1
Luxembourg 0.70 1.4 1.2 0.89 1.1 1.1
Germany 0.72 1.4 1.2 0.82 1.2 1.1
Iceland 0.73 1.4 1.2 0.84 1.2 1.1
Japan 0.75 1.3 1.2 0.67 1.5 1.2
Netherlands 0.76 1.3 1.2 0.82 1.2 1.1
Slovenia 0.79 1.3 1.1 0.91 1.1 1.0
Chile 0.80 1.2 1.1 0.93 1.1 1.0
Denmark 0.96 1.0 1.0 0.94 1.1 1.0
t gives the 2009 participation tax rate associated with moving from long-
or short-term unemployment to full-time work at fifty percent of the av-
erage wage. Besides labor-income related taxation, it incorporates social,
housing, and family benefits, and, for the short-term measure, unem-
ployment benefits. Data shown are the averages of the participation tax
rate for four demographic groups: single parent, two children; one-earner
married couple, two children, spouse inactive; single; two-earner mar-
ried couple, two children, spouse earning 67 percent of the average wage.
UB and UR give the upper-bound and uniform-rationing values of the
required number of Harberger triangles to fill one Okun gap.
Source: OECD (2011b) and author’s calculations, available on request.
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Two things stand out from Table P.2. First, and surprisingly, in the short
run an Okun gap consists primarily of the Harberger triangle. The reason for
this, as can be seen in the table, is that short-term participation tax rates are
relatively large. This implies that most of the losses of moving from employment
to unemployment are taken by the government, which sees its tax revenues dwindle.
Analogous to this, the unemployed are to a large extent insured against the income
losses from short-term unemployment, and consequently suffer little direct utility
losses from a temporary employment reduction. Hence, even the upper-bound
value of the number of Harberger triangles it takes to fill an Okun gap is below 2
for almost any country. Second, things are decidedly different when it comes to
long-term unemployment. Participation tax rates are often much lower in the long
run when the unemployed are no longer entitled to unemployment benefits. This
implies that a potentially large part of the social losses associated with long-term
unemployment is carried by the unemployed themselves, in the form of direct utility
losses, rather than by the government. This observation becomes particularly
worrisome when we observe, from Table P.2, that this holds especially for South-
European countries – Greece and Italy, and to a lesser extent Spain and Portugal
– that are currently in a deep economic crisis, with high unemployment rates that
might persist for a long time. Thus, for the countries that currently suffer most
from high unemployment, it may take many Harberger triangles to fill their Okun
gap.
This brings us back to the Tobin Conjecture and the speculative remarks by
Williamson, Krugman, and Mankiw. On the basis of my Dissertation, which
introduced the concept of a rationing schedule, we can conclude that an answer
to the Question heavily depends on the rationing schedule and on preexisting
distortions. In the short run, Williamson’s assertion, that the Okun gap is a
Harberger triangle is approximately correct. However, for longer-lasting spells of
unemployment, which cause the unemployed to lose their unemployment benefits,
direct utility losses might take up a large part of the social losses associated with
unemployment. In that case, Krugman might be very right by stating that during
severe economic slumps it takes a lot of Harberger triangles to fit an Okun gap.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
(summary in Dutch)
In deze samenvatting van het proefschrift “Essays over optimaal overheidsbeleid”
concentreer ik me op twee verschillende aspecten. Allereerst waag ik een poging om
in een aantal pagina’s aan te geven hoe het proefschrift aansluit op de orthodoxie
van publieke economie. Hierbij ontkom ik er niet aan een korte beschouwing te
geven van deze academische discipline, om op die manier het contrast tussen het
proefschrift en de rest van de relevante literatuur helder weer te kunnen geven. In
het tweede deel van de samenvatting richt ik me op de vraag wat het proefschrift
ons leert over optimaal overheidsbeleid. Per hoofdstuk bespreek ik de concrete
beleidsimplicaties die uit mijn onderzoek voortvloeien.
Relatie tot de orthodoxie van publieke economie
Publieke economie
Zoals de titel doet vermoeden, probeert het proefschrift een bijdrage te leveren aan
de discussie over wat goed overheidsbeleid behelst. Deze discussie staat centraal
binnen de academische discipline van de publieke economie. Publieke economie
wordt doorgaans gezien als een van vele academische subdisciplines van economie
en wordt ook op die manier gedoceerd aan universiteiten. De onderliggende vraag-
stelling van publieke economie verschilt echter radicaal met die van economie. Het
doel van economie kan omschreven worden als de verklaring van menselijk gedrag,
terwijl publieke economie zich de bepaling van optimaal overheidsbeleid ten doel
heeft gesteld. De enorme ambitie van dit doel blijkt uit zijn multidisciplinaire
karakter. Voordat iets zinnigs kan worden gezegd over wat optimaal overheidsbe-
leid inhoudt, moet er op zijn allerminst uitsluitsel zijn over wat een overheid zou
moeten nastreven, over het effect van overheidsbeleid op menselijk gedrag, en over
de nawerking van dit gedrag op het welzijn van mensen. In andere woorden, bij
Nederlandse samenvatting
de bepaling van optimaal overheidsbeleid baseert de publieke econoom zich onont-
koombaar op inzichten uit de politieke filosofie, de economie, en de psychologie van
het welzijn. Hieronder schets ik in het kort welke van deze inzichten deel uitmaken
van de orthodoxie van publieke economie, en in hoeverre dit proefschrift daarin
meegaat of van afwijkt.
Politieke filosofie of wat behoort de overheid na te streven?
Om te bepalen wat optimaal overheidsbeleid inhoudt, moet eerst een antwoord
worden geformuleerd op de vraag wat een overheid zou moeten nastreven. Deze
vraag speelt een prominente rol binnen politieke filosofie en er bestaat een grote
verscheidenheid aan theoriee¨n die hier een antwoord op pogen te geven. Zo zijn
er theoriee¨n die stellen dat overheidsbeleid gericht hoort te zijn op zogenaamde
‘primaire goederen’ (cf. Rawls, 1971), ‘capabilities’ (cf. Sen, 1992), minimale in-
terventie (cf. Nozick, 1974), of op de consequenties van een beperkt aantal aan-
geboren ongelijkheden voor welke individuen zelf niet verantwoordelijk gehouden
mogen worden (cf. Dworkin, 2000). Verreweg de meest invloedrijke theorie, binnen
publieke economie althans, staat bekend als welfarisme (cf. Kaplow and Shavell,
2002). Welfarisme stelt dat het uiteindelijke doel van overheidsbeleid de maxima-
lisatie van het welzijn van individuen behoort te zijn.1
Gezien het aantal concurrerende theoriee¨n over het ‘juiste’ doel van overheids-
optreden is welfarisme niet geheel onomstreden, maar er zijn een aantal belangrijke
argumenten aan te dragen ter verdediging ervan. Zo kan beredeneerd worden dat
dit het doel is dat iemand zou kiezen in de hypothetische situatie waarbij hij onwe-
tend is over welk leven hij precies zal leiden. Ook kan aangetoond worden dat het,
in tegenstelling tot eerder genoemde theoriee¨n, nooit kan leiden tot regel-fetisjisme,
waarbij een situatie waarin iedereen slechter af is wordt geprefereerd omdat het
voldoet aan het door de theorie gestelde doel. Onder andere vanwege deze rede-
nen, neem ik het door welfarisme gestelde doel van overheidsoptreden over in mijn
proefschrift: bij de bepaling van optimaal overheidsoptreden neem ik zodoende
aan dat de overheid een som van individueel welzijn behoort te maximaliseren.2
1Welfarisme impliceert niet dat het doel per se een ongewogen som van welzijn behoort te zijn,
maar staat bijvoorbeeld toe dat het welzijn van mensen die relatief slecht af zijn zwaarder telt
dan het welzijn van mensen die relatief goed af zijn. Hierdoor is het algemener dan utilitarisme
(cf. Bentham, 1907; Mill, 1863; Sidgwick, 1874).
2Dit neemt niet weg dat er geen problemen zijn met welfarisme. Een van de belangrijkste
bezwaren is de observatie dat een fenomeen als racisme te rechtvaardigen is aan de hand van
welfarisme als hieraan maar genoeg mensen welzijn ontlenen. Aangezien ik in mijn proefschrift
aanneem dat het welzijn van een individu onafhankelijk is van andere individuen zal een dergelijke
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Een antwoord op de vraag wat een overheid na zou moeten streven is nog altijd ver
verwijderd van een antwoord op wat optimaal overheidsbeleid is. Eerst moet be-
paald worden in welke mate de beleidsinstrumenten van een overheid bijdragen aan
het doel van hoger individueel welzijn. De gedragseffecten van overheidsoptreden
zijn hierbij van cruciaal belang. Stel dat herverdeling van werkenden naar werk-
lozen beschouwd kan worden als welzijnsverhogend. Dit zegt nog weinig over de
wenselijkheid van hogere werkloosheidsuitkeringen. Hoewel deze aan de ene kant
meer welzijn op zullen leveren vanwege de herverdeling, verstoort het de beslis-
sing van werklozen om te zoeken naar een nieuwe baan. Een dergelijke verstoring
zorgt voor lagere werkgelegenheid en daarmee voor lagere belastingopbrengsten.
Vanwege dit gedragseffect kan de overheid, voor iedere euro die het door middel
van belastingen ophaalt bij de werkenden, minder dan een euro herverdelen naar
werklozen. Een soortgelijke trade-off karakteriseert vrijwel ieder beleidsinstru-
ment. Een minimumloon, bijvoorbeeld, herverdeelt inkomen van bedrijven naar
laaggeschoolden. Hoewel dit an sich wellicht als welzijnsverhoging kan worden
gezien, leidt het tot een gedragseffect waarbij bedrijven, om hun winstmarges op
peil te houden, minder laaggeschoolden aan zullen nemen.
De identificatie en kwantificatie van deze trade-offs is iets waar economie bij
uitstek voor is geschikt. Economie is immers de wetenschap die als taak heeft
om menselijk gedrag te verklaren en voorspellen. Voor de identificatie van ge-
dragseffecten maken economen intensief gebruik van economische modellen. Deze
modellen zijn bijzonder gestileerde weergaven van de werkelijkheid, waarbij alle
niet-essentie¨le elementen buiten beschouwing worden gelaten. Deze aanpak wordt
veelal bekritiseerd door niet-economen, om zowel slechte als goede redenen. Aan
de ene kant is een hoge mate van abstractie van essentieel belang om iets zinnigs te
kunnen zeggen over een extreem complexe werkelijkheid. Aan de andere kant moet
de econoom zijn beslissingen om te abstraheren van specifieke elementen van de
werkelijkheid altijd kunnen verdedigen. Een belangrijke abstractie, die behoort tot
de orthodoxie van publieke economie en een prominente rol speelt in mijn proef-
schrift, is dat prijzen en loonvoeten flexibel zijn. Onder deze aanname zullen lonen
en prijzen zich altijd aanpassen om te garanderen dat vraag en aanbod aan elkaar
gelijk zijn. Dit impliceert ook dat onvrijwillige werkloosheid niet kan bestaan.
laakbare situatie niet voor kunnen komen. Inderdaad ben ik van mening dat overheidsbeleid
gericht moet zijn op zogenaamde ‘witgewassen’ welzijn, dat wil zeggen, het gedeelte van welzijn
dat onafhankelijk is van andere individuen (cf. Harsanyi, 1982).
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Psychologie van het welzijn
Tot slot, zelfs wanneer we welfarisme accepteren en de economische wetenschap
ons perfect weet te informeren over de precieze gedragseffecten van overheidsbe-
leid, weten we nog altijd niet wat optimaal overheidsbeleid behelst. Dit vereist
namelijk inzicht in hoe beleid, en haar gedragseffecten, het welzijn van mensen
be¨ınvloeden. De verklaring van mentale processen, waar welzijn onder valt, maakt
deel uit van het vakgebied van de psychologie. De consequente toepassing van
welfarisme vereist daarom een gedegen kennis van de psychologie van het wel-
zijn. Een elegante truc om hier onderuit te komen, een truc die routineus door de
orthodoxie van publieke economie wordt gehanteerd, is de aanname dat mensen
met hun gedrag altijd hun eigen welzijn maximaliseren. Onder die aanname zal
niemand ‘verkeerd’ handelen en hoeven mensen niet ‘bijgestuurd’ te worden door
de overheid. Bovendien zorgt deze aanname ervoor dat economen op basis van
geobserveerd gedrag de impact van overheidsbeleid op het welzijn van mensen kan
bepalen, zonder kennis van mentale processen.
Het proefschrift
Met dit proefschrift probeer ik een eigen bijdrage te leveren aan publieke econo-
mie. Hierbij wijk ik op een aantal punten expliciet af van de orthodoxie. Aller-
eerst verwerp ik de aanname dat menselijk gedrag altijd en overal een kwestie van
welzijnsmaximalisatie is. Hierbij baseer ik me op inzichten uit de psychologie, ge-
dragseconomie, en neurowetenschappen. Los van deze inzichten, wijst introspectie
erop dat veel menselijk gedrag voortkomt uit factoren die weinig te doen hebben
met de maximalisatie van welzijn. Als we niet langer aannemen dat gedrag geba-
seerd is op welzijnsmaximalisatie kan het voorkomen dat individuen zich niet in
hun private welzijnsoptimum bevinden. Dit cree¨ert een nieuwe rol voor overheids-
beleid, en wel het ‘corrigeren’ van individueel gedrag. In het eerste inhoudelijke
hoofdstuk van het proefschrift, hoofdstuk 2, bepaal ik de consequenties hiervan
voor de optimale inkomstenbelasting.
Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 concentreren zich op het minimumloon als beleidsinstru-
ment. Een belangrijk verschil met eerdere literatuur is dat ik expliciet de onder-
wijskeuzen van individuen modelleer, een beslissing waar andere studies over het
minimumloon veelal van abstraheren. Het effect van een minimumloon op deze
keuze is theoretisch evenwel ambigu: hogere lonen voor laaggeschoolden geven
prikkels om minder te investeren in onderwijs, maar hogere werkloosheid onder
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laaggeschoolden geeft juist prikkels om meer te investeren. In hoofdstuk 3 analy-
seer ik hoe het effect van een minimumloon op onderwijskeuzes de wenselijkheid
van een minimumloon, ten opzichte van inkomstenbelastingen, be¨ınvloedt.
Hoofdstuk 4 draagt bij aan de literatuur over het minimumloon door een an-
dere veel gemaakte theoretische aanname te verwerpen. Deze aanname heeft be-
trekking op de verdeling van de door het minimumloon gecree¨erde werkloosheid
over de laagopgeleide bevolking. Eerdere literatuur neemt veelal aan dat ont-
slagen werknemers degenen zijn die het minste welzijn ontlenen van hun baan
(zogenaamde ‘efficie¨nte arbeidsrantsoenering’), of, zoals in hoofdstuk 3, dat iedere
laagopgeleide werknemer een even grote kans op werkloosheid heeft (zogenaamde
‘uniforme arbeidsrantsoenering’). De theoretische of empirische rechtvaardiging
voor deze aannamen is echter flinterdun. In hoofdstuk 4 maak ik geen specifieke
aanname over de verdeling van werkloosheid, maar analyseer ik hoe de wenselijk-
heid van het minimumloon afhangt van deze verdeling. Bovendien laat ik zien hoe
deze wenselijkheid empirisch kan worden getest zonder aannamen over de verdeling
van werkloosheid.
In hoofdstuk 5 analyseer ik tot slot de consequenties van een inflexibele loon-
vloer voor optimale belastingen en arbeidsparticipatiebeleid. Net als in de vorige
twee hoofdstukken wijk ik hiermee af van de orthodoxe aanname dat lonen zich
perfect aanpassen om vraag en aanbod gelijk te stellen. De analyse van dit hoofd-
stuk is bijvoorbeeld relevant in arbeidsmarkten die gedomineerd worden door vak-
bonden, wier looneisen niet gericht zijn op het gelijkstellen van vraag en aanbod.
Een andere situatie waarin de analyse van bijzondere relevantie is, is in tijden van
economische recessie. Het is overduidelijk dat onvrijwillige werkloosheid tijdens
een recessie over het algemeen relatief hoog is, wat impliceert dat de orthodoxe
aanname van flexibele lonen in een dergelijke situatie sterk aan relevantie inboet.
Bevindingen over optimaal overheidsbeleid
Optimale belastingen en welzijn (hoofdstuk 2)
In hoofdstuk 2 van mijn proefschrift stap ik af van de standaardaanname dat
individuen, bij het maken van beslissingen, altijd hun eigen welzijn maximaliseren.
Net als in de rest van de economische literatuur, ga ik er nog altijd vanuit dat
menselijk gedrag beschreven kan worden als een maximalisatie van zogenaamd
‘nut.’ Maar ik verwerp de aanname dat het nut van een persoon identiek is aan
zijn welzijn – dat wat zijn leven uiteindelijk waardevol maakt. Dit impliceert dat
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hij ‘fouten’ kan maken in zijn gedrag door iets anders dan zijn eigen welzijn na te
streven.
Vervolgens bepaal ik hoe dit de optimale belastingstructuur be¨ınvloedt. Een
belastingvoet is alleen optimaal als de netto sociale baten van een kleine verhoging
van de belasting gelijk zijn aan nul. Immers, als de netto sociale baten strikt
positief (negatief) zouden zijn, loont het voor de overheid om de belastingvoet te
verhogen (verlagen). De sociale baten bestaan uit wat de overheid kan doen met de
belastingopbrengst: investeren in publieke goederen bijvoorbeeld, of herverdelen
naar mensen met lage inkomens. De sociale kosten bestaan uit een lager inkomen
van de belastingbetaler, en een verstoring van individueel gedrag.
Deze verstoring van individueel gedrag is cruciaal voor mijn onderzoek. Een
kleine verhoging van de belasting op arbeidsinkomen zorgt ervoor dat werknemers
minder werken. Deze afname in arbeidsaanbod leidt op zijn beurt tot een lagere
belastingopbrengst, wat een sociale kostenpost is. Als individuen hun eigen welzijn
maximaliseren, leidt een dergelijke afname van arbeidsaanbod evenwel niet tot een
verandering van individueel welzijn. De reden hiervoor is dat welzijnsmaximalisatie
van het individu impliceert dat een kleine verandering in zijn gedrag geen invloed
kan hebben op zijn welzijn. Dit verandert wanneer ik de aanname van individuele
welzijnsmaximalisatie verwerp. In dat geval heeft een afname van arbeidsaanbod
ook een direct effect op het welzijn van het individu. Het leidt tot een hoger
welzijn als werknemers oorspronkelijk harder werkten dan goed voor hen is; het
leidt tot een lager welzijn als werknemers oorspronkelijk minder hard werkten dan
goed voor hen is.
Dit cree¨ert een extra reden voor het gebruik van verstorende belastingen. Een
situatie waarin werknemers ‘te veel’ werken pleit voor een hogere marginale be-
lastingvoet om deze werknemers te prikkelen minder hard te werken. Een situatie
waarin werknemers ‘te weinig’ werken pleit daarentegen voor een lagere optimale
belastingvoet om deze werknemers te prikkelen harder te werken. Dezelfde logica
gaat op voor belastingen of subsidies op onderwijs of specifieke goederen. Als
mensen uit eigen beweging minder onderwijs genieten dan welzijnsmaximalisatie
impliceert, dan is dit een reden voor hogere subsidies op onderwijs.
De vraag of mensen daadwerkelijk ‘te veel’ of ‘te weinig’ werken is een empi-
rische kwestie. Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden heb ik een maatstaf van
welzijn nodig. In mijn onderzoek gebruik ik hiervoor het antwoord, op een schaal
van 1 tot 7, op de vraag: “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life
overall?”. Dankzij de British Household Panel Survey beschik ik over jaarlijkse
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antwoorden op deze vraag van ongeveer 28,000 Britse individuen, gevolgd over 12
jaar. Daarnaast beschik ik over een groot aantal andere variabelen, zoals netto
inkomen en het aantal gewerkte uren per week. Op basis van deze data bepaal
ik hoe het welzijn van individuen afhangt van zowel hun netto inkomen als het
aantal gewerkte uren, wat me in staat stelt om per individu het optimale aantal
arbeidsuren te berekenen. Na vergelijking met het werkelijke aantal gewerkte uren
concludeer ik of een individu te veel of te weinig werkt.
De resultaten van deze empirische analyse leiden mij tot de conclusie dat Britse
werknemers met relatief lage inkomens gemiddeld te weinig werken. Zij zouden
hun welzijn kunnen verhogen door wekelijks meer uren te werken. Voor werkne-
mers met hoge inkomens geldt het tegenovergestelde: deze werknemers stoppen
wekelijks te veel uren in hun baan, waarmee ze hun eigen welzijn schaden. De
beleidsimplicatie die hieruit volgt is dat de Britse overheid lagere marginale belas-
tingtarieven voor lage inkomens, en hogere marginale belastingtarieven voor hoge
inkomens zou moeten implementeren. Een dergelijke belastinghervorming geeft
prikkels aan werknemers met lage inkomens om meer te werken, en aan werkne-
mers met hoge inkomens om minder te werken. Op die manier corrigeert deze
hervorming deels het welzijnssuboptimale gedrag van Britse werknemers.
Optimale minimumlonen en scholing (hoofdstuk 3)
Hoofdstuk 3 concentreert zich op de welvaartseffecten van een minimumloon. Hier-
bij wijkt het af van het merendeel van de literatuur over minimumlonen door de
scholingsbeslissingen van individuen expliciet te modelleren. Deze innovatie is in-
gegeven door het feit dat het effect van een minimumloon op scholing a priori
ambigu is. Aan de ene kant leidt een minimumloon tot een hoger loon voor laag-
geschoolden, wat een prikkel geeft om minder te investeren in scholing. Aan de
andere kant leidt een minimumloon tot hogere werkloosheid onder laaggeschoolden
omdat het minder aantrekkelijk wordt hen aan te nemen. Deze hogere werkloosheid
onder laaggeschoolden geeft een prikkel om juist meer te investeren in scholing.
We3 laten allereerst zien dat het netto effect op scholing in belangrijke mate
afhangt van hoe eenvoudig bedrijven hooggeschoolden kunnen substitueren voor
laaggeschoolden. Hoe eenvoudiger dit is, hoe meer een bedrijf haar productie-
proces zal omschakelen naar hooggeschoolden wanneer een hoger minimumloon
laaggeschoolden duurder maakt. De substitutie-elasticiteit tussen hoog- en laag-
geschoolden – de procentuele verandering in de verhouding tussen hooggeschoolde
3Dit hoofdstuk is gezamenlijk werk met Bas Jacobs.
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en laaggeschoolde werkgelegenheid, als reactie op een procentuele verandering in
de verhouding tussen de hooggeschoolde en laaggeschoolde loonvoet – blijkt hier-
bij van groot belang. Als deze elasticiteit kleiner is dan 1, dan leidt een hoger
minimumloon tot relatief weinig werkloosheid en daardoor tot minder scholing.
Is deze elasticiteit groter dan 1, dan leidt een minimumloon tot dusdanig veel
werkloosheid onder laaggeschoolden dat meer mensen besluiten zich om te scholen
tot hooggeschoolde werknemer. Aangezien empirische schattingen van deze elas-
ticiteit doorgaans hoger zijn dan 1, maakt mijn model het aannemelijk dat een
minimumloon een positief scholingseffect heeft.
Vervolgens bepalen we hoe de scholingsbeslissing de wenselijkheid van een mi-
nimumloon be¨ınvloedt. Hierbij concentreren we ons op het geval van perfecte
concurrentie op de arbeidsmarkt. Eerder studies hebben aangetoond dat een mi-
nimumloon economische doelmatigheid kan bevorderen in monopsonistische ar-
beidsmarkten. Onze bevindingen zijn conditioneel op de aanname dat er geen
sprake is van dergelijke monopsonie. In andere woorden, we concentreren ons
op de herverdelende rol van het minimumloon, niet op zijn rol ter correctie van
imperfecte concurrentie.
Als we belastingen buiten beschouwing laten, blijkt dat een bindend minimum-
loon twee verschillende effecten heeft op de sociale welvaart. Aan de ene kant leidt
het tot hogere lonen voor laaggeschoolden, welke bedrijven betalen door lagere lo-
nen te bieden aan hooggeschoolden. Dit behelst een positief welvaartseffect onder
de plausibele veronderstelling dat het inkomen van laaggeschoolden hoger wordt
gewaardeerd dan het inkomen van hooggeschoolden.4 Aan de andere kant zullen
bedrijven minder geneigd zijn om laaggeschoolden aan te nemen vanwege toege-
nomen loonkosten. Dit leidt tot hogere werkloosheid, wat een negatief effect heeft
op sociale welvaart, onder de veronderstelling dat onvrijwillig werklozen liever wel
een baan hebben. De wenselijkheid van een minimumloon is dus ambigu en hangt
af van het netto welvaartseffect van meer herverdeling en hogere werkloosheid.
De sociale kosten van een minimumloon nemen toe op het moment dat een
inkomstenbelasting wordt ge¨ıntroduceerd. Terwijl de baten nog steeds bestaan uit
eenzelfde herverdelingswinst, nemen de kosten van werkloosheid toe, aangezien een
toename in werkloosheid nu ook leidt tot verlies van belastingopbrengsten. Even-
goed kan een minimumloon de herverdeling via inkomstenbelasting complemente-
ren op het moment dat inkomstenbelasting niet perfect toegespitst kan worden op
4Het gebruikelijke argument stelt dat een euro aan consumptie een groter positief effect heeft
op het leven van een arm persoon dan op het leven van een rijk persoon.
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loonvoeten of scholingsniveau. De reden hiervoor is dat een minimumloon direct
het nettoloon van laaggeschoolden verhoogt en die van hooggeschoolden verlaagt.
Met belastingen is een dergelijke herverdeling alleen mogelijk als deze gecondi-
tioneerd kunnen worden op het scholingsniveau. Als de overheid inderdaad de
belastingtarieven af kan laten hangen van het scholingsniveau, kan ze een herver-
deling teweegbrengen die identiek is aan die van een minimumloonsverhoging door
het belastingtarief voor laaggeschoolden te verlagen en voor hooggeschoolden te
verhogen. In vergelijking met een dergelijke belastinghervorming, leidt een mini-
mumloonsverhoging echter nog altijd tot hogere arbeidskosten voor bedrijven, en
dus tot hogere werkloosheid. Deze werkloosheid leidt vervolgens tot meer scholing,
terwijl progressieve belasting juist tot een neerwaartse verstoring van de scholings-
beslissing leidt. De rol van het minimumloon bestaat in dit geval dus niet uit de
herverdeling van inkomen, maar uit het tegengaan van scholingsverstoringen, ver-
oorzaakt door een progressieve belastingstructuur. Een minimumloon is in dat
geval wenselijk als de sociale baten van meer scholing opwegen tegen de kosten
van hogere werkloosheid.
Optimale minimumlonen en verdeling van werkloosheid (hoofdstuk 4)
Hoofdstuk 4 bouwt voort op de resultaten van het voorgaande hoofdstuk, waarin
we concludeerden dat een bindend minimumloon wenselijk is als de sociale baten
van scholing groter zijn dan de sociale kosten van hogere werkloosheid. In hoofd-
stuk 4 laten we5 zien dat deze conclusie geldig is onder zeer algemene aannamen.
Zo nemen we algemene nutsfuncties aan en staan we toe dat individuen niet alleen
beslissen over het aantal uren werk dat ze verrichten en of ze hoog- of laaggeschoold
zijn, maar ook of ze participeren in de arbeidsmarkt of vrijwillig werkloos zijn. Een
cruciale generalisatie in dit model betreft het zogenoemde rantsoeneringsschema.
Dit schema is een theoretisch concept dat beschrijft hoe werkloosheid verdeeld
wordt onder laaggeschoolden. Eerdere literatuur neemt veelal aan dat deze rant-
soenering efficie¨nt is in de zin dat werkloosheid slechts laaggeschoolden treft die
weinig welzijn ontlenen van werk. Hoofdstuk 3 neemt daarentegen aan dat de
kans op werkloosheid gelijk is voor iedere laaggeschoolde. In hoofdstuk 4 stappen
we af van dergelijke specifieke aannamen, en bepalen we de wenselijkheid van een
minimumloon onder een algemeen rantsoeneringsschema. Dit is belangrijk om-
dat er geen sterke theoretische of empirische onderbouwingen bestaan voor e´e´n
specifiek schema, terwijl dit schema wel een cruciale factor blijkt te zijn voor de
5Ook dit hoofdstuk is gezamenlijk werk met Bas Jacobs.
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welvaartseffecten van een minimumloon.
Om te bepalen of een minimumloon wenselijk is in een dergelijke opzet, lei-
den we de gevolgen af van een zogenoemde netto-inkomensneutrale (NIN) mi-
nimumloonsverhoging. Als deel van deze hervorming verhoogt de overheid het
minimumloon, terwijl ze de inkomstenbelasting zo aanpast dat het netto inkomen
van werknemers constant blijft. De welvaartsgevolgen van een dergelijke NIN mi-
nimumloonsverhoging geven een duidelijk beeld van hoe een minimumloon zich
onderscheidt van een soortgelijke herverdeling via de inkomstenbelasting. Aan-
gezien het nettoloon van werknemers gelijk blijft, heeft de NIN hervorming geen
effect op het aantal uren dat werknemers werken. Omdat de opbrengsten van
arbeid constant blijven heeft de hervorming ook geen effect op de arbeidspartici-
patiebeslissing van individuen. De hervorming verhoogt echter wel de kosten voor
bedrijven om laaggeschoolden aan te nemen en leidt daarmee tot een lagere vraag
naar laaggeschoold arbeid. Onder gelijkblijvend aanbod en dalende vraag zal de
onvrijwillige werkloosheid onherroepelijk stijgen. Een hogere werkloosheid impli-
ceert op haar beurt echter een lagere verwachte opbrengst van laaggeschoold werk,
wat individuen een prikkel geeft om meer te investeren in scholing. De hervorming
leidt dus tot zowel meer werklozen als meer hooggeschoolden.
De reden dat het rantsoeneringsschema zo belangrijk is voor de welvaartseffec-
ten van een minimumloon is nu eenvoudig te begrijpen. Als werkloosheid voorna-
melijk plaats vindt onder laaggeschoolden die liever werkloos zijn dan investeren
in scholing, zal een minimumloon voornamelijk zorgen voor hogere werkloosheid,
zonder dat dit tot hogere scholing leidt. Als werkloosheid echter voornamelijk
plaats vindt onder laaggeschoolden die net zo lief hooggeschoold zijn, zal een mi-
nimumloon juist een groot positief effect hebben op scholing. In het hoofdstuk
leveren we het bewijs dat een minimumloon altijd optimaal ‘gemaakt’ kan wor-
den door de juiste aanname te maken omtrent de verdeling van werkloosheid. Op
dezelfde manier kan een minimumloon altijd suboptimaal gemaakt worden. Om
deze reden is de wenselijkheid van een minimumloon vanuit theoretisch opzicht
fundamenteel ambigu.
Om aan deze fundamentele ambigu¨ıteit te ontsnappen herschrijven we de con-
ditie voor de wenselijkheid van een minimumloon in termen van zogenaamde suffi-
cient statistics. Dit zijn empirisch te bepalen grootheden die de wenselijkheid van
een minimumloon weergeven zonder de noodzaak om diepere parameters uit het
model (zoals het rantsoeneringsschema) empirisch te identificeren. We laten zien
dat we genoeg hebben aan drie statistieken: de belastingopbrengsten van een extra
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hooggeschoolde, het verlies aan belastingopbrengsten vanwege een extra werkloze,
en een elasticiteit die weergeeft hoe sterk het aantal hooggeschoolden reageert
op werkloosheid.6 Data over belastingopbrengsten van scholing en werkloosheid
vinden we in publicaties van de Organisatie voor Economische Samenwerking en
Ontwikkeling (OESO) voor een groot aantal OESO-landen. Op basis van deze
cijfers kunnen we concluderen dat, voor alle OESO-landen behalve de Verenigde
Staten, een verhoging van het minimumloon alleen wenselijk is als een procentpunt
hogere werkloosheid zou leiden tot een toename van het scholingspercentage van
meer dan 0,6 procentpunt. Voor de Verenigde Staten geldt een minimaal vereiste
toename van het scholingspercentage van 0,4 procentpunt.7 Als we ons richten tot
de empirische literatuur die het scholingseffect van werkloosheid meet, vinden we
dat een procentpunt toename van de werkloosheid typisch gepaard gaat met een
toename in het scholingspercentage van tussen de 0,1 en 0,6 procentpunt. Hieruit
concluderen we dat een NIN minimumloonsverlaging wenselijk is voor alle landen
binnen onze analyse – behalve mogelijkerwijs de Verenigde Staten. Een dergelijke
hervorming zorgt voor zowel een toename in belastingopbrengsten, als voor een
hoger welzijn van individuen die als gevolg van het lagere minimumloon een baan
kunnen krijgen. Een verlaging van het minimumloon maakt dus deel uit van een
zogeheten Pareto-verbeterende hervorming, als gevolg waarvan sommigen beter af
zullen zijn en niemand slechter af. Voor landen die geen wettelijk minimumloon
kennen – zoals Duitsland, Oostenrijk, Italie¨, of de Scandinavische landen – is het
onwenselijk om deze alsnog in te voeren.
Optimale belastingen en werkloosheid (hoofdstuk 5)
In het laatste hoofdstuk van mijn proefschrift sta ik stil bij de consequenties van
onvrijwillige werkloosheid voor optimale belastingen. Net als in het voorgaande
hoofdstuk, ga ik er vanuit dat het a priori onbekend is hoe de werkloosheid verdeeld
is over de beroepsbevolking. Ik laat zien dat de tegenwoordigheid van onvrijwillige
werkloosheid leidt tot conclusies omtrent belastingen die volledig haaks staan op
conventionele wijsheden uit de publieke economie, waarbij normaliter uitgegaan
wordt van volledige werkgelegenheid. Ee´n van deze conventionele wijsheden stelt
dat een hogere belastingvoet op inkomen aan de ene kant een hogere mate van
6Merk op dat we hiermee impliciet aannemen dat het directe welzijnsverlies van iemand die
werkloos raakt verwaarloosbaar is. Daarmee schrijven we de conditie voor de wenselijkheid van
een minimumloon dus sterk in het voordeel van een minimumloon.
7Zie kolom 5 in tabel 1 van hoofdstuk 4 voor specifieke waarden voor alle OESO-landen
waarvoor voldoende data beschikbaar is.
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herverdeling mogelijk maakt, maar aan de andere kant leidt tot een verstoring van
arbeidsaanbod. Een hogere belastingvoet leidt immers tot lagere netto lonen en
dus tot minder prikkels om te werken. Het lagere arbeidsaanbod zorgt op zijn
beurt voor een afname in belastinginkomsten, wat een welvaartsverlies vertegen-
woordigt. De optimale belastingvoet staat daarom in het teken van een trade-off :
de herverdelingswaarde van hogere belastingopbrengsten versus de efficie¨ntiekosten
van lager arbeidsaanbod.
Onvrijwillige werkloosheid impliceert echter dat het aanbod van arbeid groter
is dan de vraag naar arbeid. Als daarbij ook nog sprake is van inefficie¨nte ar-
beidsrantsoenering wil dat zeggen dat sommige werklozen meer welzijn van een
baan zouden ontlenen dan sommige werknemers die we´l een baan hebben. In dat
geval leidt een hogere belastingvoet voor iedere individuele werknemer nog altijd
tot een lagere prikkel tot werken, waardoor sommige werknemers besluiten minder
of geen arbeid meer aan te bieden. Maar omdat het aanbod van arbeid toch al
groter was dan de vraag naar arbeid, leidt dit op geaggregeerd niveau niet tot
lagere werkgelegenheid. Dat sommige mensen minder arbeid aanbieden door de
belastingverhoging zorgt juist voor werkgelegenheid voor mensen die aanvankelijk
onvrijwillig werkloos waren. Aangezien arbeidsaanbod op geaggregeerd niveau niet
verandert is er geen sprake meer van een efficie¨ntieverlies door dalende belasting-
opbrengsten. In tegendeel: er is sprake van een efficie¨ntieverbetering als mensen
die weinig welzijn ontlenen aan werk besluiten minder te werken en daarmee werk
cree¨eren voor werklozen die daar meer welzijn aan ontlenen. Eenzelfde conclusie
geldt voor uitkeringen, zoals de bijstandsuitkering. In afwezigheid van onvrijwillige
werkloosheid leiden hogere uitkeringen tot minder arbeidsaanbod en dus tot een
efficie¨ntieverlies. In de tegenwoordigheid van werkloosheid leiden hogere uitkerin-
gen ertoe dat werknemers die weinig welzijn ontlenen aan een baan plaatsmaken
voor werklozen die daar meer welzijn aan ontlenen. In andere woorden, door belas-
tingen en uitkeringen te verhogen substitueert de overheid vrijwillige werkloosheid
voor onvrijwillige werkloosheid, wat resulteert in een efficie¨ntiewinst.
In tegenstelling tot de conventionele trade-off tussen gelijkheid en efficie¨ntie
leidt een belasting- of uitkeringsverhoging dus tot een hogere mate van zowel ge-
lijkheid als efficie¨ntie. De beleidsimplicaties liggen dan ook voor de hand: verhoog
de effectieve belastingvoet binnen arbeidsmarktsegmenten die gekenmerkt worden
door hoge onvrijwillige werkloosheid, en gebruik de extra belastingopbrengsten om
uitkeringen te verhogen. Vanuit een dynamisch perspectief zou de overheid belas-
tingen en uitkeringen moeten verhogen als de economie zich in een recessie met
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hoge werkloosheid bevindt, en weer verlagen bij lage werkloosheid. Deze conclusie
heeft ook consequenties voor overheidsbeleid dat gericht is op het bevorderen van
arbeidsmarktparticipatie. Als de arbeidsmarkt gekenmerkt wordt door onvrijwil-
lige werkloosheid heeft het geen zin om de participatie te bevorderen. Dergelijk
beleid zorgt er alleen voor dat mensen die net zo lief niet werken toetreden tot
de arbeidsmarkt en zodoende om dezelfde banen concurreren met mensen die wel
graag een baan zouden willen hebben.
Verder laat ik zien onder welke voorwaarden deze beleidsimplicaties overeind
blijven bij een endogene scholingsbeslissing. De resultaten zijn vergelijkbaar met
het voorgaande hoofdstuk: als werkloosheid verdeeld is onder laaggeschoolden die
net zo lief hooggeschoold zouden zijn, kan werkloosheid eventueel sociaal nut heb-
ben door scholing te bevorderen. In dat geval zou de overheid eventueel niet alle
onvrijwillige werkloosheid willen vervangen door vrijwillige werkloosheid. Daar-
naast laat ik zien dat de beleidsimplicaties onveranderd blijven als de onvrijwillige
werkloosheid veroorzaakt wordt door vakbonden. Als de overheid zich committeert
aan een hogere belastingvoet wanneer de werkloosheid stijgt, dan zullen vakbonden
minder geneigd zijn tot hogere looneisen omdat ze kunnen anticiperen op hogere
belastingen. Als gevolg leidt een dergelijk beleid tot lagere onvrijwillige werkloos-
heid. Tot slot laat ik zien dat ook de conventionele theorie omtrent de weerslag
van belastingen komt te vervallen bij de tegenwoordigheid van onvrijwillige werk-
loosheid. De conventionele theorie stelt dat het irrelevant is of de arbeidsinkom-
stenbelasting geheven wordt op werknemers of werkgevers. In beide gevallen leidt
de belasting tot een lager netto loon voor de werknemer en hogere loonkosten
voor de werkgever. Ik laat zien dat deze conventionele wijsheid voortkomt uit de
aanname van een flexibele loonvoet, wat niet te rijmen is met onvrijwillige werk-
loosheid. Met onvrijwillige werkloosheid leidt een hogere belasting op werknemers
tot herverdelings- en efficie¨ntiewinsten (zoals hierboven besproken), maar een ho-
gere belasting op werkgevers leidt juist tot een no´g lagere vraag naar arbeid en
daarmee tot een efficie¨ntieverlies door hogere werkloosheid.
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